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INTRODUCTION
PERSISTENT PREJUDICE
“One of the reasons for the power and danger of prejudices lies in the fact that something of the
past is always hidden within them. Upon closer examination, we realize that a genuine prejudice
always conceals some previously formed judgement which originally had its own appropriate and
legitimate experiential basis, and which evolved into a prejudice only because it was dragged through
time without its ever being reexamined or revised.” –Hannah Arendt, “Introduction into Politics”1
The above quote addresses how unexamined prejudice can wreak havoc on politics. Within
the larger context of the essay, “Introduction into Politics,” Hannah Arendt’s comments on prejudice
and the need to examine and adjust one’s beliefs are part of an introduction into the experience of
politics. Similar to Karl Jasper’s Einfuhrung in die Philosophie (Introduction into Philosophy), Arendt’s essay
mirrors her mentor’s book which “led its readers into the experience of communicating philosophic
thought.”2 An introduction into the experience of politics, on the other hand, aims to explore how
humans ought to act politically. Arendt defines politics as a distinct and intentional way of existing
among other humans which is best exemplified by a participatory democracy. But a crucial
hindrance to politics is prejudice; hence, Arendt calls us to critically examine the root of our biases
in order to adjust our future judgements and actions. In turn, her goal is to encourage a robust
involvement in politics which is mindful of prejudice.
This passage from “Introduction into Politics” makes two relevant claims. The first asserts
that past experiences inform present judgements—a claim which can be applied to some of Arendt’s

1 Hannah Arendt, “Introduction into Politics,” in The Promise of Politics, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books,
2005), 101. According to Jerome Kohn, “Introduction into Politics” is the written result of lectures given at the
University of California—Berkeley in 1955.
2

Jerome Kohn, “Introduction,” in The Promise of Politics, viii n. †
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infamous arguments. In order to best understand these prejudiced texts such as “Reflections on
Little Rock,” “A Reply to Critics”—her response to critics of “Reflections on Little Rock”—and
“On Violence,” all of which strongly indicate anti-Black prejudice, it is necessary to follow her own
suggestions. Arendt’s suggestion, which is the second relevant claim in this passage, concerns the
harmful and dangerous nature of unexamined prejudices. In other words, because of the racist
arguments she makes in these texts, it is necessary to examine, as she suggests, and reevaluate her
understanding of politics. In this dissertation I examine political action in particular. This
reevaluation works toward a more productive political realm which has the potential to be more
critical and more inclusive.
The present dissertation examines the roots of prejudice in Arendt’s theory of politics in
order to propose a more inclusive model of political action. As indicated above, Arendt’s arguments
concerning desegregation in the American South in “Reflection on Little Rock” and the Black
Student Movement in “On Violence” perpetuate anti-Black racism—a claim I substantiate in the
conclusion. Keeping in mind Arendt’s later prejudice, I critically examine her theorization of political
action across a variety of her books and essays with the intent to uncover the roots of her bias.
Through this investigation, I argue that there exist two versions of political action in
Arendt’s thought—one which is exclusive because it is ideal in nature and the second which is
nonideal and more inclusive. The first can be found in The Human Condition, the primary source
Arendt scholars turn for her theorization of political action. I argue that Arendt’s theorization of
political action in this text is idealized and utopian in nature. This idealized approach to political
action limits the number and kind of people who can participate as political actors. The result is that

3
3

the primary version, or single story of, political action within Arendt’s corpus is exclusive to
privileged individuals—generally this entails wealthy white men. Yet, I claim that another version of
political action exists in Arendt’s thought even though it is often overlooked and underappreciated.
Earlier texts such as Rahel Varnhagen: Life of a Jewish Woman and a variety of texts from 1930s and
1940s contain valuable examples of political action which are nonideal in nature or inextricably
linked with lived experiences. More specifically, I argue that Rahel, Arendt’s biography of the
German-Jewish intellectual who deeply desired social recognition is a quintessential example of an
early theorization of political action. The biography’s nonideal nature speaks from a particular
standpoint and in turn acknowledges the social and political injustices that impeded Rahel’s attempts
at social acceptance. Additionally, I argue that Arendt’s essays and newspaper articles from the 1930s
and 1940s act as her practicum after her initial theorization of political action in Rahel. The texts
analyzed during this timeframe act as personal examples of political action which Arendt herself
enacted. These enactments are nonideal in nature and recognize the lived experience of oppression
and persecution, and how that can diminish the possibility of political action.
Proposing two versions of political action within Arendt’s thought is valuable for two
reasons. First, it is in response to, and in alignment with Kathryn Sophia Belle’s claim that aspects of
Arendt’s thought perpetuate an anti-Black racism. Her 2014 book, Hannah Arendt and the Negro
Question, forcefully calls for a reevaluation of Arendt’s politics. My ideal and nonideal versions of
political action contribute to Belle’s investigation into Arendt’s anti-Black racism by examining other
areas of Arendt’s politics that potentially contain anti-Black racism and Eurocentrism, namely

3 The subsequent chapter describes at length what I mean by “a single story,” as explained by Nigerian novelist,
Chimamanda Adichie. In short, Adichie claims that “a single story” dominates the narrative around an individual or
group of people. In this sense, “a single story” perpetuates stereotypes and prejudices.
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political action. Through this examination I have developed the two versions which can help readers
and scholars of Arendt better understand her prejudices.
The second reason for proposing two versions of Arendtian political action concerns my
methodology. As the subsequent chapter elaborates, I am interested in developing an account of
Arendtian political action that is reflective of diversity and inclusivity. In this sense, I propose the
two versions of political action to create what I call a multi-dimensional account of the concept.
Unlike a blueprint, which is two-dimensional, my multi-dimensional account of political action
includes both the ideal and nonideal versions of the concept, as well as a plethora of perspectives
from scholars of color on political action and its impediments. By including a diverse collection of
perspectives, largely from scholars of Critical Philosophy of Race, I intend to promote a more
inclusive account of Arendtian political action that does not ignore her racist prejudices.
These two versions of political action ought not exist separately. Instead, I propose that
readers, teachers, and scholars of Arendt hold in tension the ideal and exclusive version alongside of
the nonideal and inclusive version. I do not intend to propose a reading of Arendt that overlooks
her racist arguments and prejudices in order to promote a less problematic version of political
action.
In order to propose a multi-dimensional account of political action I begin by outlining my
methodology in Chapter 1. This chapter describes the intentionally antiracist approach to this
dissertation—an approach aimed at developing a multi-dimensional account of political action that
recognizes Arendt’s racism. Antiracist research in the social sciences, Critical Philosophy of Race,
Black Feminist Standpoint Theory, and Standpoint Theory inform my method. Additionally, in this
chapter I propose what I call “genuine inclusivity” or a specific reading of Arendt and Arendt
scholarship which is mindful of racism.

5
After establishing my methodology, I turn to The Human Condition in Chapter 2. This text is
the primary location where Arendt theorizes political action. Yet, as I have indicated above, I argue
that her theorization of the concept in this text is ideal, as in utopian. The ideal nature of her
explanation of and argument for political action excludes a multitude of individuals and groups.
Such exclusion undermines Arendt’s own project in this text which is to encourage more political
action. While the idea of political action is not often considered problematic in Arendt’s thought, I
argue that its exclusive nature diminishes the possibilities for political action.
The exclusive nature of political action in The Human Condition is clearly a problem. As such,
I turn in Chapter 2 to Arendt’s second dissertation, Rahel Varnhagen: Life of a Jewish Woman. In this
chapter I argue that Arendt’s biography of Rahel promotes a nonideal version of political action that
ought to be considered alongside the version found in The Human Condition. In writing from a
nonideal perspective, Arendt provides an account of the concept that is aware of, and attentive to,
race, privilege, and epistemic injustices. This early theorization of political action can help to mediate
the exclusive nature of political action found in The Human Condition. As a result, these two versions
can better realize Arendt’s goal of increased political action.
In addition to the nonideal version of political action in Rahel, I also turn to the nonideal
examples of political action that can be found in a variety of texts Arendt wrote in the 1930s and
1940s. These underappreciated texts continue to add to my multi-dimensional reading of political
action, particularly because they contain examples of Arendt enacting political action herself. In this
sense, I understand Arendt’s exemplification of political action as her experimentation of her early
theory found in Rahel. While these examples help to further develop a more robust account of the
concept, I argue in this chapter that Arendt’s Eurocentrism begins to impede her initially inclusive
account of political action.

6
Finally, I conclude briefly by turning to the clearly racist texts mentioned above—
“Reflections on Little Rock” and “On Violence”—to demonstrate how Arendt’s exclusive version
of political action is dangerous. In “Reflections on Little Rock,” Arendt does not consider school
desegregation to be a political issue—a view that limits the possibilities of political action for Black
Americans. “On Violence” argues that the Black Student Movement of the 1960s is also not
political; however, she lauds concurrent white student activism on college campuses as political
action. While these two texts are instructive in their own right, within the context of my two
versions of political action, it is clear that minoritized individuals are often barred from political
action. Put differently, the version of political action applied to desegregation and the Black Student
Movement is ideal and clearly exclusive and this is the version I trace back to The Human Condition.
Instead of solely relying on this version, by examining these two texts, I argue that we must
recognize the multi-dimensional account of political action in order to hold in tension the racist and
Eurocentric nature of the concept alongside the nonideal and more inclusive version.
Before moving on to my methodology in the following chapter, allow me a brief but
significant rhetorical question. Why should readers, teachers, and scholars of Arendt recognize the
racist and exclusive prejudices in Arendt’s theory of political action? I have two reasons—the first of
which is relevant to Arendt’s corpus while the second concerns current political sentiments. As I
have indicated above, relying solely on Arendt’s theorization of political action in The Human
Condition undermines her arguments for the expansion of political action. She believes political
action has been in decline since late antiquity and that the most salient way to combat totalitarianism
is through political action. Given her earnest desire to prevent further totalitarian regimes from
gaining power as Nazi Germany did, she ardently argues for a renewed interest in political action.

7
Yet, the ideal nature of political action in The Human Condition restricts the number and kind of
people who can participate. Put differently, this version undermines Arendt’s own project.
Additionally, there has been a rise in Arendt’s popularity since Donald Trump’s 2016
presidential election. Academic texts in addition to public philosophy and quotidian news sources
have taken up Arendt to understand the rise in popularity of authoritarian figures like Donald
Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, and Narendra Modi.4 While a number of these sources are mainly interested
in The Origins of Totalitarianism, many rely on Arendt’s politics to respond to the terrors of
totalitarianism she outlines in Origins. Relying solely on Origins or The Human Condition to understand
and apply Arendt’s theory of political action as a countermeasure to the threat of totalitarianism
results in the diminished version of political action I outline in Chapter 2. In order to best
counteract totalitarianism, a more inclusive and multi-dimensional version of political action is
necessary so that more people can become Arendtian political actors. An increase in political actors
results in a more diverse and representative participatory politics. Given Arendt’s increased
popularity, it is even more important to acknowledge both versions of political action in Arendt’s
thought, so that new readers do not enact and promote her problematic and exclusive version of
political action found in The Human Condition.

Richard J. Bernstein’s 2018 Why Read Arendt Now? (Cambridge, Polity Press) is an excellent example of a recent call to
embrace Arendt’s useful assessment of totalitarianism and authoritarianism, in addition to her thoughts on politics. On
July 2, 2020, The Atlantic published “11 Books We’re Reading this Summer” by Caroline Mimbs Nyce. The second book
listed was Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism. According to Roger Berkowitz, the director of the Hannah
Arendt Center at Bard College, there was a 16-fold increase in the sales of The Origins of Totalitarianism within the first
four months of the 2016 presidential election. See Roger Berkowitz, “Why Arendt Matters: Revisiting The Origins of
Totalitarianism,” Los Angeles Review of Books, March 18, 2017, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/arendt-mattersrevisiting-origins-totalitarianism/#!. For an example of Arendt’s approach to participatory politics, see Jason Frederick
Lambacher, “Selling the Green New Deal With Optimism, Not Fear,” The New Republic, April 18, 2019,
https://newrepublic.com/article/153495/selling-green-new-deal-optimism-not-fear. For a more recent example of
Arendt being taken up to understand lying in politics and the danger to democracy found in the January 6, 2021 Capitol
riots see Timothy Snyder, “The American Abyss,” The New York Times Magazine, January 9, 2021,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/magazine/trump-coup.html. Finally, for an example of a common article after
Trump’s election, see Zoe Williams, “Totalitarianism in the Age of Trump: Lessons from Hannah Arendt,” The Guardian,
February 1, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/01/totalitarianism-in-age-donald-trump-lessonsfrom-hannah-arendt-protests.
4

CHAPTER ONE
MOTIVATIONS AND METHODOLOGY
“So that is how to create a single story, show a people as one thing, as only one thing, over and over
again, and that is what they become.” -Chimamanda Ngzoi Adichie1
Kathryn Sophia Belle’s Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question is a widely influential, canonical
text in Arendt studies. It is also highly controversial. The first section of this chapter aims to outline
how Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question influences and motivates this dissertation, how this
dissertation differentiates itself from Belle, and how this dissertation advances the scholarship at the
intersection of philosophy of race and Arendt studies after, and largely because of, Belle. In short,
this dissertation is a continuation of Belle’s critical investigation into Arendt’s Eurocentrism and
anti-Black racism. Such an investigation is first and foremost indebted to Belle for her forcefully
insightful and persuasive elucidations of the harmful distinctions Arendt made between the private,
public, and social spheres of existence.2 Like all philosophical investigations, there are limits to what
one can accomplish in a single book. What I aim to propose here is not a critique of Belle’s
limitations in Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question, nor do I intend to frame this dissertation as an

1 Chimamanda Ngzoi Adichie, “The Danger of a Single Story,” filmed July 2009, TED video, 18:33,
https://www.ted.com/talks/chimamanda_ngozi_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_story?language=en.

In The Human Condition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998), Arendt designates the active life, or the vita activa, as
consisting of three realms of existence: private, public, and social. At times Arendt indicates the social is a realm of its
own; however, at other times she indicates the social is the result of private and public activities blending into one
another. The public realm is often considered synonymous with politics or the political realm. These three realms,
according to Arendt, ought to be kept separate. Her main concern at the outset of The Human Condition is that politics is
relegated to thought (theoria) when it ought to be practical or an active pursuit (praxis). Additionally, Arendt is concerned
that mass society’s concern with conforming behavior will replace action in the political realm. These two arguments, for
Arendt, lead her to claim that the three realms ought to be kept separate in order to privilege and protect politics.
2

8
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addendum to what Belle might have overlooked. Instead, my engagement with Belle is intentionally
collaborative.3 I view Belle’s work as a successfully run marathon—one of many in a marathon relay.
With the publication of Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question, Belle has crossed the finish line and it is
time for others to carry the relay baton.
After establishing the motivation behind this dissertation, the second half of this chapter
explains the methodology guiding the project. I have intentionally chosen to incorporate the
philosophies of other women, women of color, and people of color in this project. While I do not
exclusively rely on historically minoritized philosophers, I do privilege their scholarship in
accordance with feminist standpoint theory and what I argue is an antiracist research methodology.4
Feminist standpoint theory asserts that minoritized or oppressed individuals can, by virtue of their
lived experiences, offer valuable insights that individuals from more privileged groups are insensitive
to or ignorant of. As a methodology, feminist standpoint theory is committed to including
minoritized perspectives in order to confront and work against the historically predominant, white

Janice Moulton in “A Paradigm of Philosophy: The Adversary Method,” in Discovering Reality, eds. Sandra Harding and
Merrill B. P. Hintikka, (Dordrecht: Springer, 1983), argues against the mainstream method in philosophy—adversarial
criticism. She claims that “the philosophic enterprise is seen as an unimpassioned debate between adversaries who try to
defend their own views against counterexamples and produce counterexamples to opposing views” and that “it is
assumed that the only, or at any rate, the best, way of evaluating work in philosophy is to subject it to the strongest or
most extreme opposition.” (9) In an attempt to work against the adversary model, I instead embrace a more
collaborative model which better reflects antiracist theory and standpoint theory. Intentional collaboration is meant to
actively embrace and engage with philosophies and philosophers from historically minoritized arenas. The adversarial
paradigm, on the other hand, strikes me as opportunistic by incentivizing dissent and argumentation which runs the risk
of diminishing the philosophic value of already minoritized voices.
3

For more on standpoint theory see Patricia Hill Collins, “Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological
Significance of Black Feminist Thought,” Social Problems 33, no. 6 (1986) and “The Social Construction of Black Feminist
Thought,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 14, no. 4 (1989); Sandra Harding, The Standpoint Theory Reader (New
York: Routledge, 2004); and bell hooks, “Choosing the Margin as a Space of Radical Openness,” in The Feminist
Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies, ed. Sandra Harding (New York: Routledge, 2004). For more
on antiracist research methods sees Charles Mills, “Critical Philosophy of Race,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical
Methodology, eds. Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabo Gendler, and John Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2016); Kristie Dotson, “Concrete Flowers,” Hypatia 26, no. 2 (2011) and “Radical Love: Black Philosophy as Deliberate
Acts of Inheritance,” The Black Scholar 43, no. 4 (2013); and George Dei and Gurpreet Singh Johal’s edited collection,
Critical Issues in Anti-Racist Research Methodologies, in Counterpoints 252 (2005).
4
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and male, social location from which philosophical knowledge is often developed, disseminated and
perpetuated.
Motivation
Arendt’s public-private-social division has been the subject of debate and criticism since the
publication of The Human Condition; and, Belle’s analysis of the racial discrimination inherent in the
division persuasively adds to the existing literature.5 Yet, in addition to Belle’s forceful argument
about the division of the vita activa, her major contribution to the field of Arendt studies is a
renewed, scrupulous investigation—through the lens of the philosophy of race—into the conceptual
framework of Arendt’s thought. In other words, I believe Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question opens
up the possibility to assess other areas of Arendt’s thought through the lens of race and theories of
race-based discrimination.
Belle approaches Arendt’s thought in a way that both appreciates the contributions she has
made as one of “the most insightful and influential intellectuals of the second half of the twentieth
century,” while not “ignoring or bracketing her problematic assertions, assumptions, and oversights
regarding the Negro question.”6 Belle is persuasive in arguing that Arendt’s problematic arguments
and essays, specifically “Reflections on Little Rock,” ought not be considered misrepresentative of
her thought—fringe ideas that are not reflected in her other, more popular works such as The Human
Condition or The Origins of Totalitarianism. Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question demonstrate that
Arendt’s anti-Black and Eurocentric sentiments influence the private-public-social divide in The

5 A prominent argument concerning the need for a strict division can be found in Hanna Pitkin’s The Attack of the Blob:
Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998) where she argues that Arendt’s claim
that the political realm is shrinking as a result of the social realm is problematic and counterintuitive. See also n20 for
continued debate concerning the feminist implications of a strict division of the vita activa.
6 Kathryn Sophia Belle, Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), xi. Belle
wrote this book under the name Kathryn T. Gines.
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Human Condition. In this sense, Arendt’s distinctions of the vita activa are fundamentally skewed by
her own perceptions of others, particularly non-central European and non-white Americans.
The move away from classifying Arendt’s problematic texts—“Reflections on Little Rock,”
On Violence, Civil Disobedience, and On Revolution—as outliers and toward recognizing them as
reflective of or consistent with her thought elsewhere is influential for this dissertation. I claim this is
a valuable approach which aims to better understand not only the problematic aspects of
philosophical thought and thinkers, but also the argumentative moves scholars make to excuse those
problems. Put differently, this approach aims to work against what is called “recentering
whiteness”—the habit of privileging white knowledge, perceptions, or traditions over and against
others—by making explicit the sustained attempt to dismiss or ignore Arendt’s racist arguments.7
Belle describes Arendt’s own recentering of whiteness as a “source of entitlement and a position
from which one can raise objections—all the while erasing whiteness as a source of the very
problem in question.”8 Belle has in mind Arendt’s correspondence with James Baldwin after the
publication of his essay, “Letter form a Region in My Mind,” as well as her correspondence with
Ralph Ellison after the publication of “Reflections on Little Rock.” In both instances, Arendt
privileges her own theories and arguments over and against those of Baldwin and Ellison. As I will

The idea of “re-centering whiteness” is notably explained by Shannon Sullivan’s Good White People: : The Problem with
Middle-Class White Anti-Racism (Albany: State University of New York, 2014) and George Yancy’s Look a White!:
Philosophical Essays on Whiteness, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2012). Sullivan describes the act of re-centering
whiteness within the context of “good white liberals” distinguishing themselves from white supremacists. It is a form of
posturing that signals one is “good” and not racist; however, such posturing does not work toward any tangible antiracist goal. Instead, it merely reasserts their privileged existence over and against other whites. Yancy, on the other hand,
explains this idea within the framework of narcissism. In Chapter 6 of Look a White! Yancy argues that white responses
to racism often deny the experience of the other person in question and instead obsessively insist on their virtuous
character (157). Above, I refer to the desire to assert Arendt as offering a sophisticated and illuminating account of
political action as an example of re-centering whiteness because it too easily overlooks her Eurocentrism and anti-Black
racism. If we only read her as a valuable thinker in her early Jewish writings because she’s not being overtly racist like in
“On Violence” or “Reflections on Little Rock” we end up insisting that she’s really a good person and disregarding how
her racist beliefs affect her political thought.
7

8

Belle, 5.
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demonstrate shortly, an objection to Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question recenters whiteness by
distracting from how race and privilege affect Arendt’s thought.
As mentioned above, Belle is primarily concerned with the conceptual framework of the vita
activa in The Human Condition. This means that she focuses on Arendt’s insistence of a private-publicsocial divide. For the purposes of her arguments, Belle examines how this division affects Arendt’s
more problematic texts. While Belle addresses the Arendtian theory of politics as it exists in the
public realm, she does not extensively address Arendt’s theory of political action as the activity par
excellence of that realm. And this is for good reason—an examination of political action, an already
contested concept in Arendt’s thought, would be the work of another project. The current
dissertation takes up that exact project.
In Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question, Belle asserts four main arguments about the
relationship between Arendt’s conceptual framework and her misunderstanding of Black American
life. Only the first three arguments are relevant to this dissertation, so I will not discuss the fourth
and final argument, which concerns Arendt’s theory of judgement. The first, however, claims that
Arendt’s understanding of the “Negro question”—an intentionally broad category concerning issues
such as segregation, discrimination, or race-based power dynamics—is that the “question” is not a
question, but a problem. More specifically, Arendt sees “the Negro question as a Negro problem
rather than a white problem.”9 My interpretation of Belle’s claims is that Arendt is ignorant of the
active role white folks play in the Negro question, for example by legalizing segregation, by
normalizing discrimination, and by oppressing Black Americans. Belle’s claim infers that Arendt only
recognizes the effect of these examples—that Black Americans are segregated, discriminated against,
and oppressed—thereby making the problem their own, not the resultant product of white

9

Belle, 2.
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legislation, policy, or habit. For the purposes of this dissertation, this initial argument aligns with my
own claims concerning Arendt’s Eurocentrism which I argue inhibits her ability to comprehend
beyond her social and cultural horizon. Additionally, I accept this argument of Belle’s as valid and
persuasive. As such, the claim that Arendt is ignorant of the white role in the Negro question acts as
a premise in my larger argument. By accepting the claim that Arendt is ignorant of the effects of
white domination and power on the Negro question, I am able to apply the claim to my narrowed
focus—political action. In other words, Belle’s initial argument concerning the “white problem”
affects the Arendtian concept of political action, in addition to the public-private-social framework.
Belle’s second argument claims that Arendt’s analysis of the “Jewish question” does not
transfer, as one would hope, to her understanding of the “Negro question.” Similar to the Negro
question, the Jewish question is an amorphous category of social, religious, and political concerns
and deliberations.10 Belle is right to express dismay at the lost opportunity—Arendt’s own
experience as a persecuted Jew, a refugee, and an immigrant could have better informed her
assessment of American politics but she did not see it this way. I want to add to Belle’s second
argument by claiming that Arendt’s experiences as a Jew and her writings as a political thinker can
help us delineate where Arendt fell short so that white academics can avoid her mistakes, particularly
within the context of political action which I argue concerns the issue of speaking for others,
epistemic hubris, and willful ignorance. Put differently, I aim to narrow my focus on political action
in Arendt’s Jewish writings. More specifically, as Chapter 4 will argue, I claim that it is Arendt’s early
texts from the 1930s and 1940s that act as a practicum for Arendt. While she had early theories
10 For more on the Jewish question in Arendt’s thought see Richard Bernstein’s Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question
(1996) and Steven Aschheim’s edited collection Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem (2001). For more on the Jewish question in
the larger European context see Robert Fine and Philip Spencer’s Antisemitism and the Left: On the Return of the Jewish
Question (2017), Elisabeth Roudinesco’s Revisiting the Jewish Question (2013), Paul Lawrence Rose’s German Question/Jewish
Question: Revolutionary Antisemitism in Germany from Kant to Wagner (1990), Jay Geller’s The Other Jewish Question: Identifying the
Jew and Making Sense of Modernity (2011), Alex Bein’s The Jewish Question: Biography of a World Problem (1990), and Sarah
Gordon’s Hitler, Germans, and the “Jewish Question” (1984).
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about political action at the time, she more importantly enacted them in the 1930s and 1940s in a
Jewish context—writing for Aufbau and organizing for Youth Aliyah, for example. It is her direct
involvement with Jewish movements and issues that provided her keen insight into the Jewish
question. Because she was actively removed from the Civil Rights Movement, Black experiences in
the American South, and Black students she did not have a comparable perspective by which she
could assess, even humbly, the Negro question.
The third argument Belle makes in Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question, which spans the
entire book, concerns the divide between the private, public, and social realms. She claims that this
division has racist implications and therefore undermines her ability to understand the Negro
question. In so doing, she reads “Reflections on Little Rock” and The Human Condition as
interconnected. This argument interprets how Arendt’s strict division of the public or political,
social, and private realms of life affects her ability to adequately comprehend the political concerns,
activist agenda, and demands of Black Americans in the latter half of the 20th century. The categories
are unreflective of reality because they only narrowly perceive her Eurocentric horizon and therefore
allow for discrimination in the social realm. As Belle notes, according to Arendt, “The social realm is
a space where discrimination should be expected and permitted.”11 While she explains that Arendt
permitted discrimination in the social realm, she also acknowledges that Arendt believes it ought not
be considered a political matter, or part of the public realm. Discrimination was a fact of existence,
according to Arendt, but it should not be legalized. Instead, it ought to be allowed within the
context of social matters such as which hotel to vacation at or which school to send one’s children.
Belle cites Arendt in “Reflections on Little Rock” as stating, “There cannot be a ‘right to go into any
hotel or recreation area or place of amusement’ because many of these are in the realm of the purely
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social where the right to free association, and therefore discrimination, has greater validity than the
principle of equality.”12 According to Belle, Arendt’s insistence on the private-public-social division
is harmful to Black Americans because “The political, private, and social realms are not as clear-cut
as her paradigm suggests” because “Social and political inequalities are interconnected and reinforce
one another.”13 Their interconnection is best exemplified by desegregation. While Arendt only
conceived of desegregation as a social concern, it was inextricably tied up with political concerns
surrounding Jim Crow laws. Desegregation is not purely a social or political concern, but an issue
that exists at the intersection of social interactions and political arguments for equal access to
education.14
While Belle does address the implications the private-public-social divide has on political
action, I argue that there is more to uncover that moves beyond the division theorized in The Human
Condition. She notes that “Arendt’s exclusionary account of the public realm is inadequate because
the public-private divide limits political action for those persons who are confined to the private
realm.”15 In other words, caretakers, domestic workers, undocumented and unprotected immigrants,
and children—all groups that remain in the private realm of the home—do not have the same access
to politics that more privileged groups do. I take this assessment of Arendt’s private-public divide as
a foundational claim in this dissertation. With this claim established, I am able to further investigate
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Belle, 44. The quote from “Reflections on Little Rock” occurs on page 52.
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14 As the concluding chapter will address, desegregation and access to mainstream, white America is not universally
desired or viewed as wholly positive. See bell hooks’ explanation of the harms desegregation enacted on her safe
educational environment when her school district was forced to desegregate in the introduction to Teaching to Transgress
(1994). For more detailed analysis of the same by hooks see also Teaching Community: A Pedagogy of Hope (2003),
particularly Chapters 5, “What Happens When White People Change” and 6 “Standards.”
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how political action operates, not only in The Human Condition, but also in other, less read, texts of
Arendt’s such as Rahel Varnhagen: Life of a Jewish Woman and her early texts from the 1930s and
1940s. In this sense, I advance this third argument of Belle’s by claiming that Arendt’s theory of
political action, in addition to the private-public-social divide, also undermines her ability to
understand the myriad experiences of Black Americans.
Contributions to the Literature
In summary, it is Kathryn Sophia Belle’s 2014 book, Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question,
which is the main motivation behind this dissertation. Her work in this text is germinal because it
has provided fertile material to further advance scholarship at the intersection of philosophy of race
and Arendt studies. Albeit controversial, Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question is canonical. Anyone
working on Arendt and race is remiss to overlook Belle’s impact in the field. In what follows I
provide a brief commentary on an important review of Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question as a
means to contextualize my methodology. I then end this section with a review of the relevant
Arendt scholarship preceding Belle’s book.
Belle’s book is contentious. Reviews, particularly the Arendt Center’s Roger Berkowitz’s, and
ensuing scholarship are adversarial.16 Before turning to this review, I find it necessary to first
summarize Arendt’s interaction with James Baldwin. In the fall of 1962, after the publication of
Baldwin’s “Letter from a Region in My Mind” in The New Yorker, Arendt wrote a letter both
congratulating Baldwin and informing him of her authority to critique his arguments. Baldwin’s
essay addressed love in the political realm, and Arendt saw fit to tell Baldwin love has no place in

See also David Munson’s review (Quarterly Journal of Speech 103, 2017) which faults Belle for focusing too intensely on
race in her investigation into Arendt’s private-public-social divide. Not all reviews of Hannah Arendt and the Negro
Question, however, are adversarial in nature. See Grace Hunt’s review in Hypatia Reviews Online (2015) and Howard A.
Doughty’s College Quarterly 20, no. 2, 2017, review.
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that realm—it must stay in the private realm. As Belle recounts their correspondence in Hannah
Arendt and the Negro Question, she notes that Arendt telling Baldwin that she is “‘entitled to raise
objections’” “neglects to engage Baldwin on his own terms. Far from articulating exactly how
Baldwin’s article has helped her to understand the Negro question differently, Arendt largely ignores
the terms of the question as outlined in the very article to which she is objecting.”17 In other words,
Arendt fails to engage with Baldwin’s own argument, context, or lived experience and instead inserts
her conceptual framework—the divisions of the private, public, and social realms—effectively
ignoring Baldwin’s argument. I claim that Berkowitz’s review of Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question
replicates Arendt’s mistake with Baldwin.
In his review, Roger Berkowitz, the director of Bard’s Arendt Center, begins by conceding
that it is not difficult to find racial discrimination at play in Arendt’s thought, yet he quickly asserts
her contributions to the philosophical and political scholarship concerning totalitarianism,
antisemitism, and civil rights worries concerning anti-miscegenation laws. This quick redirection is
the first step in ignoring Belle on her terms. Belle does not deny Arendt’s contributions in other
fields but instead is interested in deeply engaging with Arendt’s conceptual framework in The Human
Condition and its implications for her problematic assessment of Black Americans. The second, and
more important step, is his explicit denial of how Belle engaged Arendt’s thought on race. He writes,
“To do justice to Arendt’s thinking on questions of race requires moving beyond accusatory citation.
What is required is an exploration of how Arendt contributes to our understanding of race within
the modern contexts of totalitarianism, de-politicization, and assimilation.”18 While immediately
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18 Roger Berkowitz, review of Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question by Kathryn Sophia Belle, Political Theory 46 no. 5
(2018): 816.
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preceding this he notes that that is what Belle “sets out to do,” his review ultimately claims that she
does not accomplish this. Yet, I am not convinced that exploring “race within the modern contexts
of totalitarianism, de-politicization, and assimilation” is actually Belle’s goal. Instead, this is
Berkowitz imposing his own terms of what he thinks constitutes a valuable and valid investigation
into Arendt’s ideas on race.
Additionally, Berkowitz goes on to assert that Belle’s claims to “discredit Arendt’s arguments
by accusing her of being racist and serve as cover for Gines’s refusal to engage the substance of
Arendt’s argument.”19 In essence, Berkowitz is claiming that Belle’s book does not “do justice” to
Arendt’s thought on race because she is merely accusing Arendt of anti-Black racism. While Belle’s
book does do more than merely, repetitiously lambast Arendt as racist, I claim that it is necessary to
first and foremost recognize and bear witness to the harmful racism which influenced Arendt’s
thought. Belle does this and she also goes on to substantiate her claims concerning the wide-reaching
influence of anti-Black racism on Arendt’s thought. Berkowitz is unable to see Belle’s substantiation
for what it is because he frames an investigation into Arendt on race differently. In establishing the
criteria for what constitutes a valid or satisfactory investigation into Arendt’s race-based thinking,
Berkowitz fails to engage with Belle on her own terms and, in turn, repeats Arendt’s mistake with
Baldwin.
Additionally, Berkowitz’s review is a recentering of whiteness—an attempt to recognize but
distract from Arendt’s problematic claims.20 While there are positive reviews of Hannah Arendt and

19 Berkowitz, 817. Kathryn Sophia Belle published Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question under the name Kathryn T.
Gines.

In Look a White! George Yancy advocates for white folks to “tarry” with their racism and racist world. I claim the same
ought to happen in light of Berkowitz’s review. By recognizing Arendt’s racism but quickly moving to account for her
more positive or generative contributions, the seriousness of racism’s pervasiveness is dampened. We ought to sit with
the discomfort of researching racist philosophers and not be too hasty to overlook or distract from their problematic
theories or arguments.
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the Negro Question that counteract Berkowitz’s assessment, as Director of the Arendt Center he is
widely influential. His refrain, that Belle merely repeats the claim that Arendt is racist, is a strawman
argument. This dissertation, in order to intentionally avoid oversimplifying Belle’s arguments, aims
to pursue an antiracist approach to investigating the role of race and racism in Arendt’s theory of
political action. Before addressing how I intend to accomplish this, a brief survey of the appropriate
literature preceding Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question is necessary.
There exists a rich scholarship of critical responses to Hannah Arendt’s work. Within
feminism, Arendt has often been a source of intrigue and debate, particularly concerning her
distinction of the private, public, and social realms of existence and her relative silence on the
woman question.21 While this vein of critique is well-established, criticisms of Arendt’s Eurocentrism
and anti-Black racism have more recently emerged in the last three decades. Shiraz Dossa’s The Public
Realm and the Public Self: The Political Theory of Hannah Arendt, offers a natural starting point for what I
claim is a nonideal vein of critique of Arendt’s private-public-social spheres of existence. Dossa
focuses on Arendt’s hyper-fixation on the public realm as the sole location of politics and the
resultant limitations of such an uncompromising claim. While there is overlap with feminist
philosophers, this strain of criticism is less concerned with Arendt’s silence on women and more
with the implications of her Eurocentrism. Notably, David Scott and Richard King also address
Arendt’s Eurocentrism within the context of the Haitian Revolution and her meta-awareness, yet
ultimate acceptance of the confines of Eurocentrism, respectively. And then there is the work of

21 For arguments which interpret Arendt as ignoring the “woman question” see Adrienne Rich, “Conditions for Work:
The Common World of Women,” in On Lies, Secrets, and Silence: Selected Prose, 1966-1978 (New York: Norton, 1979); and
Deborah Hertz, “Hannah Arendt’s Rahel Varnhagen,” in German Women in the Nineteenth Century: A Social History, ed. J.C.
Fout (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1984). Many have sought to defend Arendt against anti-feminist claims. See Bonnie
Honig’s edited collection, Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1995); Mary G. Dietz, Turning Operations: Feminism, Arendt, Politics (New York: Routledge, 2002); and Lisa Disch,
Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Pres, 1994).

20
Robert Bernasconi and Kathryn Sophia Belle who move beyond claims of Eurocentrism to more
precisely address Arendt’s anti-Black racism. While Arendt is often thought of as a controversial
figure, mostly for her assessment of Adolf Eichmann and his trial, her work on the realm of politics
has certainly garnered unsavory attention.
One immediate reaction to this assessment of recent scholarship on Arendt is to ask what
sets her apart from any other philosopher with problematic presumptions and arguments. For the
purposes of this dissertation, the answer is, most likely nothing. It is unimportant to merely
categorize Arendt as racist, outdated, or insensitive to other cultures, ethnicities, or races. I am
uninterested in dismissing Arendt out of hand for her harmful missteps; and to be clear, the same
can be said of this vein of scholarship. Instead, the aim of this dissertation is to do exactly what
Arendt herself claims to be doing—"to think what we are doing”22—with the added benefit of
hindsight and the intellectual tradition of nonideal critiques of Arendt. Put differently, I aim to
advance the scholarship following Kathryn Sophia Belle’s book which forcefully argues for a new
understanding of Arendtian politics given her anti-Black racism.
In summary, it is Kathryn Sophia Belle’s 2014 book, Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question,
which is the main motivation behind this dissertation. Her work in this text is germinal because it
advances scholarship at the intersection of philosophy of race and Arendt studies. Albeit
controversial, Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question is canonical. Anyone working on Arendt and race
ought not overlook Belle’s impact on the field.
Methodology
In this section I outline my antiracist research methodology which relies on scholarship from
the social sciences, critical philosophy of race, and Black Feminist Standpoint Theory. Research in
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the field of continental philosophy does not have a prescribed or customary research methodology
to counteract racist and white supremacist thought which, I claim, results in the continued
dominance of male and white scholarship.23 However, there are other fields of study from which I
glean anti-racist methodological approaches and concerns. I briefly explain some social science
approaches to antiracist methodologies, critical philosophy of race’s methodologies and its influence
on continental philosophy, and end with Black Feminist Standpoint Theory—all of which inform
my approach to Arendtian political action.
In the social sciences, there are ongoing debates concerning antiracist research
methodologies.24 George Dei, Professor of Social Justice Education at University of Toronto, in his
introduction to Critical Issues in Anti-Racist Research Methodologies argues that all research, regardless of
the field of study, must critically analyze the implication of race on knowledge production. He
writes,
Every researcher must acknowledge the crucial impact of race identity and social difference.
Our subjective identities and political locations inform how we produce knowledge and
come to interpret the world. Along with this important knowledge, antiracist research must
acknowledge the inherent asymmetrical power relations that are structured along lines of
difference.25
While conversations concerning antiracist pedagogy have become more common in the United
States since the summer of 2020 when police brutality and police-killings prompted nationwide
protests and influenced similar movements abroad, there is still more that can be done to develop
antiracist research methods in philosophy. As Dei suggests, a starting point is recognition of one’s

23 By white supremacist, I do not mean membership in a specific hate group. Rather, I mean the institution of white
dominance which privileges white knowledge, power, and existence over and against minoritized knowledge, power, and
existence.
24 See George Dei and Gurpreet Singh Johal’s edited collection, Critical Issues in Anti-Racist Research Methodologies, in
Counterpoints 252, 2005.
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social and political location and the related power dynamics. White philosophers have dominated the
field and in turn so have white ideals and theories. Intentionally engaging in an antiracist research
entails a recurring awareness of the prevalence of white scholarship and its effects on the philosophy
of minoritized individuals—a silencing, dismissal, or disapproval of their scholarship and place in
the field.26 The antiracist research methodology practiced in this dissertation privileges minoritized
philosophy and philosophers.27 This manifests in two distinct ways—working within the framework
of feminist standpoint theory and collaboratively, as opposed to adversarially, engaging with Kathryn
Sophia Belle’s arguments in Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question.
Scholarship in critical philosophy of race also provides helpful methodological
considerations, particularly when applied to history of philosophy and continental philosophy.
Investigating a philosophical figure’s, such as Hannah Arendt’s, anti-Black racism is a contentious
endeavor. While Arendt’s misguided perspectives on segregation are well known, she is also lauded
for her work on racialized thinking and race-based hate in The Origins of Totalitarianism. In Charles
Mills’s chapter, “Critical Philosophy of Race,” he refers to Arendt as one of three “important
twentieth-century figures for anti-racist theorization” alongside Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel
Foucault.28 Yet, for the purposes of this dissertation, this assessment of her valuable insights must be

26 Kristie Dotson in “Concrete Flowers,” Hypatia 26, no 2 (2011) makes a similar argument. She claims that “academic
philosophy is structured in such a way that established trends in philosophical thought delimit what questions can be
addressed, and this is reinforced by the dominant conception of philosophy as critique; this effectively marginalizes
problems and/or concerns of diverse people that do not fit comfortably within an already set disciplinary agenda.” (407)
See also, Dotson’s “Radical Love: Black Philosophy as Deliberate Acts of Inheritance,” The Black Scholar 43, no. 4 (2013),
where she argues for the existence and perseverance of Black philosophy. Black philosophy, she argues, is often silenced,
questioned, and disregarded as philosophy—a result of predominantly white institutional powers which aim to define
philosophy through its white, Western variant.

Following Dei, this approach embraces antiracist research methods by “giving saliency and centrality to minoritized
peoples’ perspectives on the issue of race, social justice, and oppression.” (13)
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28 Charles Mills, “Critical Philosophy of Race,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, eds. Herman Cappelen,
Tamar Szabo Gendler, and John Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 717.

23
held in tension with her problematic arguments. As such, I aim to follow Mills’s characterization of a
critical philosophy of race methodology as applied to the study of the history of philosophy. He
claims that this method attempts “to track the origination and development of race and racism as
concepts and framing presuppositions in the work of Western philosophers, and to excavate the
ways in which such assumptions might have shaped their thought.”29 For Arendt, this means
examining any changes in her conception of race and how race functions. More specifically, I aim to
examine how Arendt’s theory of political action changes when she is operating at the ideal and
nonideal levels, and how that affects her thought concerning race and racism.
There is also a wealth of scholarship working on the future of Continental Philosophy, much
of which argues for Critical Philosophy of Race’s influence in shaping the future of the field.30
Unsurprisingly, Kathryn Sophia Belle has written a handful of articles addressing the need for critical
philosophy of race investigations into continental philosophy. In “Reflections on the Legacy and
Future of the Continental Tradition with regard to the Critical Philosophy of Race,” she argues for a
pluralistic approach to philosophy which welcomes minoritized and marginalized thought—most of
which is often not considered “philosophy.” The field of Continental philosophy has a history of
not being considered philosophy, a charge shared with Critical Philosophy of Race which acts to
keep the philosophical tradition predominantly white and Western.31 While Belle is not arguing that
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30 See Robert Bernasconi’s introduction to his edited collection, as well as the collection, Race and Racism in Continental
Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003); and Kathryn Sophia Belle, “Reflections on the Legacy and
Future of the Continental Tradition with regard to the Critical Philosophy of Race,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 50,
no. 2 (2012). For additional commentary on the future of Continental Philosophy, see Peg Birmingham and James
Risser, “Refiguring Continental Philosophy,” Philosophy Today 51 (2007); and Peg Birmingham and James Risser, “The
Expanding Horizons of Continental Philosophy,” Philosophy Today 52 (2008).
31 For more on gatekeeping in philosophy, see Kristie Dotson’s “How is this Paper Philosophy?” in Comparative
Philosophy 3, no. 1 (2012).
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either Continental Philosophy or Critical Philosophy of Race are insufficient on their own, she is
interested in promoting their continued confluence, in addition to other minoritized studies such as
Africana and feminist philosophies. She writes, “I think that it is possible to use resources from
various philosophical traditions to identify and analyze oppressive systems and viable methods to
confront and overcome them.”32 In light of Belle’s pluralistic call to action, I aim to take up Critical
Philosophy of Race and Black Feminist Standpoint Theory in this dissertation to make sense of
Arendt’s ideal and problematic approaches to race and racism while also latching on to the moments
when she nonideally, and less problematically, engages with race.
Before addressing how Black Feminist Theory as a methodology guides this dissertation, I
want to outline how I conceive of collaborative, as opposed to adversarial, engagement with Hannah
Arendt and the Negro Question. In what follows, I differentiate two approaches to contentious
scholarship. The first, which I call “inclusivity signaling,” is a version of adversarial academic
engagement. Much like virtue signaling, inclusivity signaling superficially engages with the text at
hand, in this case, Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question, by referencing it and moving on as though
the work is not significant or impactful, even though it is. I have found that many iterations of this
move take the form of a “yes, but” response. For example, “yes Belle is right that Arendt had some
racist tendencies, but we can still find value in Arendt on X.”33 In its most well-meaning iteration,

32 Belle, “Reflections on the Legacy and Future of the Continental Tradition with regard to the Critical Philosophy of
Race,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 50, no. 2 (2012), 344.

This approach can be seen in Berkowitz’s review: “Hannah Arendt was German Jew and carried prejudices with her to
the United States. It is an easy matter to collect quotations showing that Arendt could be disdainful of East-European
Jews, that she found both black South Africans as well as their Boer oppressors uncivilized, and that she thought many
of the black students entering American universities in the 1960s academically unqualified. While Arendt is known for
her essay “Reflections on Little Rock” that opposes forced school desegregation, she also was an opponent of legal
segregation, took a strong stand against anti-miscegenation laws, insisted that slavery was the “one great crime of
American history,” and argued that the Black Power movement, for all its problems, better represented real political
interests and was consequently more politically meaningful than the white student movement. Arendt wrote at length on
antisemitism and developed a detailed theory of racism as an ideology, which she opposed to Jew-hatred and the hatred
of blacks.” (1) The first few sentences of the review reveal a “yes, but” approach.
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this inclusivity signaling recognizes the important work that Belle accomplishes, but it moves forward
as though the only option is to seek out Arendt’s merits despite Belle’s contributions. It is a mere
hand-waving gesture to the importance of Belle’s work to our understanding of Arendt. Though I
am not interested in proposing that anyone is perniciously utilizing inclusivity signaling, I think it is
important to note that anyone writing on Arendt and race must reference Belle. However, I want to
argue that there is another, more responsible way to reference her work, and I call that “genuine
inclusivity,” which I aim to undertake in this dissertation.
In contrast to inclusivity signaling, “genuine inclusivity” approaches a text like Hannah Arendt
and the Negro Question and recognizes that it holds the potential to transform how we conceive of a
problematic yet influential philosopher like Hannah Arendt. In this sense, genuine inclusivity
intentionally acts against an adversarial model by aiming to collaborate with, instead of argue against,
Belle.34 I argue that Belle’s book ought to change the way we think about and engage with Arendt,
though that does not mean that we must throw her out with the bathwater because she, as Belle
brilliantly showed us, is mired in deeply rooted anti-Black racism. Instead, we must move forward,
holding on to the tension of a racist philosopher who provides a useful, if not contentious, theory of
political action. Tension, in this case, is productive because we can benefit from Arendtian political
action in a way that recognizes her shortcomings. The difference between the two approaches is
small, but what we ought to hold on to is the transformational power of a philosopher like Belle to

34 In addition to conforming to Janice Moultan’s model of philosophy, genuine inclusivity is informed by standpoint
theory. As Sandra Harding explains in “Standpoint Theories: Productively Controversial,” “It is one thing to gesture
toward ‘including the excluded’ in our thinking and social projects. It is quite another to engage seriously not only with
their ways of understanding themselves and their social relations, but also with their ways of understanding us and our
social relations” in Hypatia 24, no. 4 (2009), 193. “Them” refers to non-Western thinkers/peoples but I claim it is also
applicable to white normative society in terms of minoritized populations. Without standpoint theory we have one
dominant and dominating account of political action per The Human Condition; with standpoint, we can see both the
nonideal and ideal accounts of political action while also incorporating additional minoritized and marginalized voices on
Hannah Arendt and political action.
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the field of Arendt studies. The appropriate approach should take a “yes and” format. For instance,
as this dissertation argues, yes, Belle is correct to draw our attention to Arendt’s anti-Black racism
and the ramifications of it in her thought, and with that knowledge we can begin to reconceptualize
what political action looks like—shortcomings and all.35
Practicing what I call “genuine inclusivity” here is generative in two main ways. On a broad
level, genuine inclusivity is a tool to explicate the mired writings of Arendt—with this tool we are
able to approach her texts from different angles which take seriously Standpoint Theory. This tool is
similar to 3-dimenionsal (3D) modeling software, such as AutoCAD or SketchUp, which create
interactive 3D models of architecture, allowing the user to view the building from a myriad of
angles.36 In other words, this tool allows and encourages us to read and interpret Arendt from the
perspectives of those who are actively aware of her racism and its ramifications. For those who fear
this tool will result in a swift rebuke of Arendt as a racist who has nothing more to offer philosophy,
fear not. Genuine inclusivity, on a smaller scale, is a tool that allows us to tell more than one story
about Arendt, just as the 3D modeler allows us to see many different perspectives of a building.
As I will demonstrate in future chapters, it is all too easy to turn to certain texts as
redemptive for Arendt—texts wherein she is largely unproblematic. Yet, even referring to the
redemption of a philosopher is, I claim, a category mistake. Redemption connotes a false

35 As will be discussed in Part II of Chapter 4, Arendt’s anti-Black racism is, unfortunately, unsurprising—anti-Black
sentiments pervade Western culture. Though it is radically important to acknowledge anti-Black racism and
Eurocentrism in Western philosophy, that is not enough, nor does it accomplish much. Instead, it is necessary to analyze
how Arendt’s theory of race influences political action, not just that it does.
36 To mix metaphors, thinking of genuine inclusivity as a form of 3D modeling is useful to avoid listening to a single
story. As described above, this metaphorical tool can provide an interactive experience wherein we can easily change the
perspective to read Arendt from a different angle. Within this metaphor, we can view Arendt’s text as a building under
construction—we’re examining the architecture from a number of perspectives to see how we like the building but also
to determine what additions or changes are necessary. This analogy is important because it allows us to actively engage
with Arendt’s texts. In engaging in philosophic inquiry as “architects,” we are able to say something such as, “after
reading Belle’s argument for the racially exclusive nature of the social-political divide, I want examine where her antiBlack racism undermines political action.”
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dichotomy—one is saved or damned. But that approach fails to recognize how inextricably linked
the valuable and problematic aspects of Arendt’s thought are. For instance, in Chapter 4 I argue
that, in her early writings from the 1930s and 1940s, she is concerned with Jewish politics
specifically, that she cautions against speaking for others, and acts out her own philosophy of
political action for herself and her community. If we were operating within a binary, the story we
could tell of the Arendt in these early texts is that her ideas are nonideal and more responsive to real
injustices in the world. Yet, that is only one side of the story. By engaging in genuine inclusivity, we
are able to recognize when she is Eurocentric, myopic, and willfully ignorant. I argue that it is
necessary to hold these two stories or perspectives in tension with one another. If we overlook
Arendt’s faults, we run the risk of re-centering whiteness—sweeping aside Arendt’s shortcomings in
favor of her helpful examples in order to reassert her as a valuable and laudable philosopher—by
only telling the story where she is the venerated political thinker. In promoting the story where
Arendt is the well-respected philosopher that we ought to continue to, uncritically or mildly
critically, cling we lose out on understanding her prejudices and how they affect her theory.37
The quote from Nigerian novelist Chimamanda Adichie states at the beginning of the
chapter that there is a danger in a single story. In her TED talk, Adichie’s cautionary narrative
addresses stereotypes as a form of a “single story.” For instance, she recalls that her college
roommate was surprised to hear Adichie speak English so well because she was unaware English

37 In an ironic twist, I am reminded of the debate over Hitler’s art. There exists the argument that we ought to destroy
Hitler’s paintings. I do not pretend to fully understand this argument because I personally am not moved by the artistic
value in his pastorals. However, even if he were generally understood to be on par with Cézanne or Pissarro, I strongly
believe it is necessary to know that people who are capable of creating beautiful or moving works of art can also be the
most evil, vile, and genocidal of human beings. Inversely, and to a much lesser degree we ought to acknowledge and
learn from those like Arendt who are human and therefore capable of producing stellar philosophical analyses of human
conditions which are covertly Eurocentric and exclusionary. Failure to recognize this aspect of Arendt merely
perpetuates the Eurocentric and exclusionary nature of her work. In other words, political action will continue to be
achievable for only the privileged.
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was the official language of Nigeria, and equally surprised when she played Mariah Carey because
she thought Adichie only listened to “tribal music.”38 Her roommate had a single story of Africans as
radically different than Americans. While I turn to Arendt’s “single story” of Black Americans in the
conclusion, previous chapters diverge slightly from Adichie’s “single story.” Instead, I investigate
how the use of nonideal theory uncovers more than one version, or story, of Arendtian political
action. With multiple stories and perspectives, I aim to complete a more detailed, multi-dimensional
account of political action that does not ignore Arendt’s shortcomings.
The final methodological influence for this dissertation is Black Feminist Standpoint Theory.
In short, genuine inclusivity takes Black Feminist Standpoint Theory seriously.39 I do not aim to
theorize anything new about standpoint theory. Instead, I am simply applying Black Feminist
Standpoint Theory, and aspects of standpoint theory in general, to my investigation into Arendtian
political action. In other words, what I call “genuine inclusivity” is not a repackaging of standpoint
theory under a different name, it is a specific application of the tenets of the theory that Black
women—Kathryn Sophia Belle in this instance—have valuable epistemic insight into our
predominantly white-normative interpretations of Arendtian political action. Approaching a text
with genuine inclusivity aims to recognize the transformational nature of Belle on Arendt studies by
revisiting how political action operates. In light of Belle’s powerful argument against the socialpublic-private divide in Arendt’s thought, I believe it is necessary to extend her critical analysis to
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political action. Doing so is yet another attempt at developing a multi-dimensional rendering of the
concept which will take seriously the exclusionary nature of Arendt’s Eurocentrism.
Black Feminist Standpoint Theory and Feminist Standpoint Theory are rich, sociological and
philosophical fields of scholarship. According to Patricia Hill Collins in “Learning From the
Outsider Within,” the theory “consists of ideas produced by and for Black women” wherein it
“assumes that Black women possess a unique standpoint on, or unique perspective of, their
experiences.”40 Collins argues that this unique perspective is, first, important to the self-definition
and self-valuation of Black women as a form of resistance while, secondarily, it offers non-Black
individuals—presumably those who experience more privilege—valuable insight into “patterns that
may be more difficult for those immersed in the situation to see.”41 In other words, the secondary
benefit of Black Feminist Standpoint Theory offers unique and valuable epistemic insight into social
and political environments because of Black women’s “outsider” or “stranger” status to white,
heteronormative culture.42 In applying the tenets of this theory, particularly the appreciation for keen
and otherwise unseen insights into the Eurocentric elements in Arendt’s thought, we are able to add
another descriptive layer to our multidimensional rendering of political action, thereby avoiding a
single story or one-dimensional account of the concept. The “outsider within,” then, is the

40 Patricia Hill Collins, “Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought,”
Social Problems 33, no. 6 (1986): S16. See also Sandra Harding, “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is ‘Strong
Objectivity,’” in The Centennial Review 36, no. 3 (1992), where she claims that “standpoint theorists themselves all
explicitly argue that marginal lives that are not their own provide better grounds for certain kinds of knowledge” (129).
This claim addresses the idea that standpoint theory is more than mere ethnocentric or egocentric approaches to
knowledge production. Instead, the theory is a genuine embrace of other’s lived experiences. Additionally, Alison Wylie
in “Why Standpoint Matters,” in The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader argues that standpoint theory’s “central and
motivating insight is an inversion thesis: those who are subject to structures of domination that systematically
marginalize and oppress them may, in fact, be epistemically privileged in some crucial aspects” (339).
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epistemically rich position of someone who both understands and is able to produce knowledge on
their own culturally-specific life, but also the lives of those they observe and interact with.
As an example, Collins references sociologist Judith Rollins who chose to complete her
academic fieldwork as a domestic worker. Rollins, a Black woman, reported being invisible to her
white employers who often spoke candidly about her and other matters as though she was not in the
room at all.43 Her presence in the white family’s home gave her “outsider within” status to their lives
and thought processes, resulting in her ability to produce knowledge on their lives, as well as her
own. In the particular instance Collins cites, Rollins remarks that “These gestures of ignoring my
presence were not, I think, intended as insults; they were expressions of the employers’ ability to
annihilate the humanness and even, at times, the very existence of me, a servant and a black
woman.”44 Rollins was privy to the daily activities of the white couple she worked for and
understood their interactions with her better than they did themselves. She was more aware of their
disregard for her and was able to offer a unique perspective on their unconscious bias.
Standpoint theory not only recognizes the unique production of knowledge from
marginalized groups, it also is a helpful tool to understand the social and cultural position of the
speaker. In “The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought” Collins argues that, “All social
thought, including white masculinist and Black feminist, reflects the interests and standpoint of its
creators.”45 What she means by this is that the knowledge produced by someone such as Belle,
reveals Belle’s attitude and perspective on the issue at hand—Arendt’s anti-Black racism—and that
knowledge is impacted and informed by her particular experiences and beliefs as a Black woman.
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But, as Collins points out we can similarly dissect the standpoint of someone like Arendt who I
argue operates within a white masculinist sphere. In the same vein, Arendt’s work in Rahel Varnhagen
and her Jewish writings reflect her particular standpoint as a European, Jewish woman—one which I
argue produces, at times, Eurocentric and limited conceptions of political action. I aim to advocate
for the value found in Arendt’s nonideal account of political action while, at the same time,
prompting awareness of the ideal version of political action.
To further my commitment to an antiracist methodology, I intentionally incorporate relevant
scholarship from women. In this effort I aim to account for a variety of perspectives, or standpoints,
so that I can develop a multi-dimensional account of political action. Standpoint Theory, more
broadly construed, as a methodology intentionally incorporates minoritized voices in an effort to
counter dominant narratives. As Sandra Harding notes, in the introduction to The Feminist Standpoint
Theory Reader, “We must change the social worlds in which we live as philosophers so that they
discourage whites’ perception that our experiences in white supremacist social relations provide the
desirable route to discovering philosophic truths and universally valuable wisdom.”46 Harding calls
for a reevaluation which questions the foundations of philosophic inquiry. Because whites have
dominated the field of academic philosophy, much of the practice is grounded in the social locations
and perspectives of white lived experiences. The result is a field which often only reflects the values,
beliefs, and situated knowledge of whites. By intentionally including scholarship from women,
particularly women of color, the goal is to open up philosophy to more varied social positions who
can provide alternate routes, and destinations when it comes, to “philosophic truths and universally
valuable wisdom.” Purposely seeking out the perspectives of minoritized scholars not only provides

46 Sandra Harding, “Introductions: Standpoint Theory as a Site of Political, Philosophic, and Scientific Debate,” in The
Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies, ed. Sandra Harding (New York: Routledge, 2004), 2.
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multi-dimensional rendering but it questions and problematizes the dominant narratives which tend
to come from white scholars.
In addition to the inclusive nature of standpoint theory, this methodological approach
highlights minoritized scholarship as a site of resistance. For instance, Patricia Hill Collins claims
that she sees standpoint theory “as an interpretive framework dedicated to explicating how
knowledge remains central to maintaining and changing unjust systems of power.”47 Collins claims
that more just social and political conditions are possible if minoritized perspectives are privileged.
Similarly, bell hooks claims standpoint theory, or what she refers to as speaking and acting “from the
margin,” allows for active resistance against dominant power relations. She asserts that the margin is
“much more than a site of deprivation…it is also the site of radical possibility, a space of
resistance.”48 Taking seriously those in the margins means resisting the dominant narrative in Arendt
studies, and in turn, genuinely receiving Belle’s arguments concerning anti-Black racism. This does
not mean, contrary to much misguided criticism of standpoint theory, that merely because Belle is a
member of a minoritized racial group is her perspective to be taken seriously. Instead, it is an
intentionally fought for perspective which is the result of political engagement with the systems of
power that engage and dominate Black and other minoritized persons. In this sense, marginalization
is formative through struggle.49

47 Patricia Hill Collins, “Comments on Hekman’s ‘Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited’: Where’s
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One of the main criticisms of standpoint theory is that it unduly privileges the perspectives
and arguments of minoritized persons. This claim, as interpreted by Kristina Rolin, asserts that
standpoint theory advances an essentialism—that merely by virtue of a marginalized positionality,
one is epistemically privileged. This is a misconception concerning standpoint theory as a
methodology. Instead, as Rolin notes, “in feminist standpoint theory, the term “standpoint” is
meant to designate a moral and political commitment and not merely a perspective on social
reality.”50 In other words, this misconception claims that all one needs to do is be a minority in order
to deserve epistemic privileging. As hooks’ quote above notes, the margin is a site of possibility and
struggle. Standpoint theory is a commitment to including minoritized perspectives which have
articulated their struggle in the face of oppression and domination.
While antiracist methodologies specific to philosophy still can be developed, there are many
other fields of study which we can draw from to promote a more equitable, inclusive, and just
research practice. As Belle notes, “Black feminism in general, and the development of black feminist
philosophy in particular, would help to foster a more inclusive and pluralistic continental
philosophy.”51 With this in mind, I move forward in this dissertation intentionally and
collaboratively engaging with Belle’s arguments in Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question. I also rely
heavily on the philosophy and scholarship of Black women and people of color in order to develop
a multi-dimensional account of political action in Hannah Arendt’s thought.
My own standpoint as a white woman relying on the work of people of color and white
women to investigate the Eurocentrism and anti-Black racism within Arendt’s theory of political
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action complicates this dissertation. As Shannon Sullivan points out in the introduction to Revealing
Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits of Racial Privilege, white women have contributed to the continued
oppression and marginalization of people of color even through their attempts to ameliorate systems
of domination. Sullivan is worth quoting at length to better understand the thorny relationship
between white female scholars and critical philosophy of race:
Struggling for others because “proper” women are not “supposed” to speak out on their
own behalf is not just the result of sexism and male privilege. It also is a classed—and
classic—means by which privileged white women have contributed to the oppression of
people of color and the domination of colonized lands. With her self-sacrificing moral
purity, the white, middle-to-upper class woman savior is able to speak out on behalf of the
helpless, under-class wretches who are too underdeveloped to understand or articulate their
needs for themselves—or so the story goes.52
Choosing to write on Arendtian political action’s merits and shortcomings through the lens of
critical philosophy of race can be viewed as a form of speaking for those whom Arendt overlooks.
This form of speaking on behalf of others from historically marginalized populations can perpetuate
a white female savior complex which situates scholars like myself in positions of epistemic
superiority and authority. My positionality as a middle-class, white female scholar complicates my
intentionally antiracist and standpoint theory-informed methodology. According to Sullivan,
awareness of one’s positionality and the social and political power dynamics inherent can help to
mediate potential harms. Yet, it is a consistent concern throughout the dissertation. In this sense, I
aim to contribute one possible antiracist reading of Arendtian political action with the hope many
more from other positionalities will follow.

52 Shannon Sullivan, Revealing Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits of Racial Privilege (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2006), 12.

CHAPTER TWO
IDEAL POLITICAL ACTION IN THE HUMAN CONDITION
Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition is the primary text Arendt scholars and political
philosophers invoke when teaching or explicating her theory of political action. In this sense, The
Human Condition is seen as the monolithic text for understanding the concept. However, I argue in
this chapter that relying solely or predominantly on The Human Condition to understand Arendtian
political action not only fails to acknowledge other texts that add valuable insight into the concept
but also narrowly relies on an exclusionary and overgeneralized theorization of political action. As
Chapters 3 and 4 go on to explain, supplementing a reading of political action in The Human
Condition with Rahel Varnhagen: Life of a Jewish Woman and selections from her underappreciated
newspaper articles and unpublished essays from the 1930s and 1940s provides a more well-rounded,
or multi-dimensional account of the concept. This multi-dimensional account is better equipped to
incorporate and account for the political experiences of historically minoritized individuals and
groups.
Yet prior to developing these claims, it is necessary to argue that The Human Condition alone
provides an unsatisfactory account of political action. In order to support these claims, in Part I, I
explain in detail Arendt’s account of political action as it occurs in The Human Condition. This first
part explicates Arendt’s division of the public-private-social realms of existence within the vita activa
or theory of active life, her theorization of natality and plurality, the concepts of speech and action,
and the connection between political action and identity. Entire books have been written on each of
these aspects of Arendtian political action, but a brief introduction to these ideas and the relevant
35
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literature lays the groundwork for understanding my claim that political action in this text runs a
high risk of being exclusionary and overgeneralized—characteristics of white supremacist thought.
As such, in Part II, I advance the claim that Arendt’s theorization of political action is ideal or
utopian. While Arendt uses historic examples to frame her argument in The Human Condition, her
theorization of political action normatively aims for a utopian vision of politics. It is in this section
of the chapter that I support my main claim concerning the exclusionary and overgeneralized nature
of Arendtian political action. Specifically, I claim that this ideal version of political action offers no
way to transfer from Arendt’s ideal account of the concept to widespread application of the concept
in the real world. In Part III, I end by examining the implications of interpreting Arendtian political
action as utopian and largely inapplicable, namely the ignorance of racial difference, the
advancement of privileged actors, and the possibility for epistemic injustices against minoritized
individuals and groups. Acknowledging the exclusionary and overgeneralized account of political
action in this text aligns with this dissertation’s methodology—to actively seek out white supremacist
tendencies in Arendt’s theorization of political action.
Part I: Arendtian Political Action
The Human Condition contains Hannah Arendt’s most explicit articulation of political action.
Yet, as Arendt scholar and political theorist Margaret Canovan notes, this text was meant to act as a
prolegomena to her mature political theory—a project she never finished.1 Arendt recognized the
need to clarify the conditions which allow for robust political life prior to theorizing on politics
itself. Her motivation for theorizing the conditions for political life, according to Canovan, stems
from her work in The Origins of Totalitarianism. It is because Arendt is deeply concerned with

1 Margaret Canovan, A Reinterpretation of Hannah Arendt’s Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1992), 100. Canovan cites Arendt’s book proposal correspondence with the Rockefeller Foundation for the anticipated
book, Introduction into Politics. Arendt envisioned this text to “continue where the other book [The Human Condition] ends”
(100). Arendt’s involvement with the Eichmann trial disrupted progress on Introduction into Politics.
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reflecting on the rise of totalitarian regimes and recognizing their ever-present conditions for revival
that she wrote The Human Condition to understand the conditions of successful, anti-totalitarian
political life. In other words, The Human Condition aims to chart how best to exist among other
humans, how to act together to address common concerns and desires, and how to set oneself apart
from others. Interpreting Arendt as normatively prescribing how we ought to act in order to avoid
falling prey to totalitarian regimes again, relies on first comprehending her theory of political action.
In The Human Condition, Arendt carves up human existence into two pursuits—the vita activa
and the vita contemplativa. The vita activa or the “active life” consists, for Arendt, of labor, work and
action—these three realms are the main focus of the book. The vita contemplativa, or the
“contemplative life,” is the subject of The Life of the Mind, Arendt’s last book which was left
unfinished when she died in 1975. The Life of the Mind, Arendt’s deeply metaphysical text, imitates
Kant’s three critiques by exploring thinking, willing, and judging. She died, however, before
completing the third section of this text. Instead of engaging with the metaphysical conditions of life
on earth in The Human Condition, Arendt is interested in theorizing the spheres we exist in—the
social, the private, and the public2—and the tripartite classification of the vita activa—labor, work,
and action. In what follows I explain the social, private, and public realms before moving on to a
brief discussion of how labor and work differ from action.
The Spheres of Existence
For Arendt, the private and the public realms of existence are relatively straightforward;
though, one of her main concerns in The Human Condition is to argue that these realms of existence
have bled into one another and are no longer as distinct as they ought to be. In order to protect the
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public realm from influence, Arendt is interested in keeping these two realms of existence separate.
The ideal, as in preferred, private realm, in Arendt’s estimate is informed by an ancient Greek and
Roman model which saw it as “the sphere where the necessities of life, of individual survival as well
as continuity of the species, were taken care of and guaranteed.”3 In other words, the private realm is
where one’s basic needs—food, water, shelter—are provided. It is also the realm of sexual intimacy,
reproduction, and friendship. According to Roger Berkowitz, Arendt also wants to protect the
private so that individuals can have space to think critically about their political commitments and
judgements.4 In this sense, a protected private sphere not only concerns issues of survival, but it also
allows individuals the space to critically consider aspects of their political lives.5
The public realm is also conceived in relation to ancient Greek and Roman models. In its
ideal form, the public realm consists of individuals coming together to discuss, debate, and decide
political affairs. Informed by the ancient Greek polis, Arendt claims the public realm was where
individuals could meet other people and willingly “share in the burden of jurisdiction, defense, and
administration of public affairs.”6 In addition to obvious political necessities, Arendt claims that the
public realm reinforces reality. She writes that “the presence of others who see what we see and hear
what we hear assures us of the reality of the world and ourselves.”7 By virtue of being in the
presence of others in the public realm, we are able to verify our experiences. It is easy to connect the
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need to verify what one sees or hears with others with Arendt’s concern for the resurgence of
totalitarianism which isolates individuals from confirming horrors witnessed or expressing
individuality. When people are able to gather and confirm the reality of their world, they are better
prepared to accomplish the community’s “public affairs.”
While the private realm consists of what happens in the privacy of one’s home and the
public is the properly political sphere where people interact, debate, and decide how to live among
others, the social is, according to Margaret Canovan, “notoriously hard to grasp.”8 The social, for
instance, has at least three main interpretations. According to Seyla Benhabib “At one level, the social
refers to the growth of capitalistic commodity exchange economy. At the second level, it refers to
aspects of mass society. In the third and least investigated sense, the social refers to sociability, to the
quality of life in civil society and civic associations.”9 Not everyone, however, agrees with all three
interpretations. Kathryn Sophia Belle’s interpretation of the social coincides solely with Benhabib’s
first sense of the social—an economic and class-based realm. Because she interprets the social as
principally concerned with economics, she is able to claim that Arendt’s social realm “is a space
where discrimination should be expected and permitted.”10 In other words, economic inequality is
common and a consequence of that inequality is discrimination. Belle uses Arendt’s example of a
hotel deciding who to do business with to clarify her interpretation. Arendt claims, according to
Belle, that a business can discriminate in this instance because it occurs within an economic realm.
Arendt’s logic is that discrimination will occur—that is a fact of human interaction—but it must be
confined within the social realm because it has no place in the political realm.
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The second interpretation of the social realm follows closely from Arendt’s analysis of mass
society in The Origins of Totalitarianism. She explains that masses of people “form the majority of
those large numbers of neutral, politically indifferent people who never join a party and hardly ever
go to the polls,”11 until they are jolted into fervent compliancy by a totalitarian movement. These
people, according to Arendt, are unthinking followers. They do not act, as she outlines in The Human
Condition, they behave or conform according to social norms. She claims that “the monolithic
character of every type of society, its conformism which allows for only one interest and one
opinion, is ultimately rooted in the one-ness of man-kind.”12 Put differently, social norms require
individuals to conform to a standard, not act out as unique individuals with particular needs and
desires. Arendt’s main concern is that such uniformity allows for those who conform to cast out
those who do not because they are perceived as less than human. In this sense, the social is less a
realm than a phenomenon wherein private concerns about survival bleed over into political life
resulting in a blurred division between the private and the public.
The final sense of the social, according to Benhabib, is the realm of civilized existence. She
claims that it has to do with “patterns of human interaction; modalities of taste in dress, eating,
leisure, and lifestyles generally; differences in aesthetic, religious, and civic manners and outlooks;
patterns of socializing and forming marriages, friendships, acquaintanceships, and commercial
exchanges.”13 Similar to the previous sense, the social here refers to societal norms; yet, Benhabib’s
assessment of this sense of the social might better be understood as cultural norms.
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What is of concern here is that Arendt claims the social realm encroaches on, and blurs the
lines between, the public and private realms. She describes the encroachment as “the rise of the
social” or the rise “of economic activities to the public realm.”14 This results in “housekeeping and
all matters pertaining formerly to the private sphere of the family” becoming a “‘collective’
concern.”15 In other words, when individual issues related to survival bleed into the public realm
which ought to be concerned with collective issues, then collective concerns are sidelined. Arendt’s
ideal model does not contain a social realm, only private and public ones. In this model, the head of
the house manages all biological concerns in private and then in a different capacity exists as a
political being in the public realm. Margaret Canovan describes this model well, stating that when
the male head of a household “emerged from this dark realm of biological necessity into the light of
the public arena to join his peers and to deliberate with them on the concerns of their common
world, he left behind him domination, subjection to necessity and concern with biological life, which
were merely preconditions for the authentically human activities that went on in the public realm.”16
Keeping these realms separate ensures, according to Arendt, that domination stays in the private
which allows freedom to exist in the public realm.
But this model separating the private from the public does not exist in reality. And Arendt’s
main concern is with the social encroaching on the political—a problem which Arendt sees as
distracting people from acting politically by restricting their freedom. In other words, when one’s
private and public attention is concerned with survival, then there is no freedom to exist otherwise.
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As Dana Villa puts it, “the ‘rise of the social’ thus refers to economic absorption of the political.”
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The political realm is overtaken by private concerns such as financial security and class-based
behavior, leaving no room for engagement with fellow citizens.18
Much of Arendt’s political thought is not prescriptive, and The Human Condition is no
exception. Her theorization of the private, public, and encroaching social realms of existence are
phenomenological—she is concerned with theorizing the “preconditions” of politics as they appear
to her. She is certainly interested in arguing for intentional political action in order to combat the rise
of the social realm; however, as mentioned earlier, this text is concerned with laying the foundation
for her more mature political theory. Central to these realms are the activities of human existence—
the tripartite vita activa—labor, work, and most importantly, action.
Vita Activa
In general, Arendt’s The Human Condition sets out to diagnose why humans do not “act” as
they once did. She opens the book with the space race and Russia’s success with Sputnik. This
introduction frames her interest in understanding why humans are obsessed with escaping the earth,
and in turn, escaping what she argues should be an intrinsic value in action. To contextualize her
argument, she explains that the vita activa, consisting of labor, work, and action, is largely
misunderstood. Most notably diverging from a Marxist definition of labor, Arendt argues that labor
is tied to sustenance—building or working to secure shelter, acquiring food, and reproducing. She
claims, “labor is the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human body, whose
spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced
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and fed into the life process by labor.” Arendt defines housework, traditionally carried out by
women, as labor. In this sense labor is connected to the private sphere where it operates
universally—each individual must labor to survive. The human condition of labor in the private
sphere is shared with all humanity. Once again, Arendt’s desire to protect labor within the private
sphere is tied to her concern for the reemergence of totalitarianism. If concerns of survival affect all
aspects of life, then individuals are stripped of their freedom to do anything but labor to survive.
Work, then, is concerned with the development of community or world building and the
fabrication of materials. Architecture, sculptures, and objects constitute “work.” Work occurs
collectively with and for others and is intended to outlive the creator, pointing to a quality of
permanence. Arendt refers to human “workers” as homo faber because they create or fabricate “an
‘artificial’ world of things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings.”20 As opposed to labor,
work is manufactured by human hands for the purpose of bringing people together, not
manipulating natural resources for individual sustenance. Because work does not affect one’s
survival—one cannot “work” to make a living and survive, one can only “labor” to do so—there is a
degree of freedom associated with this activity. Arendt explains that “Alone with his image of the
future product, homo faber is free to produce, and again facing alone the work of his hands, he is free
to destroy.”21 Imagine a woodworker, retired from a previous career unrelated to carpentry. This
woodworker “works” in the Arendtian sense to create carved bowls, spoons, and cutting boards.
Their handiwork is not necessary to survive—they often give their work away or collect it for their
own benefit. Additionally, they have the freedom to decide how to design their objects, when to
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“work,” and what to do with their finished product. While the ability to work in the Arendtian sense
does not immediately prevent totalitarianism, it does reflect a degree of freedom that creates a
common world between people. This degree of freedom, however, is minimal compared to the
possibility for freedom in action.
Relatedly, when the social realm blurs the distinction between the private and public, Arendt
claims that we lose our ability to differentiate our individual selves while also losing sight of what
brings us together. She writes, “What makes mass society,” the world where the private has bled
over into the public, “so difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, or at least not
primarily, but the fact that the world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to
relate and to separate them.”22 Work has the ability to bring together radically different individuals
so they can relate to one another as homo faber, fabricators that leave behind intimations of their lived
experience that survives their time on earth. Yet, when the private overruns the public, work loses
its effectiveness.
Last of the three activities is action. Arendt’s main focus in The Human Condition is to
highlight the diminished pursuit of action in the public realm. Citing Sputnik, she worries that
humans would rather avoid addressing humanity’s problems—rising tensions during the Cold War,
the risk of resurgent totalitarian power, etc.—by escaping the earth than acting together to fix them.
Action, for Arendt, is made possible by the human conditions of freedom and plurality. According
to Arendt, through creation and birth “the principle of beginning came into the world itself, which,
of course, is only another way of saying that the principle of freedom was created when man was
created but not before.”23 In an existential statement, Arendt claims that the ability for humans to
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act—“the principle of beginning”—follows from birth, or what she calls “natality,” and allows
individuals to express themselves. Politics is possible because unique individuals possess the
freedom to act independently. Without freedom, interactions would be predictable and rigid or
worse, monitored, censored, and prohibited like under totalitarian regimes.
In addition to freedom, action is possible because individuals exist among other unique
individuals. Early in The Human Condition Arendt notes that “men, not Man, live on the earth and
inhabit the world.”24 Living among a multitude, or what Arendt calls a “plurality” of others allows
for action because action reveals identity, setting apart individuals, and rendering distinct the
individual from the multitude of others in the public, political sphere. Arendt’s description of the
formative nature of action is that “in so far as it engages in founding and preserving political bodies,
[action] creates the condition for remembrance, that is for history.”25 In this sense, action is similar
to work in that it preserves the narrative of the political actor through historical records. But not all
historical records take the form of textbooks and published materials which favor the exceptional
political actors. Even the political actor who engages in dialogue and debate with other unique
individuals in public is capable of being remembered through stories, diaries, and personal
connections because “the disclosure of who somebody is, is implicit in both his words and deeds.”26
As such, action requires “plurality,” the idea that others must bear witness to the words and deeds of
the individual actor in order to recognize that person. Additionally, the notion of plurality within the
context of action is what designates action as political.
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In practice, political action consists of speech and action. For Arendt, speech is the most
prevalent form of action. The emphasis on speech points to the nature of deliberative politics which
require spoken interactions. But speech is also often how individuals reveal their identity to others.
Arendt explains by stating, “The action he begins is humanly disclosed by the word, and though his
deed can be perceived in its brute physical appearance without verbal accompaniment, it becomes
relevant only through the spoken word in which he identifies himself as the actor, announcing what
he does, has done, and intends to do.”27 In other words, individuals can perform deeds in the public
realm and they can be considered instances of political action, but speech is what adds meaning to
those actions. More specifically, speech contextualizes the action in relation to the individual. For
example, imagine a situation on a public train or bus where a man is encroaching on a woman’s
personal space. He asks the woman to smile for him and it becomes clear she is uncomfortable.
Another woman physically steps in between the man and woman which cuts off a direct line of sight
between the two. The woman who physically moved in between acted in what we can presume to be
an Arendtian sense; but, it is not clear to anyone but the actor if this is the case. If this woman were
to say something to either the man or woman in this situation to clearly indicate her decision to
move in between the two was an intentional attempt to diffuse the situation and prevent further
harassment, it would be clear that she acted. Her intentions are made clear through speech and those
witnessing the situation would accordingly recognize her actions and her character.
The Web of Human Relations
In Arendt’s characterization of political action, she states that speech and action are only
possible because we exist among other humans. For Arendt, “existing” among others occurs in both
a physical and metaphysical sense. Arendt’s project in this text is grounded in understanding the

27

HC, 179.

47
conditions of human existence and interaction. It is a fact of our quotidian lives that we speak and
act with or among others. Tied up with the interpersonal nature of political action is Arendt’s claim
that the concept reveals one’s identity—one’s identity cannot be revealed if there are no witnesses.
Political action needs other people, and “occurs” in the space between people. However, there are
two different senses of “the space between people” for Arendt. In its first sense, it is an objective,
real space in the public realm where any two or more people are gathered. In reference to the first
sense, Arendt explains that “Most action and speech is concerned with this in-between, which varies
with each group of people, so that most words and deeds are about some worldly objective reality in
addition to being a disclosure of the acting and speaking agent.”28 The “in-between” references the
real, tangible space where action occurs between people. Margaret Canovan, in an effort to explain
political action, gives the example of saving someone from a drowning in a river.29 This act is an
example of political action and it occurs in the real world between two people.
But the “in-between” also refers to a metaphysical aspect of acting and speaking. In this
second sense, the “in-between” is the space created by the presence of others that are witnesses to
one’s speech and action. Whereas the act of seeing someone saved from a river is physical, the act of
witnessing that deed and being able to—and quite possibly intending to—relay that event to others
is a less tangible shared “in-between.” The web of human relations is reflective of both senses of the
“in-between.”
The web image conjures both the tangible and intangible aspects of interpersonal speech and
action; however, the concept itself is opaque. To provide more context, Arendt notes that “The
realm of human affairs, strictly speaking, consists of the web of human relationships which exists
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wherever men live together....where their immediate consequences can be felt” In this passage,
Arendt communicates another key aspect of the concept—consequences of speech and action are
felt just as the reverberations of a freshly trapped fly are felt in a spider’s web. The web of relations
connects humans to one another, to their actions, and to the consequences of those actions.
Additionally, Arendt claims that the web of relations is the reason why, “with its
innumerable, conflicting wills and intentions...action almost never achieves its purpose.”31 To make
sense of this aspect of the concept, it is helpful to imagine a communal cobweb shared by a handful
spiders. In this fictionalized communal web, there are many intersecting capture-threads which make
it difficult for individual spiders to determine if freshly caught prey is nearby—one might step out
onto part of their web to consume nearby prey but be immediately impeded by another thread in the
way or spider who devoured the prey first. This extended metaphor speaks to both the tangible
(threads) and intangible (interest in food) elements of the web. It also addresses how action is, quite
literally, an act, not a result. The spider acts by leaving its corner but that does not guarantee the
desired result.
The spiders share an interest in catching prey and that is reflected in their interconnected
threads. Additionally, by virtue of being in such close proximity to other spiders, it is nearly
impossible to avoid one another. In the same way, Arendt communicates that we all have a shared
interest in living in the world with others. If we continue to ignore this shared interest, in the way
she thought the space race was hoping to escape the earth and humanity, then we are doomed to
become less human and more robotic. Action only occurs in the presence of other people, even if
the purpose of our action is thwarted by other people we come across. The communal cobweb
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image is reflective of the polis-model that Arendt idealizes. It is a shared space where radically
different people come together to deliberate and problem-solve their community’s issues and
concerns. The web of human relations reflects both the physical relationship we have living among
other human but it also speaks to our metaphysical interactions.
Review of Relevant Literature
A number of criticisms of Arendt’s construction of political action are worth addressing. To
begin, it is important to differentiate a number of criticisms on how political action is characterized
in The Human Condition. I have organized what I think is the relevant literature on political action into
three categories of critique—interpretive, feminist, and philosophy of race.
Interpretive Literature
The interpretive category includes scholars that theorize political action as they interpret it in
Arendt’s texts. There are a variety of interpretations but most promote either a single or twofold
account of action. George Kateb’s interpretation is that “The heart of Arendt’s account of action in
her writings is that authentic political action is speech--not necessarily formal speeches, but talks,
exchanges of views--in the manner of persuasion and dissuasion. Political speech is deliberation or
discussion as a part of the process of deciding some issue pertaining to the public good.”32 Focusing
in on speech as a vital aspect of political action, Kateb argues that the concept is best exemplified
through vibrant, participatory democracies—especially when those democracies are most concerned
with the participatory whole. In other words, political action per Kateb needs to be free from
biological concerns that rely on basic needs and survival—that is a facet of the private realm.
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Instead, political action should entail conversations in one’s community and with political leaders
that concern the community’s development.
On the other hand, Dana Villa and Margaret Canovan argue that Arendt’s account of
political action is agonal or exceptional, respectively—it is demonstrated by the few, heroic
characters that perform on the world’s political stage. Villa, in “Beyond Good and Evil: Arendt,
Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization of Political Action” argues that political action is performative.33
The actions of great political leaders are performed for their country and for the world and they are
long remembered for their outstanding public deeds.
Canovan takes a slightly different approach and instead argues that political action can be
understood on two levels. On an introductory level, Canovan argues that action “is a very broad
category of human activity that covers interactions with other people that are not matters of routine
behavior but require personal initiative.”34 As previously mentioned, Canovan goes on in her
interpretation of the last activity of the vita activa to say that saving someone drowning in a river is
Arendtian action, whereas “going to work is usually not.”35 It is important to note that Canovan’s
example reflects exceptional actions—it is not an everyday action to save someone’s life from a
potentially dangerous river. Beyond the introductory level, she acknowledges that Arendt’s
explanation of political action is not so straightforward in The Human Condition and that it is
necessary when explaining the concept to discuss how political action reveals one’s identity
according to Arendt. At this secondary level, political action according to Canovan is speech and

Dana Villa, “Beyond Good and Evil: Arendt, Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization of Political Action,” Political Theory
20, no. 2 (1992): 274-308.
33

34

Canovan, 131.

35

Canovan, 131.

51
action done by exceptional people in the public realm, as exemplified by the ancient Athenians. She
gives the example of Ancient Athens where “every citizen had the chance to be a hero, while the city
provided an ‘organized remembrance’ to save his deeds from oblivion in case no Homer should be
on hand.”36 As long as one’s actions were retold, their exceptional identity lived on past their death.
By Canovan’s estimate, political action is largely relegated to the special few who history has
recorded and admired.
In an attempt to address some of the previous critiques of Arendtian action that claim it is
elitist in that it only applies to exceptional political actors, Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves’s The Political
Philosophy of Hannah Arendt claims that there are two accounts of action that Arendt gives us that
function simultaneously. The first, which he calls “expressive” refers to those in the public that do
exceptionally make their identities known through heroic deeds.37 However, he claims that many
scholars overlook the second aspect of action which he calls “communicative.”38 Entrèves argues
that there is a tension between these two accounts of action but that it is a productive tension,
reflective of modern politics with elected leaders and masses of people participating in the
democratic process. In Seyla Benhabib’s The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, she also promotes
a two-fold model of political action that builds off of d'Entrèves’. Instead of using the terms
“expressive” and “communicative,” Benhabib claims Arendtian action is best understood as agonal
and narrative.39 The agonal model of action accounts for those great, heroic actions of people like
Alexander Hamilton or Achilles, whose extraordinary actions reveal their character to the public;
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while the narrative model is “a kind of democratic or associative politics that can be engaged in by
ordinary citizens.”40 This second model of action relies on the presence of others to do more than
witness great deeds—those in the public realm engage with one another. Though minimally different
models, d’Entrèves and Benhabib interpret Arendtian action to account for both individual and
cooperative action.
Feminist Critiques
In Melissa A. Orlie’s “Forgiving Trespasses, Promising Futures,” she targets the result of
political action and how it can be problematic for intersectional sensitivity. The downside to political
action is that the result and reception are out of the actor’s control. From a feminist perspective,
Orlie argues that political action—like her involvement in the activism surrounding the misogynistic
and racist media coverage of the 1990 “Central Park jogger” trial41—can have unintended
consequences. In her example, she recognizes that the predominant white feminist interpretation of
the case thought that any nod to minority groups would distract from the goal of publicly addressing
misogyny—a classic refrain of white feminism. Without addressing the consequences of political
action in ideal and nonideal terms, Orlie communicates that one problem with political action is that
it has the potential to be too generalized and too ideal to help prevent the oversights of white
feminism. In particular, Orlie notes that in this situation, “political action required that we question
our own and others’ ‘identities.’”42 From Orlie’s perspective, political action necessitates recognizing
how race, class, sexuality, and gender—not merely gender alone—affect the public perception of a
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case like the Central Park jogger. However, according to Orlie, many white feminists at the time
denied the value of recognizing intersectional identities and instead acted as if their fight for gender
justice was generalizable beyond race, class, and sexuality. In this sense, the political action invoked
by white feminists in this case actively ignores the nonideal and intersectional positionality of other
activists fighting to shape public perception around this high-profile case.
In her survey essay, “Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt,” as well as her book
Turning Operations, Mary Dietz argues that a number of feminist critiques of Arendt focus on the
gendered division between private (female) and public (male) and therein forget that the labor-workaction division in The Human Condition is descriptive, not normative. In other words, she claims that
Arendt is not claiming that women ought to remain in the private realm whereas men ought to
belong in the public. Instead, she is making descriptive statements—women labor and men work.
Dietz claims that leaves action ungendered and open to whoever musters up the courage to act and
speak, risking ridicule and dismissal. Additionally, she claims that “Without action to insert new
beginnings (natality) into the play of the world, Arendt writes, there is nothing new under the sun;
without speech, there is no memorialization, no remembrance.”43 Dietz’s interpretation claims that
Arendtian political action ought to be reaffirmed by feminists.
Less optimistically, Hanna Pitkin argues alongside Villa and Canovan, that those who are
capable of political action “resemble posturing little boys clamoring for attention. (‘Look at me! I’m
the greatest!’ ‘No, look at me!’)”44 Pitkin draws careful attention to the small and privileged number
of people—white males—that are most capable of Arendtian political action. In all, a plethora of
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feminist critiques, some even aware of intersectionality and the dangers of white feminism, have
debated the merits of Arendtian political action.45
Philosophy of Race Critiques
And last of all, as has been made clear in the introduction, Kathryn Sophia Belle published
the preeminent critical philosophy of race-influenced critique of Arendt’s private-social-public
divide. In short, Belle argues that the tripartite construction racistly assigns desegregation to the
social category, as opposed to the public. It is important to note here that Belle argues that Arendt
holds differing positions on what is public and what is social for whites and Blacks. Though Belle
does not explicitly focus on political action, it is impossible for her analysis of Arendt’s anti-Black
racism in the private-social-public divide to not engage with the contents of the public realm—
action. In essence, the deeds of the Black students on the frontlines of desegregation do not count
as political action for Arendt under Belle’s argument—they are instead demoted to the social realm.
In Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship since Brown v. Board of Education, Danielle Allen
also agrees that political action is reserved for the Achilles-like characters throughout history, and
that for Arendt, desegregation was a social matter, not a public one. Instead, political action ought to
“secure political rights, like the rights to vote and hold public office, and also private rights, like the
right to marry whom we please.”46 Political action did not include young adults and children on the
frontlines of desegregation. As Allen and Belle point out, desegregation was considered a social issue
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because she claimed it had to do with “nonheroic economic and ‘vital’ interests.” In other words,
47

Arendt believed that the Black parents that sent their children to previously segregated schools were
doing so for personal economic gain. Though more will be said in depth about Arendt’s troubled
analysis of desegregation in the final chapter, it is helpful to note that these two philosophers have
paved the way for continued research into Arendt’s problematic theorization around race.
Part II: Ideal Political Action
Now that I have outlined some of the basic concepts in Arendt’s theory of political action, in
the ensuing section I argue that the concept is ideal, as in utopian, in nature and therefore
susceptible to overgeneralizations which too often exclude minoritized individuals and groups. I
begin by briefly explaining how I take up the terms “ideal” and “nonideal” before applying them to
Arendt’s inspiration for the public realm and political action—the polis. As Chapter 3 explains in
more detail, Arendt was no stranger to storytelling. I claim that her account of the ancient polis is
fictionalized in a way that makes it ideal and therefore exclusionary. I then turn to Charles Mills’s
work on ideal theory to further support my reading of political action as ideal in The Human
Condition. Applying Mills’s philosophy of ideal theory to Arendtian political action in this text reveals
how Arendt’s desire for a more active and collaborative political culture is undermined by her ideal
and utopian approach.
In reading The Human Condition as ideal, I claim that this text has a realistic potential to
prioritize whites and marginalize people of color. It is important, however, to first define my use of
“ideal.” According to Laura Valentini, political philosophers have taken up the distinction between
ideal and nonideal theory, yet there is no standard interpretation for what those terms mean. In her
article, “Ideal vs. non-ideal theory: a conceptual map,” Valentini separates the terms into three
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categories: “(i) full compliance vs. partial compliance theory; (ii) utopian vs. realistic theory; and (iii)
end-state vs. transitional theory.”48 For my purposes, I am taking up the second distinction between
ideal and nonideal wherein the ideal links up with a utopic goal or sense of normative political action
whereas the nonideal approach advocates for a political action that is more reflective of and
responsive to the actual cultural and societal surroundings of a culture, society, or country. Within
the context of The Human Condition, I argue that Arendt’s political action is utopian in that it reflects
how political action ought to be in a best possible world. But, there is no acknowledgement for how
to move from the ideal version of political action to real world application of it.
In this most basic sense, an ideal account of political action could be as innocuous as
advocating for a political realm where everyone’s voice is genuinely heard and everyone’s actions are
recognized as worthy. Concretely, this could look like a push for an abundance of communities with
robust civic discourse opportunities that encourage everyone's involvement, or the pursuit of
legislation that expands and simplifies the voting process. Indubitably, these are noble endeavors.
Yet, like most critiques of utopian visions of a political world, there is no guarantee that it will come
about—the same can be said of Arendtian political action.49 Yes, it is a worthy cause to fight for
everyone’s “right to have rights,”50 or the opportunity to engage with other people in meaningful
ways that aim to benefit society; however, the critique of such an ideal approach is that it is all too
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easy to become frustrated with or dismissive of because it lacks normative guidelines for how to
bring about such a world.
Another way to look at how political action in The Human Condition is ideal is to examine
Arendt’s model for the concept. In the larger context of the book, she argues that proper political
action is missing from the modern world and we need to reintroduce it. According to Arendt, we
ought to model our concept of political action on the Ancient Greek and Roman model of how
citizens acted and spoke in the polis.51 Though she has critiques of the polis model, and is aware of
some of its downfalls, Arendt claims that in order to prioritize political action we ought to return to
antiquity. Though I do not think she means historical antiquity—the ancient Greek and Roman
model she takes up is fictionalized to improve, or at the very least, point out, its limitations. This
fictionalized account cherry-picks the benefits of the polis model, such as embracing a community
space where men spend their time discussing and debating politics, while leaving out the
warmongering rhetoric of expansion and defense. She does claim that she wants to avoid the use of
rhetoric and violent persuasion which she acknowledges was an active part of late antiquity polis life,
but instead wants us to recall “the specifically human way of answering, talking back and measuring
up to whatever happened or was done” in the city-state that day.52 In this initial characterization of
the model that Arendt wants us to embrace in order to revive political action, we see a fictionalized
and idealized polis that points to a utopian vision—one that is not fully reflective of its historical
example nor one that easily and readily transfer over to the real world.
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Insightfully, she makes it clear that she is aware of how exclusionary, and therefore further
ideal, the polis model is: “The Greeks, whose city-state was the most individualistic and least
conformable body politic known to us, were quite aware of the fact that the polis, with its emphasis
on action and speech, could survive only if the number of citizens remained restricted.”53 She even
goes on to include a footnote that states that Xenophon exaggeratingly, but poignantly, stated that in
a Spartan marketplace of 4000 people, maybe 60 citizens would be present.54 In using the ancient
polis model, Arendt notes how only a few citizens would have been able to participate; yet, she does
not go so far as to introduce solutions to these problems. The brief acknowledgement to how the
polis model excludes women, slaves, and even poorer citizens who don’t have the ability to take time
out of their workday to be politically active additionally points to the idealized, utopian nature of the
setting of political action.
In addition to its exclusionary nature, the polis model is too generalized—a common
limitation of ideal theory. Take for example when Arendt describes political life in the polis: “To be
political, to live in a polis, meant that everything was decided through words and persuasion and not
through force and violence.”55 Here she is stating that political existence consists of debate and
dialogue with one’s peers in an environment free from extortion and other forms of violence. But
mere debate and dialogue seems to paint an idyllic picture of political action in which everyone is
getting along, and waiting their turn patiently to be heard. This is far from the reality of many
political debates or discussions. The picture closer to reality is, I think, Jacques Louis David’s Tennis
Court Oath which depicts the chaotic motion of competing conversations and sidelined impassioned
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pleas being made all the while the oath to join the fight against the monarchy by French
revolutionaries is being read. Instead, Arendt gives us an all too generalized picture of nondescript
actors listening and speaking patiently with one another. David’s painting better reflects the kind of
disorderly nature of political action than Arendt’s idealized and overly generalized account does.
Much of the chapter on action in The Human Condition aims to claim that all political
philosophy and politics have ignored and defied, since ancient Greece and Rome, the human
condition of political action; therefore, she claims, we must return to the ideal scenario that allowed
for political action. Because most political leaders since antiquity have been attempting to rule in the
public realm instead of cultivating a space for political action, she says that “the commonplace
notion already to be found in Plato and Aristotle that every political community consists of those
who rule and those who are ruled...rests on a suspicion of action rather than on a contempt for men,
and arose from the earnest desire to find a substitute for action rather than from any irresponsible or
tyrannical will to power.”56 In other words, in the ruler-ruled relationship, there is no room, Arendt
tells us, for political action—the ruler commands and the ruled follow out those commands. For
Plato and Aristotle, Arendt claims that they did not want political action to interfere with the
unambiguous relationship between rulers and the ruled. While this situation can be interpreted as
“tyrannical will to power,” Arendt points out that Plato and Aristotle, instead, desired an efficient
political order. Yet, not all rulers during and after their time were as noble as they would have
desired. In this sense, political action has been largely lost since antiquity and replaced by political
leaders who desire power over their populations. The suspicion of action has made its way through
the modern era and according to Arendt has pushed the possibility for its revival out of the way.
Instead of working with the current situation that includes a suspicion of action, Arendt claims we
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need to remodel our political existence—a move that appeals to a utopian vision of purely respectful
and engaged political debate.
Mills on Ideal Theory
I now turn to Charles Mills and his theory on the dangers of ideal theory in order to examine
political action’s ideological potential. In his article, “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideological,” Mills argues that
ideal theory runs the risk of being ideological and, therefore, dangerous to found one’s political
theory on if the interests of all inhabitants in the political realm are to be taken seriously. He argues
that ideal theory is most conducive to those in power—largely this consists of white males, as well as
white females. In the article, Mills argues that ideal theory “is really an ideology, a distortional complex
of ideas, values, norms, and beliefs that reflects the nonrepresentative interests and experiences of a
small minority of the national population—middle-to-upper class white males—who are hugely overrepresented in the professional philosophical population.”57 For Mills, political philosophers that
continue to use ideal theory, such as Arendt, do so out of self-interest and at the cost of people of
color and other minorities. Additionally, the continued, unexamined use of Arendt’s idealized
conception of political action by the “over-represented” in philosophy—white men, and to a slightly
lesser degree, white women—simply reifies the exclusionary nature of the concept. In other words,
if we continue to claim that Arendt’s concept of political action, as it is described in The Human
Condition, is unproblematically useful then we also run the risk of excluding individuals from
historically minoritized groups from political action.
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More concretely, Mills claims that ideal theory creates some or all of the following: (1) “An
idealized social ontology;”58 (2) “Idealized capacities;”59 (3) “Silence on oppression;”60 (4) “Ideal
social institutions;”61 (5) “An idealized cognitive sphere;”62 and (6) “Strict compliance.”63 In (1), the
use of ideal theory distances the theorist from social and cultural conditions of experience such as
power dynamics found in “structural dominance, exploitation, coercion, oppression.”64 Doing so
reinforces relations of superiority and inferiority, in addition to the development of social
hierarchies. In this sense, Arendtian political action is promoted as a way to effectively engage with
other people in public; yet, we are given no indication that Arendt has accounted for the vast
number of people who would not be able to participate in political action—women who, out of
necessity, stay at home to care for children, undocumented immigrants, those who must spend their
time working out of economic necessity and have no additional time to spend as political actors, the
incarcerated, etc. Arendt is aware of how few people are able to participate in the polis-inspired
model of political action but she does not offer a solution to this problem. Instead, her normative
account of political action aims for the utopian vision of a fictionalized Greek-revival and in turn
ignores the systemic power dynamics at play that restrains a large number of people from
participating.
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Similarly, the “idealized capacities” aspect of Mills’ argument claims that ideal theory asserts
individuals are capable of utopian feats—this does not need to go so far as to claim that moral
agents can achieve world peace, but something like universal consensus on political issues would
apply. He points out that these purported capabilities or achievements are not realistic for the most
privileged elite and, obviously, even less so for those who experience oppression or domination in
society. The idealized capacities we can see in political action first speaks to those privileged elite—
those who have time and energy at their disposal to engage in organized debates with others or
participate in marches or other forms of activism. Even with the time available, the privileged elite,
according to Mills, would still be set up to fail—they are not going to reach a consensus in a debate
because that is not realistic. For those who experience systems of domination or oppression, for
instance an undocumented immigrant, might not even have the opportunity to speak on their
experience in a debate concerning immigration reform; and if they do, their testimony could easily
be discounted. In advocating for a vision of political action that claims it is fundamental to the
human condition of living in relation with other humans—“Action, the only activity that goes on
directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter”65—makes it seem as though,
naturally, all are capable of speaking and acting in public wherein they are heard and seen in a
genuine way. Epistemic injustices are too much a part of daily life for those in historically
marginalized groups to be as readily capable of political action as Arendt purports.66
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Mills’ claim that ideal theory encourages “silence on oppression” is closely related to the
previous “idealized capacities.” In choosing to use ideal theory, the result is that systems and
experiences of oppression are disregarded. Take for instance the father of liberal democratic ideal
theory—John Rawls and his A Theory of Justice.67 Rawls’s original position strips away the individual’s
identity and historical circumstances in order to develop the principle of justice. But, as many have
argued,68 removing individual particularities might get all rational persons to agree to the principles
but it does not guarantee that those principles will then appropriately serve minoritized individuals
once the veil of ignorance is lifted. That is to say, aiming for idealized principles inherently ignores
or erases histories of oppression and therein likely does not account for the continued existence of
oppression. Interestingly, as noted above, Arendt does acknowledge that the polis model of political
action is rooted in a slave-based economy where only a few would be able to participate in speech
and action; yet, she never addresses how to overcome the problem of small numbers of political
actors. In this text, she does not give a voice to those who, out of necessity, might not be able to be
political actors. In so doing, she silences the oppression that they experience and mutes them from
speaking out against that oppression. In this sense, systemic oppression is ignored, and if we
continue to encourage Arendtian political action, we too run the risk of reproducing the same
conditions.
Next, the “ideal social institutions” aspect of ideal theory goes hand in hand with “an
idealized cognitive sphere.” By the first, Mills references institutions such as the family or legal
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systems. These become idealized which result in a failure to see how these social institutions actually
do or could work. Similarly, the “idealized cognitive sphere” results in individual, cognitive
insensitivities to how oppression operates. In other words, women, people of color, or the poor,
under an ideal theory, are not thought of as oppressed, so social institutions and individuals don’t
respond to or react in light of the actual oppression. Take for instance how the medical-health
system does not recognize that Black mothers are dying at higher rates than white mothers in
hospitals.69 Under ideal theory, when the claim is made that the medical-health system in a highly
developed nation such as the U.S. should have a low-maternal death rate, that claim ignores the real
data which demonstrates Black mothers are treated irresponsibly by health professionals.70 This lack
of knowledge operates both at the institutional level in addition to the individual level. Arendtian
political action in its ideal state affects participation in social institutions because action is reserved
for those who are able to participate in the public realm—largely white, male citizens. The way that
political action is thought of does not account for those who are excluded from political action
because of factors such as systemic oppression.
In The Human Condition, political action is conceived of as requiring “strict compliance” with
the idealized framework of the polis model. I think the best way to see this is through Arendt’s strict
adherence to the private-public-social divide. It is only in the public realm that political action can
occur.71 Only through the idealized division of spheres can political action take place.
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With the features of ideal theory laid out, Mills asks us to question how we were ever able to
achieve the goals, in his case, of ethical action if we are appealing to a clearly biased approach. In the
same way, it is relevant to ask how effective Arendtian political action is when it is presented in an
ideal form. I think that from the relatively privileged position that Arendt experienced when she
wrote The Human Condition, it is plausible and helpful to consider that her academic and economic
success might have desensitized her to the oversights in utilizing such an idealized account of
political action.
Charles Mills and Arendtian Political Action
Given Mills’s critiques of ideal theory, I next address how Arendt’s use of ideal theory
undermines aspects of political action including the web of human relations, plurality, and natality.
Web of Human Relations
In its ideal state, the web of human relations is reflective of the inextricable connection
completely unique humans, with varying and competing interests and desires, have with one another.
However, this picture of interpersonal human relationships glosses over systems of oppression and
provides a fictionalized account of what Mills calls the social ontology by ignoring or suppressing
the existence of power dynamics. The web of human relations, one could argue, implicitly accounts
for systems of oppression that might affect individuals because Arendt makes clear that those who
present themselves in the public realm are all unique individuals. Unique individuals are bound to
have differing experience of oppression and power dynamics. However, recognition of the banal—
that we are all unique—is not enough to counteract oppression. If Arendt wants her concept of the
web of human relations to truly capture the diversity, yet connectedness, of the human experience,
then she needs to account for the fact that the web, in fact, extends into the private and social
realms of existence.
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To return to the spiderweb analogy, some threads are also stronger than others which, in
turn, are more capable of producing the outcomes those individuals are personally invested in. The
connections we have as humans are constituted by our particular identity—race, gender, religion,
economic status, etc. This is an unavoidable feature of human relationships, and by glossing over it,
Arendt overlooks how power dynamics and systems of oppression affect people’s ability to be
political actors. In this reading, Arendt’s web is reflective of the generalized white male citizen’s
experience of interacting with others politically. This moves beyond Arendt’s initial use of the polismodel in that the web image itself caters to those already in power.
Plurality
According to Arendt, the conditions of political action are plurality and natality. Plurality, or
as Arendt characterizes it, “the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world...is
specifically the condition--not the conditio sine qua non, but the conditio per quam--of all political life.”72 It
is no small matter that plurality and natality are the conditions that cause all political life. Yet, the
manner in which Arendt discusses these two conditions is ideal, and according to Mills, runs the risk
of being ideological in that it mainly caters to those who do not experience oppression or
domination—wealthy, white, straight, cis-gendered, currently able-bodied men. I now turn to these
two causal conditions of political life, assess their ideal nature, and assert their ideological
implications.
Arendt states that plurality “is the condition of human action because we are all the same,
that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or
will live.”73 Arendt’s understanding of plurality appears to merely reference the multitudinous
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populations on earth. It does not appear to equate the concept of diversity which is more inclusive
of diverse populations of people who have varied experiences. Instead, plurality is the abstracted,
ideal way to understand the human condition of action. In a way, it is a snowflake approach to
humanity—all humans are unique just like snowflakes. However, this approach ignores pervasive
conditions of inequality and discrimination. It is harmful to start with overarching claims of equality,
which are, unfortunately, blatantly false in reality. If we start with the assumption that all humans are
equal74—which in an idealized, theoretical sense we do want—but do not go on to add in
protections to ensure the equal treatment, reception, or recognition of all humans then it is a futile,
doomed starting point. Arendt’s concept of plurality in this text is that futile starting point. I think
that for political action to be truly capable for all humans, Arendt’s concept of plurality needs to
recognize the diversity of experiences based on factors such as race and gender.
As Michael Omi explains in his article, “Rethinking the Language of Race and Racism,”
there is a prevalent “common sense” about race and racism that I think Arendt herself was
unconsciously entertaining in The Human Condition.75 Omi, writing in the early 2000s, states that there
are a few themes prevalent in this new “common sense,” all of which misunderstand how race
functions. One theme of this racial “common sense” that relates to Arendt, is the prevailing idea
that we need to get beyond race because continuing to fixate on it further divides people. He states
that “race is seen as a smokescreen or an apparition that detracts our collective attention from the
‘real’ issues,”76 when in fact, the opposite is true. Instead, claiming that a cultural fixation on race is
74 It is helpful to note that in The Human Condition Arendt does not discuss protections against inequality, though she
does in On Revolution and The Origins of Totalitarianism.
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harmful is itself a “smokescreen.” Conversations about how race functions, at an individual and
societal level, is instrumental in unifying people. In terms of Arendt’s concept of plurality, I think
she is calling for a more unified humanity that, even though everyone is unique, shares this call for
unification that Omi warns against. If Arendt wants people to come together and learn how to be
politically active again, instead of embracing this desire to leave the earth, she needs to account for
racial diversity, not simply gloss over it.
Arendt’s further description of plurality is that it “has the twofold character of equality and
distinction.”77 Though it is implausible that Arendt would have intended to communicate this, I find
it interesting to draw a connection between the phrase “equality and distinction” and “separate but
equal.” Plurality, according to Arendt, accounts for the equal footing that humans share by virtue of
being human and the unique accidents and qualities that we all have. These are what bring about
political action. If we were all the same—lacking distinction—there would be no need for political
action because we would not need to share our interests or desires nor would we need to act to set
ourselves apart from one another.78 Yet, the idea of distinction seems to only reference the fact that
we are all unique—certainly, a fact about our human existence that ought to be recognized—and not
that particular categories of uniqueness, like race and gender, affects the perception of equality. In
other words, the idea of distinction does not account for diversity. More importantly, it is necessary
to distinguish between recognizing someone’s uniqueness from recognizing the systems of
domination and oppression they are subject to on a daily basis.
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Take for instance when Arendt states that “Human distinctness is not the same as
otherness.”79 In order for political action to be more inclusive, it ought to additionally account for
otherness. She goes on to define “otherness” as something shared with all existence and all things,
whereas “distinctness” is reserved for living beings. In other words, she designates “distinctness” as
a characteristic of being (animal, insect, human, etc.) while “otherness” can refer to chairs and cities
and nationalities. She goes on to state that through speech and action “men distinguish themselves
instead of being merely distinct” which can be made sense of given her introductory worries about
the rise of the social realm and with it, conformism.80 Arendt opens The Human Condition by
expressing concern about the rise in social conformity that is interested in appropriate behavior.
Political action, and its ability to reveal one’s distinctness is about fighting social conformity. It is not
concerned with embracing multiculturalism and racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity.
Natality
After studying under Martin Heidegger, Arendt was well aware of his claim to understand
human existence as rooted in the anticipation of death. Instead of aligning herself with Heidegger on
this point, Arendt develops her own ontology on the basis of birth. Arendt argues that human
existence is marked by birth, and as a condition of this birth, humans are political beings. Explaining
her perspective on the reality that all humans are born and how that fact relates to the human
activity of acting, she writes, “of the three, action has the closest connection with the human
condition of natality; the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only
because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting.”81 As
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soon as a human being is born they are instantly capable of acting in the world which designates
them as a political agent according to Arendt. Natality, the condition of being born, is the definition
of human existence for Arendt because at the moment of birth, a human being is capable of acting
in the world. This act of being born and the political are inseparable “since action is the political
activity par excellence, natality, and not mortality, may be the central category of political, as
distinguished from metaphysical, thought.”82 The political being is one that acts through speech and
action, which means that these activities coincide with birth.
Though Mills’s critique of ideal theory is largely directed at ethics and moral action, I think
that his claim about the harm of idealized capacities applies to Arendtian political action as well. In
ideal theory, if one’s capacities are idealized—they are thought capable of more than they actually
are—not only are those people doomed to fall short of their purported capability, but Mills claims
“they end up disabled in crucial aspects.”83 Within the context of natality and its relation to political
action, if we assume everyone—because everyone has been born—is capable of political action, we
ignore the circumstances, such as citizenship requirements or various forms of discrimination, that
impede certain groups of people from participating. Additionally, we then do not build into our
account of political action ways to include those who might experience discrimination. In this sense,
we can see how an idealized account of a condition of political action—one where everyone is
capable of participating because they were born—caters to those in the powerful minority.
Take for instance the case of Crystal Mason, a Black woman who was sentenced to five years
in prison in March of 2018 for casting a provisional ballot for the 2016 presidential election while on
probation. Texas, the state Ms. Mason resides in, prohibits ex-felons from voting. Ms. Mason was
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unaware of the law restricting her from casting a ballot and the provisional ballot she attempted to
cast was not counted. Yet, Judge Ruben Gonzalez sentenced her to five years in prison. In a New
York Times interview, Ms. Mason said, “‘I showed my kids that no matter what you can get out and
get your life in order...But sometimes, regardless of whatever your past is, you are still going to be
beat up for it.’”84 Ms. Mason’s case has garnered national attention, particularly since Terri Lynn
Rote, a white woman from Iowa, was sentenced to only two months of probation after admitting
she intentionally voted for Donald Trump twice in the 2016 election.85 This case provides real details
on how natality does not appropriately account for forms of discrimination, like institutional racism.
Ms. Mason’s race, in addition to discrimination that comes along with misdemeanors and felonies,
played an active role in her sentence, unlike the case of Ms. Rote. The failure to protect against
discrimination which impedes one’s ability to participate politically is an unfortunate oversight in
Arendt’s theory. It is an oversight due to the ideal nature of political action in The Human Condition
which overlooks conditions of inequality and discrimination.
Arendt’s idealized theorization of political action diminishes its applicability. By promoting
ideal aspirations for political action, her narrow account of the concept impedes many people from
participating. While her ideal approach is valuable because it affords us worthwhile goals, it is
unrealistic to think many would be able to participate in active political lives like those she argues
for. In Mills’ words, “the best way to bring about the ideal is by recognizing the nonideal, and that
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by assuming the ideal or the near-ideal, one is only guaranteeing the perpetuation of the nonideal.”
86

Arendtian political action aims to be accessible by everyone, by virtue of their birth into this world,
but as this section has pointed out, she falls short of that goal. If she wants to “bring about the
ideal” scenario wherein all can be political actors, then it is necessary to account for the nonideal—
such as experiences of oppression and discrimination. In the following and final section of this
chapter I elaborate on how the ideal nature of political action in The Human Condition has
implications beyond Arendtian thought.
Part III: Implications of Ideal Political Action
The ideal nature of political action in The Human Condition has ramifications beyond Arendt’s
thought. Most significantly, the way she constructs political action erases racial difference, is
exclusionary in that it largely applies to those who experience privilege, and it does not guard against
epistemic injustice. Though these ramifications have been mentioned throughout the previous
section, I now explain how political action plays an active role in each.
Erasure of Racial Difference
Plurality, which I have previously argued is not the same things as diversity in Arendt’s
thought, ignores racial difference and encourages a whitewashing of political actors. A whitewashed
public realm then largely serves white male citizens who are able to speak and act, reveal their
identity to others, and shape political decisions. When others are left out of the public realm, their
voices, identity, and concerns, which can be tied up with their racial and gendered identities, do not
affect public affairs. Recall that Arendt’s inspiration for ideal political actors comes from the male
citizens who come to the ancient polis to speak and act—the concept, as it is described in The Human
Condition, does not have room to include noncitizens, or slaves, or women, or laborers. And even
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though Arendt is aware that only a small number of people in the ancient model were able to
participate as political actors, she does not overtly accept how problematic her model is in its
capacity to erase racial difference. She, instead, appeals to natality—the fact that we are all born and
therefore capable of acting—to claim that all have the capacity to be political actors. The capacity
exists, yet there are no protections in place to guarantee that all can actually participate politically.
Put differently, there is no mechanism in Arendt’s thought to move the ideal version of political
action into the real world. Arendt herself is critical of how few people are political actors when she
wrote The Human Condition, but she argues this is the result of economic concerns that ought to be
confined to the private realm overtaking the public realm where action occurs. Her concern is not
with systems of oppression and discrimination that impede political action for people of color or
minority populations.
Similarly, the Combahee River Collective, a Black feminist organization, and their famous
1977 statement addresses the pervasive erasure of racialized and gendered identities in the Civil
Rights Movement and the predominantly white Feminist Movement. Their critiques of the erasure
of racial difference help to contextualize Arendt’s overgeneralized account of political action. As the
Combahee River Collective statement makes clear, racial identity matters in political action. They
state that “There have always been Black women activists...who have had a shared awareness of how
their sexual identity combined with their racial identity to make their whole life situation and the
focus of their political struggles unique.”87 The unique experiences of oppression and domination
that the Combahee River Collective speak of is the kind of unique plurality for which Arendtian
political action needs to make space. The way that Arendt describes plurality, a collection of equal
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and distinct people, is not reflective of power relations in reality. Arendt erases the racial differences
that are inherent in distinction, and therefore erases conditions which impede groups of people from
political action. The Collective states that they are “committed to working on those struggles in
which race, sex, and class are simultaneous factors in oppression.”88 Because of its ideal nature,
political action overlooks these interlocking experiences of oppression and in turn overlooks how
ineffective the concept is in practice.
Instead, what Arendt’s plurality needs is a nonideal recognition of racial difference. In this
sense, plurality could anticipate and acknowledge the discrimination and oppression that most
people of color experience. Because identity is revealed through political action, according to
Arendt, it is imperative that a vast diversity of people are able to participate so that the public realm
mirrors the diverse needs and desires of different people. If political action is limited to elite, white
men, then not only are political concerns debated and decided by and for those people, but those
people are known and remembered because of their public presence. The continued dominance of
white and male ideals perpetuates itself through political action unless safeguards are established to
acknowledge the political needs and desires of others.
In order to further explore what a nonideal approach to plurality might look like I turn to
decolonial feminist philosopher, María Lugones. Lugones, in “Playfulness, ‘World’-Traveling, and
Loving Perception,” encourages a different kind of “plurality” than Arendt’s.89 Lugones’s sense of
plurality is individual—in that each individual can be plural in their identification—as well as
collective. Considering Arendt’s account of plurality alongside Lugones is helpful because it further
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addresses how Arendt’s ideal version falls short. Arguing within a feminist context, Lugones
encourages a “plurality in and among women” that is brought about by love.90 Though the concept
is not a reference to Arendt’s concept of plurality, Lugones addition of love opens up space, that
Arendt misses, for individual differences. In an individual sense, Lugones is speaking from a
personal perspective as an Argentinian woman residing in the United States, experiencing varied
levels of comfort depending on who she is speaking with—friends and family from Argentina she is
comfortable being playful around, as opposed to coworkers in the United States with whom she is
not comfortable being playful. She deems the two realms of experience “worlds” which she finds
herself traveling between. The two “worlds” that she describes point to the idea of an individual
plurality—“I am suggesting that I can understand my confusion about whether I am or am not
playful by saying that I am both and that I am different persons in different ‘worlds.’”91 Her
individual plurality speaks to varied experiences that people have when they inhabit different parts
of the world. If one of these worlds impedes free expression such as playfulness, then love is needed
to support the individual.
Additionally, in terms of collective plurality, Lugones’s encourages “world”-traveling
“because by traveling to their ‘world’ we can understand what it is to be them and what it is to be ourselves
in their eyes.”92 The plurality of a multitude of other people’s lived experiences can only be understood
if one is willing to “travel” to that person’s world. Though some Arendt scholars would argue that
her concept of the enlarged mentality aims to do just that, it is at least clear that Arendt did not
account for the fact that people’s ability to be political actors can change based on location, power
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dynamics, and systems of oppression. Arendt’s concept of plurality benefits from Lugones’ sense of
plurality which addresses people’s and groups of people’s diverse experiences.
Privilege
As explained above, the polis-based model for political action is problematic because it only
applied to Greek or Roman citizens. In this sense, the model privileges those already in position of
power and authority. However, as Arendt scholar Dana Villa makes clear,93 Arendt was well aware of
the fact that the ancient model was exclusive and flawed. But, Arendt does little more than reference
the exclusive nature of political action. Instead, her focus shifts to what allows for political action to
arise—plurality and natality. After exploring how Arendt’s theorization of plurality produces an
erasure of racial difference, I now turn to how natality reinforces exclusivity beyond the polis model
through white privilege.
As previously discussed, the idea of natality is what allows us to be political actors because
the act of birth imbues us with “the capacity of beginning something anew.”94 According to Arendt’s
logic, since we are all born, we possess the capacity to be political actors. Logically and theoretically,
this follows. However, it is an ideal approach which overlooks lived experiences which contend with
oppression and marginalization. In reality, the fact of one’s birth, whether due to race, gender, or
disability status, often plays a significant role in one’s ability to act. It is reasonable to assume that
Arendt understands natality from a normative perspective, because as a stateless and rightless person
herself at one point in her life, she knew the ability to freely act is not guaranteed. Yet, even as a
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normative statement—that by virtue of the fact that we all were born, we all ought to be capable of
political action—the lived experiences of historically minoritized individuals are often testaments to
the difficulty of achieving this normative goal.
In order to further contextualize my assessment of natality, I turn to philosopher George
Yancy. In his introductory article to a special volume of the Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal
focusing on race and racialization in the history of philosophy, Yancy writes about his lived
experience as a Black philosopher. The following quote, communicates his experience in the field:
“As a Black philosopher, I write about race from a lived position, from a site of racialized Erlebnis,
one that is not about experiential generalities, but concrete particularities. It is not an exercise in a
species of philosophical abstraction that is able to bracket out how the topic of race impacts my
everyday existence, my embodied existence, my being in-the-world.”95 Yancy’s approach to writing
about race is nonideal. He states that he does not abstract away from the particularities of his
everyday life as a Black, male philosopher. His existence is entwined with his racialized experience.
In this sense, it follows that Yancy’s lived experience is not abstractable or generalizable to the point
where his race is negligible. To do so would “bracket out” his personal experience of race.
At the time Arendt wrote The Human Condition she was a United States-based scholar and
professor experiencing economic security and academic recognition. While she certainly experienced
persecution as a Jew in Europe and likely experienced antisemitism while living in the United States,
she did not experience the same racial discrimination that Yancy does as a Black male philosopher.
In turn, her limited personal experience and minimal interest in how race can impede political
involvement in the United States affected her ability to propose an account of political action that
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considers real impediments to political action. Put differently, Arendt’s relative privilege made her
insensitive to the lived experience of race and how that can negatively affect one’s ability to be a
political actor within a U.S. context. Yancy communicates that his race affects everything from
riding an elevator with white women,96 to his teaching assignments,97 to fielding virulent emails that
were the backlash of a news radio appearance.98 Though Arendt certainly faced persecution and
narrowly escaped death because of her race, her experience of being raced was largely diminished
once she arrived in the United States. In this sense, her position of privilege and resistance to
understanding more about the diversity of racialized experiences in the United States impeded a
nonideal approach to political action. Instead, The Human Condition generalizes race and abstracts
from the lived experiences Yancy bears witness to.
Yancy goes on to emphasize that his race is always a factor in his ability to exist freely. In
Arendtian terms, an accidental quality of his birth—that he was born a Black baby in the United
States—did not allow for his free and equal access to be a political actor. Without a doubt, Yancy is
an effective and powerful political actor in his capacity as a well published scholar, activist, and
professor; however, the crucial point is that his birth, his natality did not automatically afford him
access to political action. Instead, he writes that his “Black body is situated within history, a history
that is racially oppressive and violent. It is part of a larger social integument, a social skin, that has
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claimed my body to be ontologically problematic, inferior, ersatz, hypersexual, sexually deranged,
violent, lacking imagination, animalistic, and human-like if not simply unhuman.”99 Unlike white
bodies, Yancy’s skin significantly affects his ability to not only act, but exist safely. There is nothing
in the concept of natality and its connection to political action that accounts for the lived experience
of oppression and domination. Natality abstracts away from the lived experience of people and
largely caters to those whose race is, wrongly, considered invisible—white folks.
Epistemic Injustice
Speech is the main manifestation of political action, according to Arendt. She even states
that “many, and even most acts, are performed in the manner of speech.”100 In this final section of
the chapter I turn to Miranda Fricker and José Medina’s work on epistemic injustice to further
problematize Arendt’s ideal account of political action in The Human Condition.101
Miranda Fricker’s article “Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of
Knowing,” a precursor to her 2007 book Epistemic Injustice, focuses on the testimony of oppressed or
marginalized individuals which she argues are frequently dismissed or derided. Her overall project is
to merge virtue theory with practices of epistemic justice. In other words, Fricker argues that by
consciously reflecting on why we decide to believe someone’s testimony, we can develop virtuous
habits of listening that protect against prejudice. She writes that “an epistemic climate in which some
people suffer systematic testimonial injustice must be regarded as seriously defective both
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To combat epistemic injustice Fricker proposes what she calls a

“Reflexive Critical Openness” which aims to encourage individuals to examine and grapple with
their own prejudice in order to adjust their reaction to speakers they might otherwise hold biases
against.
The virtue of reflexive critical openness is developed like any other Aristotelian virtue—
through intentional habituation. Fricker’s approach to developing epistemic justice is another
necessary consideration when taking up Arendt’s idealized understanding of those who can speak in
the public realm as political actors. Combating epistemic injustices which impede others from being
heard in the public realm can help to expand the number of possible political actors in a way that
pays close attention to nonideal systems of oppression and marginalization. The virtue Fricker
argues we ought to develop aims to, first, be reflexive, or critically reflective of how bias and
prejudice might impede us from believing another person’s statements or claims. We also ought to
develop what Fricker calls a “testimonial sensibility”103 through the virtue of critical openness.
Fricker claims that everyone has a testimonial sensibility, or the ability to judge another person’s
claims. But the ability to judge is affected by social constructions such as race, gender, and ability.
Fricker advocates for an intentional development of this sensibility that critically engages with
personal biases. In this sense, she claims we ought to be critical of our biases and open to changing
our perceptions in order to develop a virtuous testimonial sensibility that fairly engages with other
people’s statements. Put together, the virtue of reflexive critical openness aims to develop a
testimonial sensibility that reacts to the critical engagement of our own biases when listening to and
deciding to believe other people’s claims.
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Fricker’s reflexive critical openness can help to combat epistemic injustice in Arendt’s public
realm. First, it is important to recognize the prevalence of epistemic injustices which diminish
political actors from being heard. While Arendt would claim that political action does not necessitate
being heard because the attempt alone is what constitutes action, it is worth considering the
limitations to continued political action if epistemic injustices are not intentionally combated.
Consider someone experiencing homelessness who attends a townhall meeting to share their
experiences and testify to their needs.104 If this person’s testimony is not fairly considered in
accordance with the virtue of reflexive critical openness, it is unlikely they will return to advocate for
their needs. For those whose testimony or political speech is often disregarded, not only is their
speech disregarded but the likelihood of continuing to speak is diminished. This once again
establishes a community of political actors that does not represent diverse experiences and political
needs. Instead, those who are already listened to continue to act and speak in the public realm.
Those privileged elites then shape the political environment and their needs and desires are met
through political action.
In José Medina’s book, The Epistemology of Resistance, he also investigates the way in which
minoritized groups of people are not listened to. He introduces the claim that personal testimonies
of oppression can counter how oppressed persons are considered within the confines of their
society and government. Medina’s scholarship intentionally operates at the nonideal level.
Testimony, for Medina, involve “exchanges…in which communicators participate as knowers and
possible epistemic benefits can be obtained.”105 Allowing for people to voice their experiences in

104 It is worth noting that social conditions already discourage political involvement for those from historically
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such a way that the information they convey will be recognized as coming from an epistemically
credible source is what testimony aims to do. Yet, when the vast majority of people who hear the
testimony do not believe it comes from an epistemically credible source, Medina claims that
“epistemic friction” needs to occur in order to jolt those people into recognizing the credibility.
Medina writes that “the external epistemic resistances one encounters can be positive insofar as they
offer beneficial epistemic friction, forcing one to be self-critical, to compare and contrast one’s beliefs, to
meet justificatory demands, to recognize cognitive gaps, and so on.”106 In general, Medina refers to
epistemic friction as a kind of epistemic resistance, which is to say an act of resistance that forces
someone to think about what they know or do not know. In terms of racial oppression, epistemic
friction functions to resist false, misleading or stereotypical conceptions and ideas about particular
races or ethnicities. Epistemic friction is an act of epistemic resistance that serves the purpose of
educating and informing others that the held conception of a race in question is in fact false, or
misleading, or stereotypical. As Medina notes, beneficial epistemic friction is what aids in critical
thinking and open-mindedness about individuals and groups of people.107 He goes on to note that
not all epistemic friction is good. Instead, there is a kind of epistemic friction that perpetuates
closed-minded and hateful conceptions of others.108
When a racial group is consistently oppressed, and in Medina’s terms, consistently seen as
epistemically deficient, that affects the group’s self-knowledge. If a group is not able to form and
affirm their own self-knowledge; and instead, a dominant group defines the oppressed group, then
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we no longer have a working resistance-based democracy. In turn, oppressed groups of people will
have little recourse to speak and be heard in their political and social system.
Arendt does account for the fact that as soon as an action occurs or a speech is finished, the
reception and result is out of the agent’s control. Of course, this is an unavoidable fact about any
action. However, my concern is that some might not have the opportunity to speak in a meaningful
way wherein their words are genuinely listened to and they are afforded epistemic justice. This
appears to be a predecessor to political action, not necessarily the aftermath. By this I mean that
when one’s words are judged as incapable of meaning before even being spoken aloud, speech in the
Arendtian sense is hardly a possibility because the speaker is not conceived of as an equal in the
public realm. Once again, the detrimental effect that prejudice has produced in marginalized
speakers further discourages involvement in an Arendtian public realm where speech and action are
perceived as possibilities only for privileged white folks.
In this chapter I provided an overview of Arendtian political action as it is commonly
understood and interpreted. I then argued that political action, as it is theorized in The Human
Condition, is ideal and utopian in that it overgeneralizes and excludes historically minoritized
populations. The exclusive and generalized account discourages minoritized populations from
engaging in political action while also encouraging privileged whites to participate. In line with the
antiracist methodology of this dissertation, the final section of the present chapter turned to the
implications of this account of political action and utilized philosophers from historically
marginalized backgrounds to propose alternatives to Arendt’s idealized theory.
The Human Condition is often the primary text consulted and taught when examining
Arendtian political action. In this chapter I have argued that relying solely or primarily on this text to
understand the concept diminishes the effectiveness of political action. In particular, Arendt argues
against the increasing desire to leave the earth by invoking a new understanding of how we actively
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ought to exist in the world with an emphasis on political action. By acting more, we are less
susceptible to behavior which uncritically conforms to societal norms and expectations. And, in
theory, when more people who act, the result is a move vibrant and productive political sphere
which better reflects the diverse collection of individuals in a community. However, Arendt’s
reliance on an idealized and utopian polis-model and overgeneralized account of plurality and natality
limits the number and variety of people who are able to participate in political action, therefore
diminishing the possibility of wide-ranging applicability. Put differently, the version of political
action presented in The Human Condition is self-limiting—it caters largely to privileged elites and does
recognize the limitations to political action by historically minoritized individuals.
While The Human Condition is limited by its ideal approach to political action, there are other
texts worth examining for their nonideal approach to the concept. The subsequent chapter turns to
Arendt’s second dissertation, Rahel Varnhagen: Life of a Jewish Woman to argue that Rahel can act as a
beneficial supplement to The Human Condition. This often overlooked biography, which is
philosophical in nature, largely operates at the nonideal level and promotes similar arguments about
political action. In turning to Rahel I argue that we ought to read this text alongside of The Human
Condition to develop more of a multi-dimensional rendering of political action that better recognizes
racial identities, experiences of privilege, and epistemic injustices.

CHAPTER THREE
RAHEL VARNHAGEN AND NONIDEAL POLITICAL ACTION
The exclusionary nature of ideal political action found in The Human Condition leaves much to
be desired. As the previous chapter argues, Arendt’s theorization of the concept in The Human
Condition inadequately addresses privilege, racial difference, and individual testimony. In order to
construct a multidimensional account of political action I argue it is necessary to turn to Arendt’s
early biography on Rahel Varnhagen. Doing so substitutes the missing pieces from The Human
Condition on privilege, race, and testimony and results in a more developed account of political action
from a nonideal perspective. The genre of biography naturally lends itself to nonideal theory because
it is reporting on the specific, lived experiences of an individual. Additionally, turning to Rahel
Varnhagen: Life of a Jewish Woman (henceforth, Rahel) makes possible a more detailed, multidimensional rendering of political action because it is understood as an early account of the concept.
Put differently, Arendt’s early theorization of political action in Rahel is a nonideal account of
political action which supplements the later, more robust theorization presented in The Human
Condition.
This chapter aims to argue two related main points. First, while Rahel is an early and often
overlooked text, I argue it is an immensely valuable account of political action because it is a
nonideal counterpart to the ideal iteration we receive in The Human Condition. Within the parameters
of the 3D rendering analogy, Rahel adds another angle from which to view and subsequently
understand political action. While others have made the argument that Rahel is an early theorization
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of Arendt’s political philosophy, I want to add a further distinction to these scholarly conversations
1

by claiming that Rahel is a nonideal, as well as early, theorization of political action. The nonideal
nature of the philosophical biography is important to recognize because it acts as a foil to the ideal
nature of The Human Condition. In this sense, I am arguing that The Human Condition and Rahel’s
theorization of political action ought to be read and understood together because they complement
one another. My second point builds on the first in arguing that the nonideal account of political
action theorized in Rahel exemplifies real social and political impediments to Arendtian political
action. In order to develop an account of political action that is more responsive to these
impediments, I argue that we can turn to Rahel which recognizes and embraces racial difference,
promotes a self-awareness of privilege, and values testimony from marginalized individuals.
Consequently, Rahel, at one level acts as a foil to The Human Condition by emphasizing the heightened
contrast between nonideal and ideal theory. And, it is also a testament to the specific impediments to
political action which aids in my multi-dimensional rendering of the concept.
Due to the unorthodox nature of Rahel Varnhagen, it is necessary to start with a chronological
summary of her life, as presented by Arendt. In the biography, Arendt does provide a semi-linear
account of Rahel’s life from early childhood through life until death. But she briefly begins with her

1 See Carolina Armenteros, “Hannah Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen, and the Beginnings of Political Philosophy,” The Journal
of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 8 (1998), who claims Rahel contains embryonic or proto-theorization of political action.
Similar claims are made in Seyla Benhabib’s chapter, “Arendt’s Biography of Rahel Varnhagen” in The Reluctant Modernism
of Hannah Arendt; Dagmar Barnouw’s chapter “Society, Parvenu, and Pariah” in Visible Spaces: Hannah Arendt and the
German-Jewish Experience (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); and Richard J. Bernstein’s chapter, “The
Conscious Pariah as Rebel and Independent Thinker” in Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1996). Additionally, Julia Kristeva, in Hannah Arendt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), argues Arendt’s use
of Rahel is as “an individual or an event that stimulates the imagination” (49-50). Kristeva contrasts this interpretation of
Rahel against my own that the biography acts as a case study or specific example of social and political issues concerning
Jewish assimilation and exceptionalism. Liliane Weissberg’s introduction “Hannah Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen, and the
Writing of (Auto)biography” in Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess, The First Complete Edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1997) claims Rahel acted as an example of Arendt’s political philosophy. Margaret Canovan in Hannah
Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought claims Rahel is deeply political in that it aims to critique how and why
Rahel and so many of her contemporaries could be so “unpolitical” or so uninterested in collective action (9).
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deathbed confession, jumps back and forth from other times in her life, and often veers away from
biographical narrative into philosophizing on identity, discrimination, and Jewish history—to name
only a few digressions. It is also helpful to start with a chronological account because Arendt’s
biography is not strictly a biography, and as such is difficult, at times, to follow. Some claim Rahel is
a mix of biography and autobiography while others claim it is existential philosophy under the guise
of biography.2 I claim, in the second part of this chapter, that this text is an example of Modernist
biography akin to the biographies and autobiographies of Virginia Woolf and Gertrude Stein, crafted
intentionally through narrative choices meant to illicit emotional reactions from readers so they can
feel the pain, confusion, and exclusion that Rahel herself felt. I also claim it is a philosophical
biography meant to communicate Arendt’s early thoughts on concepts such as political action. This
second section ultimately aims to analyze Arendt’s philosophical and literary moves as they relate to
the medium of biography. In the final section of the chapter, I outline my analysis of Arendt’s
attention to racial and gendered difference, her awareness of Rahel’s privilege, and her awareness of
the epistemic injustices Rahel was subject to. This final section pieces together an account of real
impediments to political action, as exemplified through Rahel’s experience.
Part I: The Life of Rahel Varnhagen
Rahel Varnhagen: Life of a Jewish Woman is Arendt’s Habilitationsschrift—her second dissertation,
a requirement in Germany to teach. Because Arendt was forced to flee Germany, then France, in

2 Liliane Weissberg in “Hannah Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen, and the Writing of (Auto)biography” claims Arendt’s
biography was also meant to tell her own, autobiographical story of personal heartbreak and public attempts at securing
political protections as German Jew. Martine Leibovic, in “Arendt’s Rahel Varnhagen: A New Kind of Narration in the
Impasses of German-Jewish Assimilation and Existenzphilosophie,” Social Research 74, no. 3(2007), argues that Arendt is
marking out her own existential philosophy, distinct from Jasper’s and Heidegger’s, in telling Rahel’s life. Seyla Benhabib
(2000) also explores Jasper’s existentialism in Arendt’s biography and claims that “’Jewishness’ [in the biography] permits
a certain kind of existential condition.” (9) Benhabib additionally agrees with Weissberg when she writes, “In telling
Rahel’s story, Hannah Arendt was bearing testimony to a political and spiritual transformation that she herself was
undergoing.” (10)
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order to arrive in New York in 1941 via Lisbon, Rahel was published in 1957 after The Origins of
Totalitarianism’s first edition publication and only months prior to the publication of The Human
Condition. Arendt notes, however, in the preface to Rahel that she completed all but the final two
chapters in 1931 when she fled Germany. The final two chapters were written roughly five years
later while living as a stateless refugee in France. While the publication dates of all three texts occur
in the same decade, Rahel was drafted more than two decades prior.
In what follows, I reconstruct a chronological account of important and relevant events in
Rahel Varnhagen’s—née Levin—life, as told by Arendt. As previously mentioned, in the next
section of this chapter I expand on Arendt’s narrative decisions which cast a heavily edited shadow
on the life of Rahel. Put more bluntly, Arendt’s account of Rahel is well curated to fit her
philosophical arguments but this sacrifices clarity when it comes to understanding the details of her
life. Given the winding and ambiguous nature of how Arendt tells Rahel’s story, it is helpful to
reconstruct—from what Arendt gives us—her life’s accomplishments, heartaches, and confessions.
The next section will turn to other biographies of Rahel and criticism of Arendt’s version to further
situate the philosophical argument lurking just below the surface in Rahel. For the present, however,
I extract details of her early life, her years spent as a locally famous Berlin salonnière, her search for a
husband, the effect of Napoléon’s invasion of Berlin and Prussia’s war against his forces, and the
circumstances surrounding her death.
Born in 1771, Rahel’s life was fraught, from the very beginning. As Arendt crassly tells us,
Rahel was “[n]ot rich, not cultivated and not beautiful—that meant that she was entirely without
weapons with which to begin the great struggle for recognition in society, for social existence, for a
morsel of happiness, for security and an established position in the bourgeois world.”3 Born into a
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successful mercantile Jewish family, Rahel’s desire from a very early age was to escape the confines
of her Jewish existence in late 18th, early 19th century Prussia, and be accepted in the larger German
society.
Rahel wrote letters to express her philosophical insights and lamentations about what she
claims was a cloistered and suffocating existence as a Jewish woman at the time. Many of her letters,
the main source of Arendt’s investigation into her life, expressed her desire to be heard and known
by others.4 In order to accomplish this feat, Rahel recognized from an early age that she needed to
leave the religious, political, and social world of the German Jews. Writing to her childhood friend,
David Veit, she boasted of her individuality and lamented over how her Jewishness held her back
from recognition in German society when she wrote the following: “‘I have a strange fancy: it is as if
some supramundane being, just as I was thrust into this world, plunged these words with a dagger
into my heart: ‘Yes, have you the faculty of eternally thinking. But I add one thing more: be a
Jewess!’ And now my life is a slow bleeding to death….I can, if you will derive every evil, every
misfortune, every vexation from that.’”5 Rahel thought herself fully capable of intellectually
contributing to society; yet, German, and European, discrimination against Jews and women stifled
her ability to exist as anyone but a marginalized Jewish woman.
Rahel’s desire to contribute to society was grounded in her belief that if people were able to
learn about her, about her uniqueness, then they would befriend her and welcome her into their
social circles. If this were to happen, Rahel would be free to exist outside of her insolated Jewish
community and make new friends, attend social events, and learn about the wider world. Arendt tells

For Arendt, political action is concerned with speaking and acting in the public realm. It is no coincidence that Rahel
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III of this chapter.
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us Rahel pleaded with Veit to share her letters with others outside of the Jewish community. She felt
that her particular situation, existing as a marginalized individual with invigorating thoughts to share
and a voracious desire to learn, marked her as unique. While Rahel certainly was unique, her
marginalized existence was not—a fact Arendt subtly indicates when she writes, “[t]he world and
people were so boundless, and whatever happened to her seemed so little directed toward her in
particular, that discretion was incomprehensible to her.”6 Arendt synthesizes the tension between
Rahel’s desire to be seen as an individual and her fraught understanding that because the world was
so large, no one would take the time to take offense at her Jewish identity. Put differently, Rahel did
not, at this early point in her life nor at any point hereafter, recognize the systemic nature of racism
and discrimination because she thought her uniqueness exempted her from hatred, if only people
could know her personally. She excoriated Veit, asking “‘[w]hy won’t you show anyone a whole
letter of mine?’” and went on to insist that “‘[i]f only I could throw myself open to people as a
cupboard is opened’” for then “‘[t]hey would certainly be content, and as soon as they saw, would
understand.’’7 Rahel’s desire to be widely known and read marked only the beginning of her
troubled, early years.
At the age of 19, Rahel’s father died, leaving her younger brother Markus in charge of the
family’s gemstone business and financial affairs. Arendt tells us that after her father’s death, “the
sons took over his business, settled a lifetime allowance upon the mother, and determined to marry
off the two sisters as soon as possible.”8 Rahel’s younger sister, Rose was eventually married in 1801,
but her brothers Markus, Ludwig, and Moritz were unsuccessful in arranging or encouraging a
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marriage for Rahel. Arendt tells us she was dependent on her mother’s allowance, and after her
mother’s death in 1809, entirely reliant on her brothers’ charitable whims. While her father’s
business was successful, after his death she was entirely financially dependent on her tepid family
members’ generosity.
Despite Rahel’s difficult early years, she succeeded in entering German society through the
success of her salon. From 1790 until Napoléon’s invasion of Prussia in 1806, Rahel welcomed a
diverse cross-section of society into the attic of the apartment she shared with her mother on
Jägerstrasse in Berlin. Salon culture in Berlin centered around tea and conversation, and opened up the
opportunity for Jewish women to access the larger German society. Visiting one’s salon was an
opportunity to converse, gossip, debate, socialize, and nurture friendships.
Though Arendt characterizes Rahel as “not cultivated,” she was certainly intelligent. Due to
both Rahel’s intellect and charisma, as well as the lingering sentiment of the Enlightenment—that all
people are capable of reason—coupled with a short-lived Berlin trend that fetishized Jews as exotic
and enticing persons, her salon was quite popular. Arendt tells us that in addition to a brief
encounter with Goethe, her salon included “almost all the important intellectuals of Berlin...the
Humboldt brothers, Friedrich Schlegel, Friedrich Gentz, [Friedrich] Schleiermacher, Prince Louis
Ferdinand of Prussia and his mistress Pauline Wiesel, the classical philologist Friedrich August Wolf,
Jean Paul, Brentano, the Tieck brothers, Chamisso, Fouqué, etc.”9 Though graced by the presence of
such influential people, Rahel’s salon did not allow for societal acceptance outside of her attic.
Additionally, her days as a salonnière were numbered. As soon as Napoléon invaded Berlin, Rahel’s
salon attendants fled abroad, scattering her friends and extinguishing their daily visits.
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Napoléon’s invasion of Berlin disrupted more than Rahel’s successful salon. In addition to
losing her flock of interested visitors, Rahel’s finances were restricted while the French military
forces occupied Berlin, disrupting commerce. Her brothers’ allowances varied, becoming solely
dependent on a volatile business. Arendt reports that Rahel’s “bare living was always secure, but
after 1807 its standard had dropped below the level of her associates” or peers.10 With the entrance
of a new political and military power in Berlin, only rich and well-connected Germans continued to
operate salons. Rahel, who had already moved out of her apartment on Jägerstrasse shortly before her
mother’s death, was forced to move to a smaller apartment which was not conducive for visitors. All
the while, her ravenous desire for social acceptance and a venue for public interaction went
unsatiated.
Rahel believed her most reliable opportunity for full entrance into German social society was
through marriage. She was convinced of this early on in her life though she was desperate for a nonJewish partner by the time the French invasion disrupted daily life in Berlin. Arendt observes that
for a Jewish woman during Rahel’s lifetime, the one way to achieve social recognition was through
marriage and conversion to Christianity through baptism. Rahel experienced two heartbreaking,
failed engagements—both outlined in extensive detail by Arendt—before finally marrying August
Varnhagen, a German soldier and eventual diplomat, at the age of 43. In marrying Varnhagen, she
changed her name to Antonie Friederike.11 While Rahel had long sought for a romantic partner,
Arendt tells us Rahel was not secretive about the functional nature of her marriage. Arendt
maintains that Rahel “had persuaded neither herself nor him that she loved him.”12 Instead, Rahel’s
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marriage to Varnhagen provided stability and social connections. She knew he was ardently devoted
to her, and his prospects, and hers by proxy, of becoming “someone,” of being recognized in and
accepted by society, were steadily increasing because of his growing influence as a German diplomat.
Through her marriage to Varnhagen and his subsequent success in the German army, Rahel
was finally able to enter society as Antonie Friederike Varnhagen. She quickly realized, however, that
many in Berlin still recognized her as a Jewish woman and refused to greet or speak with her. It is
only abroad that those who knew nothing of her ancestry treated her with respect in society.
Because of this, Arendt tells us that Rahel began to doubt why she ever wished to cast aside her
Jewish identity. She sent Varnhagen to track down her old friend from her Berlin salon, Pauline
Wiesel, whom, after Varnhagen found her, she began to write to regularly. Through her letters,
Rahel expressed regret over her lifelong wish to be accepted by society at the cost of her identity,
and on her deathbed declared, “The thing which all my life seemed to me the greatest shame, which
was the misery and misfortune of my life—having been born a Jewess—this I should on no account
now wish to have missed.”13
Part II: Arendt’s Curation of the Life of Rahel Varnhagen
Arendt, however, did not straightforwardly tell the biographical story of Rahel as
summarized above. Instead, her book is interested in affecting an empathetic understanding of
Rahel’s plight—a plight shared by most German Jews at the time. The affective dimension of the
biography derives its strength and effectiveness through the winding narrative meant to inform the
reader of the larger social, political, and religious conditions for German Jews at the time. The
winding narrative is also meant to affect feelings of frustration, impatience, and uncertainty at the
seemingly endless impediments to social and political recognition by peers and governments as well
13
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as at the overwhelming pressure to convert to Christianity in order to move beyond the isolated
Jewish community. In addition to the affective dimension, Arendt’s biography unconventionally
argues that we ought to accept our innate qualities, characteristics, and identities by exploring how a
specific, marginalized individual existed in the world. In a letter about Rahel Varnhagen to Karl
Jaspers, her advisor for her first dissertation on St. Augustine and love as well as the Rahel
biography, Arendt writes, “[w]hat this all really adds up to fate, being exposed, what life means—I
can’t really say in the abstract (and I realize that in trying to write about it here). Perhaps all I can try
to do is illustrate it with examples, and that is precisely why I want to write a biography.”14 Arendt
felt too constrained by the abstract nature of philosophical analysis and so turned to biography to
tell the story of what it means to be vulnerable because of one’s identity and how to best overcome
adversity related to that vulnerability.
Arendt’s book on Rahel’s life has been the source of lively debate even though it is often
overlooked within the corpus. I aim to clarify and improve upon the claim that Rahel Varnhagen is
exemplary of Arendt’s political philosophy by analyzing how Arendt chooses to tell Rahel’s story. I
examine Arendt’s editorial and narrative decisions which reveal a heavy-handed manipulation of
Rahel’s letters and circumstances in order to best serve Arendt’s purposes—arguing for the
acceptance of one’s “given” or innate identity and perseverance in the face of overwhelming social
and political distain. I also turn to some brief considerations on the nature of biography—a far from
static genre. The experimental nature of Arendt’s biography which infuses philosophical analysis of
identity with one individual’s life story was not uncommon for the time. I end this part of the
chapter by turning to famed biographer Hermione Lee’s assessment of the genre and analysis of
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biographies written in the Modern era to demonstrate that Arendt’s narrative and editorial choices
were not as uncommon as one might initially think.
How Arendt told Rahel’s story:
Arendt’s editorial and narrative choices
In the following section I explain how Arendt chose to tell Rahel’s story, focusing on
editorial and narrative decisions. The well-curated story is less a true depiction of Rahel’s life than
the backdrop for Arendt’s philosophical and political arguments about Jewish identity and the
Jewish question. Because the biography is more philosophical than straightforward, many scholars
have sought to understand why Arendt chose to pursue a biographical project for her
Habilitationsschrift instead of a more traditional dissertation, similar to her first one on St. Augustine’s
theory of love. While there are individual nuances amongst all, it is helpful to designate two main
camps. The first includes those who claim Arendt wrote Rahel in response to her recent separation
from her previous advisor, Martin Heidegger, with whom she had a years-long affair.15 The second
camp includes those who are uninterested in examining Rahel through the lens of the HeideggerArendt affair.16 I fall into the latter camp because, even though I am certain the terminated affair
affected Arendt, I am not persuaded that this aspect of her personal life ought to be viewed as a

Notably, Weissberg (1997) claims Arendt’s (auto)biography “tries to provide healing for history” but it also acts as a
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Arendt to grieve and heal from her secret affair with Heidegger. She also claims that telling Rahel’s story provided
Arendt the opportunity to covertly share her secret affair with Heidegger vicariously through Rahel’s many romantic
endeavors and heartaches. Elisabeth Young-Bruehl’s biography Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2004) asserts Rahel is Arendt’s best friend because Rahel “was most deeply able to understand”
Arendt’s heartache when Heidegger made it clear he would not leave his wife and children for Arendt (56).
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valuable or generative entry into understanding Arendt’s arguments in the biography. In fact, I am
not interested in why Arendt wrote Rahel, but how she wrote it.
As someone who resisted the title of philosopher, it is no surprise that Arendt was cautious
of philosophy’s ability to articulate suffering, vulnerability, and the importance of accepting one’s
identity. In a short essay titled “Action and the Pursuit of Happiness” Arendt reveals her theory of
storytelling. She believes that “no matter how abstract our theories may sound or how consistent
our arguments may appear, there are incidents and stories behind them which, at least for ourselves,
contain as in a nutshell the full meaning of whatever we have to say.”17 In Rahel Varnhagen Arendt
sets out to do more than merely report on the experiences of Rahel’s life, but she uses those
experiences to ground what she wants to say about political action and identity. And while she does
go on, in The Human Condition, to more elaborately abstract her ideas about political action and
identity, I argue that we have access to a unique mix of the “incident and story” of Rahel and the
less concrete theories on social and political constraints against German Jews in Rahel Varnhagen.
This is all to say, Arendt has a developed account of storytelling and we ought to pay attention to it,
particularly how she tells Rahel’s story, in order to better understand her more abstract political
theories.
Arendt’s approach to telling Rahel’s story is more interested in cultivating an argument and
affecting political involvement than historically uncovering the life, experiences, and death of the
person. According to political scientist and Arendt scholar, Lisa Disch, Arendt “believed philosophy
inadequate to inspire resistance in times of political crises.”18 Additionally, Disch goes on to claim
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that for Arendt, stories can “position its audience to think from within [a story’s] dilemma.”
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Situating her narrative within Rahel’s life, Arendt aims to share Rahel’s story while also sharing her
own, and droves of other European Jews’ search for a welcoming place in the world. In this sense,
the dilemma Arendt strove to “think from within” is rooted in the Jewish question—an amorphous
question about Jewish religious, social, and political existence in an increasingly antisemitic world.
While there is not room here to expand on the Jewish question and Arendt’s more pointed
arguments surrounding it,20 it is necessary to note that her biography on Rahel is an early
theorization of political action,21 a theory that she goes on to apply practically in the 1930s and 1940s
through her involvement with Zionism, and which she more abstractly theorizes in The Human
Condition. Given this trajectory, Arendt’s work in Rahel ought to be recognized as an early theory of
political action proposed through the medium of biography.
With a more developed account of Arendt’s use of storytelling laid out, it is now possible to
move on to the specifics of how she tells Rahel’s story. In the preface, Arendt tells us she sought “to
narrate Rahel’s life as she herself might have told it.”22 Stepping into Rahel’s life, Arendt intends to
share Rahel’s story as a kindred spirit and fellow German Jew because, at the time, it was largely
unknown. But Arendt’s approach and method are more skewed than a simple retelling of Rahel’s
life. In part, choosing to narrate Rahel’s life, as she would have, ignores the scores of letters Rahel
left behind in which she meant to inform others of her life, her philosophical musings, and her
literary assessments. Rahel’s plea to her childhood friend David Veit to share her letters was not
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abandoned at any point in her life. She wrote copious letters over her lifetime to friends, family, and
recent acquaintances. In this sense, Rahel did tell her story. But Arendt’s story is more than Rahel’s
life and struggles. It is the story of Central European antisemitism and German Jewish assimilation
and exceptionalism from a 20th century perspective which was well aware of the increasing threat of
Hitler’s destructive power. Rahel’s life serves as the “nutshell” for the larger, more complex Jewish
question.
Arendt’s method behind telling Rahel’s story is also unorthodox. Instead of setting out to tell
Rahel’s story, Arendt intentionally tells a well-curated version of Rahel’s story which better fits her
argument about assimilation and exceptionalism. This argument boils down to accepting one’s given
qualities—an argument further developed in the first chapter of The Human Condition. In telling
Rahel’s story, Arendt explains the historical conditions of Rahel’s milieu. Compared to poorer,
Eastern European Jews, German Jews were significantly wealthier thanks in part to the prevalence
of Enlightenment ideals concerning the universal nature of reason. Arendt tells us that “[e]very
Berlin Jew felt like a Grand Sultan compared in contrast to his poor, backward co-religionist” and
because of this comparison, “he drew his consciousness of being an exception.”23 The slightly more
welcoming environment for German Jews did not prevent them from experiencing other forms of
discrimination based on their Jewish identity and religion. Yet, Arendt’s point is that the improved
circumstances encouraged German Jews to further assimilate into Gentile society, erasing their
Jewishness, or to embrace their Jewishness only in so far as it made them an exception. Exceptional
Jews were allowed to retain their Jewish identity, but they were required to be exceptional in both
senses of the word—extraordinary and excluded or at least removed from the larger Jewish
community. Arendt refers to these exceptional or assimilated Jews as parvenues and she argues that
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the individualized nature of German Jewish exceptionalism precludes collective, political action for
all Jews. By attempting to gain social favor and political protections on an individual basis, the
Jewish people as a whole would never gain emancipation.
Instead, Arendt advocates for what she calls a conscious pariah existence for Jews. Instead
of atomized assimilation or exceptionalism, which relies on masses of unassimilated or
unexceptional Jews to compare oneself to, conscious pariahs intentionally embrace their outcast
status. This argument is best exemplified by Arendt’s start to the biography which begins with
Rahel’s death. On her deathbed, Arendt’s opening lines quote Rahel as saying “‘the thing which all
my life seemed to me the greatest shame—having been born a Jewess—this I should on no account
now wish to have missed.’”24 Much of the biography charts Rahel’s desire to erase her Jewish
identity in order to move more freely in German society. While her salon was successful, it was her
main and at times only social opportunity and it required others to come to her. Yet, Arendt is guilty
of only communicating that which benefits her argument for accepting one’s identity. According to
Heidi Thomann Tewarson, a German literature scholar who wrote Rahel Varnhagen: The Life and
Work of a German Jewish Intellectual, Arendt conveniently left out what immediately follows, according
to August Varnhagen’s records: “‘Dear August, my heart is refreshed in its inmost depths. I have
thought of Jesus and cried over his passion; I have felt—for the first time so felt it—that he is my
brother. And Mary, how did she suffer! She saw her beloved son suffer but did not succumb; she stood
at the cross! That I could not have done; I would not have been that strong. May God forgive me, I
confess how weak I am.’”25 August Varnhagen’s notes record a significant acceptance of
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Christianity’s influence on Rahel. She sympathizes with the Jewish Mary’s suffering in life and
strongly associates with Jesus’s sacrifice. The complex relationship with Christianity as a converted
Jew is clear in the quote which complicates Arendt’s argument concerning Rahel’s acceptance of her
Jewish identity.
Arendt’s choice to exclude Rahel’s full deathbed confession is in tension with her harsh
criticism of August Varnhagen’s editorial decisions. In the preface, Arendt does not mince words,
claiming that his “mutilations are frequent.”26 She goes on to clarify that “[h]e made wholesale
corrections, expunged essential portions and coded personal names in such a manner that the reader
was deliberately led astray.”27 While Arendt does not code names or make wholesale corrections, she
does expunge essential portions—the most blatant is the deathbed confessional. And, the effect of
Arendt’s exclusion is similar to August’s. The deliberate edits to Rahel’s letters, according to Arendt,
were intended “to make Rahel’s associations and circle of friends appear less Jewish and more
aristocratic, and to show Rahel herself in a more conventional light, one more in keeping with the
times.”28 Though different in substance—August, purportedly, wanted to paint Rahel in a more
conventional light whereas Arendt wants to draw out Rahel’s Jewish identity for the purposes of her
argument about German Jewish identity—both August and Arendt’s edits aim to craft a specific
portrait. As an example, consider profile portraits which are drawn from a specific side—left or
right. August’s approach to preserving his wife’s life took one perspective while Arendt’s took
another.
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Arendt’s frustration with August’s edits has been the topic of some debate. It is commonly
accepted that August Varnhagen did edit, at times heavily, his wife’s correspondence but it is unclear
to what degree he did that on his own. In the introduction to Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess First
Complete Edition, editor Liliane Weissburg takes Arendt’s side claiming that Varnhagen mutilated
Rahel’s letters. Yet, Weissburg admits the possibility that Rahel herself was involved in the editing
and preservation process of her writing. Little else is said to expand on Rahel’s editorial involvement
or the implications of her involvement for Arendt’s critiques. German cultural historian, Dagmar
Barnouw in Visible Spaces: Hannah Arendt and the German-Jewish Experience insists that “Rahel, of
course, might not have minded, might even have desired such careful editing” of her letters by
August.29 And according to Tewarson, Arendt’s contempt for Rahel’s husband is unfounded and
also mimics largely antisemitic and misogynist historians’ conclusion of Varnhagen. Those historians
demonized August for supporting a dominant and Jewish wife. Tewarson is right to point out that
August “was able to rise above the conventions of his time by admitting his wife’s superiority and
serving her as a loyal friend and partner.”30 Far from common at the time, August’s devotion to
Rahel and to preserving and publishing her writing took priority in his life. Arendt’s criticism of
August fails to acknowledge his devotion and Rahel’s probable involvement in the editing process.
Her frustration, I claim, stems from the different stories she and August, and by extension possibly
Rahel, want to tell. Arendt is focused on the German Jewish story of assimilation, exceptionalism,
and eventual conscious pariahdom where Rahel embraced her Jewish identity. August, on the other
hand, wanted Rahel’s life story to be more accessible to those Rahel wished to be socially connected
with—German and other German Jewish social elites.
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Another editorial choice of Arendt’s worth examining for its selective nature is her decision
to tell Rahel’s story, largely through her failed love affairs, engagements, and eventual loveless
marriage. While Arendt’s decision to focus on this aspect of Rahel’s life is often tied to her recently
ended secret affair with Heidegger,31 there is also a clear connection between Rahel’s relationships
and her misguided search for social acceptance. Instead of analyzing Arendt’s focus for its personal
connection, it is important to recognize the political philosophy at work in her decision to focus on
Rahel’s affairs. According to Norma Claire Moruzzi in Speaking Through the Mask: Hannah Arendt and
the Politics of Social Identity, Arendt’s decision to focus on her love affairs is rooted in her need to heal
from her relationship with Heidegger. Her particular form of healing, according to Moruzzi takes
the form of telling her own story of love lost through the “mask” of Rahel. Moruzzi laments that
“[i]nstead of the salon hostess, the woman who lived her life through passionate friendships,
Arendt’s Rahel is a woman who lives her life through a series of futile, unhappy love affairs.”32
Interestingly, Arendt does include information about Rahel’s years as a salon hostess and her
friendships as they were cultivated through the salon and letter writing. Moruzzi takes issue with
Arendt’s emphasis on this aspect of Rahel’s life and argues that Arendt’s decision to write the
biography in this way diminishes the vibrant social life Rahel actually experienced.
Yet, focusing on Rahel’s love life serves a deeper purpose, even if Arendt is too heavyhanded in her editorial decisions. Rahel’s story serves as the backdrop for Arendt’s argument
concerning accepting one’s given qualities and the social and political struggles associated with
German Jewish identity. By focusing on Rahel’s failed love affairs and eventual loveless marriage,
Arendt leads her readers through the heartbreaking details of Rahel’s attempts to evade her Jewish
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identity. With each failed engagement, we feel the tedium of Rahel starting her life over. We
experience alongside Rahel her pain and frustration in thinking she’s ill-fated to succeed in what she
wants most—to be accepted in a society which shuns and marginalizes Jews. Her desire to succeed
was so strong that she entered into a loveless marriage, despite having searched for decades for
someone to both love and offer entrance into German society. Arendt’s decision to place emphasis
on Rahel’s love life is emotive—how better to persuade someone of the frustrations and difficulties
of pursuing the life of a parvenue than to do so through the personal story of one who only on her
deathbed confesses that her pursuit was in bad faith? If Arendt were to focus more on her
“passionate friendships” her argument for the conscious pariah would be less effective.
Arendt’s editorial decisions, particularly her selective quotes taken out of context, alongside
her underlying argument about Jewish existence, assimilation, and exclusion at the turn of 18th
century Prussia leaves us with a biography closer to fiction than fact.33 But the point is that her
editorial decisions allow her to make the argument she does, even though it is exemplified by a
fictionalized version of Rahel. While Tewarson claims that Arendt’s concentration on “Rahel’s
Jewishness…created a rather one-dimensional portrait of this very complex and self-aware woman,”
I disagree, only because Arendt’s portrait of Rahel serves the purpose of advancing her arguments
about the multi-dimensional impediments to Jewish acceptance in German society and the
difficulties of embracing the conscious pariah existence. These impediments and difficulties are
multi-dimensional because they engage with religious demands and expectations, language barriers
for non-German speaking Jews living in Germany, varied social interactions which are influenced by
quickly changing public sentiment toward Jews, and political protections for Jews who existed as

33 Disch and Moruzzi both agree with this assessment and Disch’s characterization of Arendtian storytelling (though it
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stateless refugees in their generational homeland. Rahel experienced every one of these impediments
and difficulties, and she was not alone. Arendt’s point in fixating on Rahel’s Jewishness serves a
distinct purpose, even though she heavily edits aspects of Rahel’s life. She aims to tell the story of
German-Jews attempting to gain social acceptance and political protections.
Arendt is clear that she never intended “to write a book about Rahel.”34 Rahel is, instead, an
act of Arendtian political action. Arendt makes it clear she is telling the story of Rahel and that of all
German Jews. She sees herself as their Homer, ensuring their words and deeds are recorded and
remembered. This is only possible, according to Arendt, because both Rahel and German Jews no
longer exist. Rahel died in 1833 and according to Arendt, since the Holocaust, “the history of the
German Jews has come to an end.”35 By writing and sharing the story of Rahel and all German Jews,
Arendt is acting politically—speaking publicly to preserve the life story of her people who she sees
as radically altered, no longer the same after the Holocaust. By telling Rahel’s story, she is able to
resist competing narratives that demean the testimonial value of marginalized voices such as Rahel’s
and her own.
Biography as a genre is not always strictly tied to fact, a claim famed biographer Hermione
Lee and her most recent subject, screenwriter and playwright Tom Stoppard agree on. In Biography:
A Short Introduction Lee’s first rule for biographical writing states that it ought, but need not, be true.
She quickly qualifies this rule, by claiming that over the course of centuries of biographical writing
the genre has defied such neat guidelines. She admits that “biography is a form of narrative, not just
a presentation of facts.”36 Particular to the Western Modern literary era (late 19th and early 20th
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century), Lee goes on to claim that biographers such as Virginia Woolf and Gertrude Stein felt that
“facts needed to be manipulated.”37 For both Modernists, facts alone cannot provide emotional,
intimate, and affective portraits of the lives examined. Details need to be adjusted, ignored, or
overemphasized. Because of these exact alterations, Tom Stoppard is well known for his distaste for
the genre. Despite decades of open hostility toward biography, Stoppard only recently asked
Hermione Lee to write his life story.38 In a review of the biography, New York Times literary critic
Charles McGrath notes that “[i]n his play “Indian Ink,” a character calls biography ‘the worst
possible excuse for getting people wrong’ and in “The Invention of Love,” Stoppard has Oscar
Wilde describe biography as ‘the mesh through which our real life escapes.’”39 Stoppard’s concern is
that the genre’s subjective nature often results in manipulated portraits, straying too far from the
person’s likeness.
Yet, Arendt’s desire to write a book about German Jews, through the life-story of Rahel
necessitates the exact manipulation Woolf and Stein embrace and which Stoppard despises. Rahel is
an effective conduit for the larger story Arendt wishes to share, but it is not perfect. Arendt’s edits,
in turn, act to promote her historical documentation of German Jewish assimilation and
exceptionalism, and theorization of political action. However, Arendt’s edits and manipulations have
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important ramifications. The following section outlines the precariousness of Arendt’s biographical
method.
Part III: Nonideal Manifestations
How Arendt tells Rahel’s story—a heavily edited, intentionally curated biography which
serves the purpose of exemplifying Arendt’s underlying philosophical argument about given qualities
and pursuing a conscious pariah existence–is crucial to providing a fuller, nonideal account of the
limitations of political action. However, more exists in Rahel that can add to our multi-dimensional
picture of Arendtian political action. In the following, final section of this chapter, I examine
Arendt’s awareness of racial difference, criticism of Rahel’s privilege, and advocacy for marginalized
voices and their influence on Arendt’s early theorization of political action. In The Human Condition,
attention to the lived experiences of racism and racial difference, social and political privilege, and
epistemic injustice is missing, yet robust accounts of these experiences are found in Rahel. These
experiences depict, assess, and judge the nonideal implications of Arendtian political action, namely
the impediments to political action. In order to render a multi-dimensional account of political
action, it is necessary to investigate these experiences not only because they are nonideal but also
because they depict the fragility of Arendtian political action. If racial discrimination, ignorance of
privilege, and epistemic injustice inhibit an individual from political action, then the number of
individuals who could become political actors is restricted to an elite few. Examining closely the
moments when Arendt is aware of the impediments to political action allows us to develop an
account of political action that anticipates and accounts for discrimination.
Additionally, there are clear parallels between Arendt and Rahel worth elaborating on.
Political action, for Arendt, reveals one’s identity. In Rahel, we witness two layers of revelation—
Rahel’s and Arendt’s. As the former half of this chapter has outlined, Rahel’s identity is revealed to
us through Arendt’s narrative. In the following sections, I examine how Arendt’s narrative and
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editorial decisions which pay attention to race and identity, privilege, and epistemic injustice reveal a
more attentive and therefore effective version of political action.
Each of the following three sections in Part III examine one of these discriminatory
experiences. I first look to Arendt’s awareness of racial difference and discrimination as they affect
Rahel’s ability to be seen and heard in German social circles. Then, I examine Arendt’s deeply
critical analysis of Rahel’s privileges. Rahel is largely ignorant of her relative privilege and Arendt
harshly critiques her insufficient self-awareness. I end by examining instances where Arendt is aware
of how epistemic injustice hinders political action.
Awareness of Racial Difference
In this section I argue that Arendt is well aware of racial differences and their connection to
marginalization and oppression. In other words, she is attentive to the varied experiences of Jews in
Prussia in the 18th and 19th centuries.40 I begin by arguing that this text, unlike The Human Condition,
operates at the nonideal level—paying close attention to the lived experiences of Rahel, Rahel’s
Jewish family and friends, and her non-Jewish friends, and the historical conditions of life in Prussia.
Additionally, I argue that Arendt’s critique of Jewish assimilation, which is addressed throughout the
entire course of the book, demonstrates her recognition of the importance of racial differences. In
other words, because Arendt is deeply critical of assimilation, there is room to interpret Arendt as
embracing racial differences.
It is helpful to begin this section with Arendt’s awareness of the nonideal, as opposed to
ideal nature of Rahel. In the first chapter Arendt explains Rahel’s reluctance to embrace her Jewish

40

Arendt’s main concern with the Jewish question was political—see Ch. 4 for more on Arendt’s narrow interest. Yet, it
is well worth noting that in Rahel’s time the Jewish question revolved around social assimilation, political protections,
cultural and religious practices, and racial identity. Jewish racial identity at the time was largely believed to be biological,
as opposed to the more commonly accepted understanding of race today, that it is socially constructed.

108
identity which she was more intent on covering up. Arendt is fiercely critical of Rahel’s desire to lie
about her existence as a Jewish woman. In Weissberg’s introduction to the first complete edition of
Rahel, she quotes correspondence between Arendt and German journalist Günter Gaus as saying
“‘To be Jewish belongs to the irrefutable conditions of my life, and I have never tried to change any
such fact, not even in my childhood.’’41 Arendt’s dedication to her Jewish identity, what Arendt calls
her unique, given qualities, stands in sharp contrast to Rahel’s desire to reinvent herself as someone
society would accept. In relation to one another, Arendt has the benefit of hindsight, assessing
Rahel’s life a century later. Rahel was not afforded that opportunity. But from Arendt’s privileged
perspective, she is able to critique Rahel’s assimilationist aspirations.
Critical of Rahel’s desire to rewrite her identity, Arendt analogizes Rahel’s fantasy-filed
journey with Quixote. In a cryptic passage, Arendt writes,
As long as Don Quixote continues to ride forth to conjure a possible, imagined, illusory
world out of the real one, he is only a fool, and perhaps a happy fool, perhaps even a noble
fool when he undertakes to conjure up within the real world a definite ideal. But if without a
definite ideal, without aiming at a definite imaginary revision of the world, he attempts only
to transform himself into some sort of empty possibility which he might be, he becomes
merely a ‘foolish dreamer,’ and an opportunist one in addition, who is seeking to destroy his
existence for the sake of certain advantages.42
As mentioned above, this is a strange passage following a section of the first chapter where Arendt
is explaining how Rahel, being Jewish, felt the need to lie about her identity in order to gain the
favor of those in society. Here Arendt is communicating the senselessness and impracticality of ideal
theory. Like Quixote, those who aim for imaginary, ideal constructions of the world and how it
works are fools, destined to spend their lives seeking out false realities. According to Arendt, if one
has a “definite ideal,” a well-thought out, well planned ideal, then they are still a fool, albeit a noble
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one. Yet, she cautions against what Rahel was attempting, which was to rewrite her history and
identity. Those who attempt to do this are only searching to climb the social ladder in her
estimate—an individual solution which necessitates masses of less fortunate Jews remain
marginalized. In all, Arendt here appears to critique an ideal approach to understanding the world
and enacting change—a radically different approach than the one she takes in her later works, The
Human Condition in particular.
In tandem with Arendt’s outright critique of the ideal approach and method in the previous
passage, her historically-rooted text engages nonideally with Rahel’s world. We can make sense of
this by looking at one of Arendt’s main arguments in Rahel—those who are not accepted by others,
socially or politically, ought to become what she calls “conscious pariahs,” as opposed to parvenues
or mere pariahs. As previously mentioned, the conscious pariah lives their life in full, conscious,
acceptance of their outsider position, refusing to renounce their identity in order to fit in or curry
favor. In contrast, the mere or unconscious pariah remains on the outskirts of society, upholding the
status quo. On the other hand, the parvenue casts aside or lies about their identity in order to be
acceptable. Rahel, according to Arendt, was a parvenue for much of her life because she sought to
hide and deny her Jewish identity. In order to demonstrate the perils of parvenue existence, Arendt
engages with the specifics of Rahel’s biography, her diary and correspondences, the Prussian state
during the 18th and 19th centuries, and the salon culture of Berlin at the turn of the 19th century.
The nonideal nature of these investigations truly aims to persuade us of the dangers of the parvenue,
and the values of the conscious pariah in such a way that pays close attention to how race operates
in Rahel’s endeavors.
Another of Arendt’s main arguments is that the wholesale approach to emancipation for
European Jews in the 18th and 19th centuries—assimilation—was harmful to the Jewish people for
it embraced the erasure of their identity and denial of their history. Arendt characterizes assimilation

110
as a lie to oneself and one’s racial identity. Narrowing her critique of assimilation in Rahel largely to
German Jews, she writes, “The German-speaking Jews and their history are an altogether unique
phenomenon; nothing comparable to it is to be found even in the other areas of Jewish
assimilation.”43 Notably, she is privileging the German Jewish experience—which was generally
understood to be the most privileged, elite group of Jews compared to other European Jews—but
she is also engaging with it at the nonideal level. Privileging the German Jewish experience in this
situation speaks to Arendt’s positionality—her own identity as a German Jew who was forced to flee
Germany in the midst of Hitler’s rise to power because she refused to attempt assimilation by
denying her identity. In this sense, Rahel’s failed attempts and ultimate dissatisfaction with
assimilation bear witness to the struggle for social and political protections for German Jews.
More specifically, Rahel struggled with what Arendt claims “was the greatest error that Rahel
shared with her contemporaries,”44 which was to create a persona which often cast aside their given
identity in order to thrive in society. Arendt claims that European Jews during this time period did
not consider Jewish emancipation en masse. Instead, individual, exceptional Jews, were able to
“overcome” their Jewish identity either through wealth, intellect, or connections. Arendt provides an
interesting analysis of this phenomenon, proving that her attention to the particular social and
political conditions Rahel experienced ought to be understood and communicated in order to make
a compelling argument for social acceptance. By engaging at this nonideal level, Arendt is able to
address, and critique, Rahel’s concerns about social acceptance in a way that acknowledges the
discrimination and lack of political protections that Rahel faced while also disparaging her from
denying her Jewish identity. Even though Arendt is critical of Rahel’s desire to recreate herself,
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Rahel is exemplary of political action because, as Arendt tells us, “All that remained for her to do
was to become a ‘mouthpiece’ for experience, to verbalize whatever happened.”45 Her Berlin salon
allowed her to speak and act with others that did not otherwise exist for Jewish women. Even
though the salons were private, they existed as a microcosm of the public realm, allowing individuals
to speak and be heard. According to Arendt in The Human Condition political action entails speaking
and acting so that those words and actions can reveal one’s identity to those in attendance. Certainly,
Rahel’s letters and diary entries also act this way to reveal herself to others.
Arendt’s characterization of Rahel’s salon additionally demonstrates her awareness of the
need for social and political recognition, regardless of race or stature. She describes it as “a socially
neutral place where all classes met and where it was taken for granted that each person would be an
individual.”46 Political action requires individualism because as an unique person, one can speak and
act and therefore reveal their particular self to others. The degree to which Rahel’s friends and salon
participants embraced each other’s individual differences was certainly a product of the time—
Arendt claims that it was due to a particular point in Berlin’s history that Jews, princes, social elites,
and intellectuals would gather, unhindered by their race, ethnicity, religion, or social standing. Yet,
the swift dissolution of Rahel’s friends and salon with Napoleon’s armies’ arrival in Berlin was
evidence of the tenuousness and disingenuousness of their relationship. The short-lived acceptance
of individuals in Berlin revealed that accepting historically minoritized individuals was merely in
fashion at the time, it was not a genuine awareness and respect for other racial, ethnic, religious, or
socio-economic groups. Even through the successful years of her salon, Arendt tells us that “Rahel
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was distrustful, because there was no place in the world for her, and she considered hope foolish.”47
The salon’s ability to provide Rahel a stage to speak and act proved inadequate. Her Berlin friends’
feeble attempt at providing social acceptance forced her to fervently peruse marriage. Marriage,
however, entailed a sweeping denial of her Jewish identity—something she did not have to commit
to as a salonnière.
From a very young age, Arendt tells us that Rahel pursued marriage as a means to escape her
Jewishness. Then, through adulthood Rahel devoted all her efforts to being socially recognized
through marriage. Arendt says that “She gave herself to love as though she were nothing but a
creature of nature, and she hoped since she had been ‘pushed out of the world by birth, by ill luck
not admitted to it,’ to be able to circumvent ill luck and birth through love.”48 As previously
discussed, Rahel only succeeded in marrying August Varnhagen in the latter half of her life. And yet,
quickly after her attempts at overcoming her Jewish identity were realized did she begin to renounce
her previous desire for social acceptance at the cost of her identity.
At times Arendt changes gears from providing an account of the specifics of Rahel’s life and
instead critiquing the larger social conditions of her time. In one such moment, Arendt critiques
what she says is an Enlightenment era desire to be lost in pure thought. She claims that Rahel sought
escape in that theoretical world of thought when she wrote the following:
The individual who has been liberated by reason is always running head-on into a world, a
society, whose past in the shape of ‘prejudices’ has a great deal of power; he is forced to
learn that past reality is also a reality. Although being born a Jewess might seem to Rahel a
mere reference to something out of the remote past, and although she may have entirely
eradicated the fact from her thinking, it remained a nasty present reality as a prejudice in the
minds of others.49
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For Arendt, the Enlightenment produced the mentality that “reason” is all one needs to become
accepted and Rahel certainly felt this way. But because Rahel was so wrapped up in the
Enlightenment ideal, she failed to understand that her Jewish identity would not be enough to gain
her social acceptance. Instead, she would, consistently throughout her life, be reminded that her
Jewish identity is what barred her from most of society.
Privilege
While Arendt’s characterization and analysis of Rahel’s particular circumstances as a Jewish
woman are concerned with Rahel and her interactions with the larger Prussian society, the following
analysis of privilege turns in on Rahel herself. In other words, this section aims to focus on Arendt’s
criticisms of Rahel individually, and German Jews in general. Arendt’s main critique is against
assimilation because, as has been previously mentioned, a main argument that Arendt is making in
this book is that to become a parvenue—someone who assimilates into the larger society and culture
at the cost of their own—is to live a life of denial and lies. Furthermore, the denial and lies remove
people like Rahel from the realities of oppression and marginalization. In other words, taking on the
parvenue existence is a distancing strategy which overlooks the social and political conditions which
force people like Rahel to disavow their Jewish identity in the first place. Similarly, to stay a pariah—
an outcast, an outsider—is to never confront the social and political circumstances that perpetuate
marginalization and oppression. Instead, Arendt argues that outsiders ought to be conscious pariahs,
individuals who are aware of their status, who refuse to deny or erase their racial identity in order to
gain political rights or social recognition. The conscious pariah’s fight for political protections is
grounded in their minoritized position. This section will first turn to Arendt’s critique of Rahel and
her fellow German Jews who pursued assimilation as parvenues, as well as Arendt’s critique of Rahel
for her inability to see beyond her own, individual struggle for social acceptance and political rights.
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German Jewish Assimilation
Arendt’s analysis of Jewish emancipation in the 18th and 19th centuries in Central Europe
contends that individuals vied for social acceptance, which also happened to come with political
protections. There was not a movement for mass emancipation for all Jews. According to Arendt,
“A political struggle for equal rights might have taken the place of the personal struggle….Jews did
not want to be emancipated as a whole; all they wanted was to escape from Jewishness, as
individuals if possible.”50 Rahel exemplifies this approach by exhausting all her resources to marry a
Christian and in turn erase her past identity. In fact, the thought did not even occur to Rahel until
the last few years of her life that her struggles as a Jew were shared by all Jews, and therefore all Jews
ought to be emancipated.
In addition to generalizing the Jewish approach to assimilation in the 18th and 19th
centuries, Arendt does helpfully narrow her focus, and critique, to Berlin Jews. She states that “The
Berlin Jews considered themselves exceptions. And just as every anti-Semite knew his personal
exceptional Jew in Berlin, so every Berlin Jew knew at least two eastern Jews in comparison with
whom he felt himself to be an exception.”51 Though descriptive in nature, this assessment of Berlin
Jews is certainly critical of the privilege they experienced compared to other European Jews—a
privilege that afforded a higher quality of life in terms of economic advantages as well as human
rights. Here it is quite clear that Arendt is aware of the privilege Berlin Jews (and German Jews in
general) experienced. Her awareness and critique is operating as a nonideal analysis of privilege
which addresses the intergroup discrimination that she claims was a common feature of German
Jewish self-perception. This discrimination is rooted in a social construction of race—that where,
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nationally, one is located affects their privileged and exceptional status. Additionally, exceptionalism
in this instance is a form of internalized racism that consciously or unconsciously supports the idea
of a racial hierarchy. Not only does this perspective elevate and isolate the exceptional German Jews
who were supposedly lucky enough to assimilate, but it ignores the masses of European Jews who
have to continue to exist in poverty and without social and political protections in order for those
exceptions to succeed. Though Arendt’s recognition of the privileged Germans, and specifically
Berlin Jews is obvious, it is necessary to keep in mind that her later texts come close to totally
ignoring the existence of privilege among the white American population compared to people of
color. So, although she appears to keenly understand the relationship between privileged, elite
groups of people (which she herself is a member of when writing Rahel) and the oppressed,
marginalized ones that are seen to exist in contradistinction, that insight becomes lost along the way.
Rahel’s Path to Assimilation
Rahel’s dying words, “The thing which all my life seemed to me the greatest shame, which
was the misery and misfortune of my life—having been born a Jewess—this I should on no account
now wish to have missed,”52 reflect her lifelong struggle with her Jewish identity. She insatiably
desired acceptance by the larger, non-Jewish society for the individual person she was, and thought
her plight was particular to her. After spending the first three quarters of her life failing to
accomplish this goal, she married Varnhagen, was baptized and finally accepted as the wife of
Varnhagen in some social circles. It was not until her last few years of life that she began to
understand that the lack of human rights she experienced were not particular to her—it was shared
by all Jewish people. In the following section, I discuss Arendt’s, at times harsh, critique of Rahel’s
insensitivity to the larger, political fight for human rights that Rahel overlooked for much of her life.
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I argue that Arendt’s analysis of Rahel’s insensitivity and self-centeredness is evidence of Arendt’s
understanding of how privilege operates in relation to marginalized populations—it perpetuates
systems of oppression by incentivizing individuals to rise socially or politically at the cost of others.
Put differently, Rahel’s desire for social acceptance at the cost of her Jewish identity harms other less
privileged Jews who are not able or willing to disregard their Jewish identity. Doing so reinforces
internalized racism and its hierarchical conception of race.
Rahel believed that if she were able to meet a multitude of people, mostly through her salon,
she would be remembered. To be remembered is a hallmark of exceptionalism. Arendt states that
Rahel “believed herself superior to, beyond the game of life, and shielded herself against being dead
by contact with many people.”53 If people knew of her, and spoke of her, and brought others to visit
her salon, then she had the potential to exist after death through her legacy. This same idea about
great words and deeds being recorded and remembered are an aspect of action for Arendt.54 It even
plays into Arendt’s theory that only the exceptional, those whose lives are recorded and
remembered, have truly acted. However, even though Arendt goes on, in The Human Condition, to
elevate exceptional actors, she is critical of Rahel’s mentality—that she is superior, that she is more
than the circumstances she was born into.
Rahel’s desire to be remembered grew—she felt an overwhelming need to speak and be
heard and in turn, be differentiated from other Jews. Arendt keenly understands that Rahel’s ability
to act outside the confines of her salon were nonexistent and mournfully tells us that “With each
passing day, as the past receded further into the past, her need for speaking grew….she could not go
on like this, merely mutely insisting upon what had been in the past and mutely waiting until death at
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last carried her away.” Facilitating the salon, though not experiencing social acceptance outside of
55

her garret room on Jägerstrasse, was not enough for Rahel. She knew the salon would not last and
yearned for more than a private attic room for friends to visit and debate the literature or news of
the day. While Arendt shares with us the very private struggle that restricted Rahel’s ability to act and
speak, we are also privy to the exceptional nature of Rahel’s desire. She aimed to be viewed as an
exceptional Jew who was worthy of German society’s acceptance and remembrance.
Yet, as we already know, Rahel sought to, and was in a privileged enough position to succeed
in, marrying in order to gain social favor. In her attempt to change herself, to rewrite her history
through marriage, Arendt argues that Rahel’s decision is to live a lie. She tells us that “Full of
illusions about the possibilities of the outer world, she imagined that disguises, camouflage, changes
of name could exert a tremendous transforming power.”56 In turn, Rahel was baptized and changed
her name to Friederike Robert in 1814. However, it’s important to pause and take stock of Arendt’s
awareness of Rahel’s privileged position as a woman who had enough money, a charismatic
personality, and social location that allowed for her and a small number of similar Jews to erase their
identity through marriage. Arendt characterizes this path as illusory and false because she is claiming
that Rahel’s identity as a Jewish woman cannot really be changed. Baptism and name changes could
not transform Rahel so that she was no longer a Jew. This interpretation indicates that Arendt
understands Rahel’s Jewishness to be unchangeable—a given fact of her birth. In this sense, race is
defined biologically by Arendt, not socially. Yet, Arendt humanizes Rahel’s desire to “become one
human being among others” simply through a Christian marriage.57 Even the humanization carries
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judgement—Arendt still is reproachful of Rahel’s desire to gain social and political advantages
through the denial of her Jewish identity and history.
During the Napoleonic wars, anti-Semitism rose and German Jews lost considerable social
standing according to Arendt. In 1806, after Napoleon initially defeated the Prussian army, Arendt
writes that “Only now, in a time of breakdown did Rahel realize that her life also was subject to
general political conditions.”58 Arendt’s characterization of Rahel here shows a sheltered, naive, and
ignorant individual who, although miserable for being rejected by society, was able to live most of
her life in a comfortable attic apartment, paid for by her brothers. She was fortunate enough to have
the leisure to run a popular Berlin salon. It was not until Berlin’s future as a German city was at
stake that she began to realize her relative comfort was at the mercy of social trends and political
factions.59 When Jews once again became scapegoats during this time, Rahel started to understand
how her identity personally and as a racial Jew ought to have political protections to avoid volatile
social perceptions.
However, Arendt makes it clear that Rahel was not quick to understand that her struggles as
a Jew were minimal compared to less fortunate Jews in Europe. During the Napoleonic battles,
Rahel was able to escape to Prague. It was there that she became more patriotic in her appreciation
for being German but also began to understand that her struggles in Germany were shared with
other Jews. In Prague she realized that Germany “had never of its own accord granted her—as a
Jew—the most elementary, most important and minimum concession: equal human rights.”60 Rahel
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might have wanted to be recognized socially, but her inability to accomplish that goal was a direct
result of political constraints.
Arendt’s most harsh criticisms surround Rahel’s inability to recognize her own privilege.
Specifically, she focuses on Rahel’s ignorance of the larger, political desire for human rights that
Jews needed. Instead, Rahel only fixated on social acceptance—a concern Arendt articulates in The
Human Condition when she claims the social realm overshadows the political. She tells us that “The
world and reality had, for Rahel, always been represented by society.”61 This statement speaks to why
Rahel yearned for social acceptance, and why, because of Rahel’s tunnel vision, society is spoken of
largely, as opposed to political issues or questions. She goes on to state that financial security was
Rahel’s only real concern. Economic matters exist in the social realm, for Arendt, hence this is why
Rahel’s desire is considered a social matter.
Throughout her four decades, Rahel continued to be ignorant of the common plight of
those marginalized by society. Arendt writes that “She had never been able to fit her private ill luck
into a scheme of general social relationships; she had never ventured into criticism of the society, or
even to solidarity with those who for other reasons were likewise excluded from the ranks of the
privileged.”62 She could not see past her own pain to realize that thousands of others, Jews and other
marginalized groups of people, experienced similar, difficult lives. Here Arendt is communicating
the importance in looking past one’s own trying, oppressive existence in order to see others who
share similarly distressed lives.63
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Arendt makes it clear that Rahel’s desire for social assimilation inherently meant assimilation
to antisemitism. When Rahel and August Varnhagen returned to Berlin after Napoleon's forces were
pushed out, Rahel was once again the subject of discrimination. Arendt claims that, “One had to pay
for becoming a parvenu by abandoning truth, and this Rahel was not prepared to do.”64 It is only at
the very end of Rahel’s life that she reaches out to her old friend Pauline to express her burgeoning
realization that having to lie about who she was had not been nor would it be worthwhile. In
addition to the self-deception, Arendt hammers home the point that buying into assimilation meant
perpetuating antisemitism. The Jewish parvenues saw themselves as exceptions, allowed to exist with
freedom and some rights, because they constituted a few special cases. The remaining Jewish
population needed to stay subjugated in order for the few to flourish.
Though Rahel’s reversal in the last few years of her life certainly marks an improved
appreciation of her Jewish identity, it still falls short of an awareness of how her relative privilege
operated in German social circles and abroad when surrounded by people who only knew her
husband and not her Jewish heritage. Arendt is, at times, ruthless in her critique of Rahel’s
ignorance; however, Arendt intends to tell not merely Rahel’s story, but how privileged women like
Rahel affected many more minoritized German Jews.
Epistemic Injustice
Arendt’s nonideal approach to telling Rahel’s story uncovers key impediments to political
action. Some of these impediments come at the hands of Rahel herself while others are a product of
the social and political restrictions against Jews. In this final section I outline epistemic injustices,

disrupt such hierarchical notions of race which pit those who identity as different races and those in differing privileged
situations within races against one another.
64

Rahel, 204.

121
with the help of José Medina and Miranda Fricker, that I claim Arendt marks out as impediments to
political action. The key distinction is Arendt’s explicit articulation of Rahel’s struggles to be seen
and heard in social and political contexts because of her Jewish identity. As argued in the previous
chapter, Arendt, in The Human Condition overlooks the impediments to political action in a way that
undermines its efficacy. However, in Rahel I argue that Arendt keenly points out Rahel’s struggle to
be a political actor, providing us a more detailed, multidimensional picture of political action.
Arendt shows us that from an early age Rahel was frustrated not only that few were
interested in hearing about her life, interests, and desires, but also that she was so radically cut off
from the bustle of activities in Berlin. As a young child Rahel was “Excluded from society, deprived
of any normal social intercourse, she had a tremendous hunger for people, was greedy for every
smallest event, tensely awaited every utterance.”65 She desperately wanted to experience a welcoming
community that allowed her to experience debate and dialogue, even simple friendship. Rahel was
not entirely without friends, however. She wished to have the freedom to meet anyone she wished,
however, not only those in Berlin’s Jewish quarter.
Arendt tells us that “No one…was more candid than she; no one wanted more to be
known.”66 Recall Rahel’s plea to her childhood David Veit, demanding to know why he wouldn’t
share her letters with his friends and acquaintances. Rahel’s naivete about the world’s prejudices was
evident in her exchange with Veit. She believed that if the world took the chance to see her as a
valuable, unique individual then they would understand her. But her Jewish identity barred her from
many opportunities to express her thoughts and desires, and in turn reveal the kind of person she
was, with others. Put differently, Rahel’s desire to be a political actor, one who could speak and be
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heard and in turn be revealed to others, was impeded by predominant, racist conceptions of Jews.
Practically speaking, segregation and discrimination during Rahel’s time largely inhibited Jews from
even being in a position to be political actors outside of cloistered communities.
I claim that the epistemic injustice at play in this example can best be described by José
Medina’s classification of epistemic vices and virtues, as explained in Epistemologies of Resistance.
Taking Miranda Fricker’s work at the intersection of epistemology and virtue ethics a step further,67
Medina examines epistemic injustice through the lens of virtues and vices. Epistemic virtues,
according to Medina, include “humility, curiosity/diligence, and open-mindedness” while epistemic
vices include arrogance, laziness, and closed-mindedness.68 Epistemic laziness, or the “socially
produced and carefully orchestrated lack of curiosity,”69 is vicious because it involves actively
ignoring easily accessible information about certain groups of people. In Rahel’s case, she was right
to acknowledge that all it ought to take is a few hours with her to convince others that she was
worthy of friendship, social interactions, and political protections. But the German milieu outright
denied her this opportunity, out of epistemic laziness. Through Rahel’s example, it is clear that a
successful account of political action necessitates protections against epistemic laziness. The virtuous
counterpart to epistemic laziness is curiosity and diligence, which in Rahel’s context could look like a
willingness to listen to people from different social locations in order to learn about their desires and
needs. Framed in this way, political action ought to prompt epistemic curiosity and diligence in order
to be effective.

See Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) and
“Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing” in Metaphilosophy (2003).
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In attempting to gain social favor in Gentile society, Rahel often found herself immediately
underestimated and overlooked. Arendt writes that “Rahel was being opposed by the world,
society’s prejudices, and not any individual, not any individual’s particular will.”70 Even though Rahel
was certainly ignored by many individuals, Arendt is pointing out the collective European rejection
of Jews and its effect on Rahel. But I claim that Arendt is also articulating Medina’s vice of epistemic
closed-mindedness. Medina explains that epistemic closed-mindedness acts as a defense strategy
because it “involves the lack of openness to a whole range (no matter how broad or narrow) of
experiences and viewpoints that can destabilize (or create trouble for) one’s own perspective.”71 The
collective prejudices in Rahel’s time perpetuated the unfair stereotyping of Jews as unworthy of
social and political protections. By actively avoiding engagement with Jews who might prove wrong
commonly held antisemitic beliefs, Rahel’s contemporaries engaged in epistemic closed-mindedness.
The wholesale opposition that Arendt tells us Rahel experienced indicates, I believe, a need to
counteract epistemic closed-mindedness because it perpetually ignores the testimonies of those who
differ from the dominant group in society. Medina suggests that epistemic open-mindedness ought
to result in what he calls “kaleidoscopic consciousness” or the openness to the manifold and everchanging perspectives of people from different social locations than one’s own. In Rahel’s
experience, this would involve a socially collective change in attitude toward Jews so that they could
be conceived of as political actors.
Yet, as Arendt makes clear, social and political custom segregated most Jews in Prussia. This
separation resulted in what Arendt says when she writes, “suffering unseen, without either witnesses
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or spectators was the ultimate in nonacting.” Secluded and excluded, Rahel, like many of her
coreligionists, was stripped of her ability to act. She had no audience to witness her suffering and so
her isolation precluded any opportunity for political action. It is only through Arendt’s retelling of
Rahel that her voice is given a proper space to be heard and remembered. In this sense, Arendt is
providing Rahel the opportunity, postmortem, to be heard and seen—something she was rarely
afforded during her life because of the epistemic laziness and closed-mindedness of her
contemporaries.
Rahel, however, did experienced a brief period of success when it came to being heard and
seen in her salon. The era in which Rahel successfully ran her salon was particularly welcoming to
Jews and Jewish salons. Giving further context for this era, Arendt writes, “The Jewish salons in
Berlin provided a social area outside of society, and Rahel’s garret room in its turn stood outside the
conventions and customs of even the Jewish salons. The exceptional Berlin Jews, in their pursuit of
culture and wealth, had good luck for three decades.”73 Yet, Rahel’s small taste of social acceptance
was confined to her attic salon, and only for a brief period of time. She was at the whims of her
visitors who were her only chance at convincing those with more power and influence that she was
worthy of social acceptance.
But as Arendt alludes, the vibrant Jewish salon culture was short-lived. She writes, “A
harmless forerunner of a far more critical development, a wave of anti-Semitism spread through the
Prussian provinces right at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was propagated and
represented by Grattenauer’s pamphlet Against the Jews.” (84) The pamphlet’s antisemitism was
unique at the time because it attacked the popular Jewish salons. According to historian and Jewish
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Studies scholar Deborah Hertz in Jewish High Society in Old Regime Berlin, the pamphlet’s “antisemitism
was a reaction to the new and rapid social success of the salon women” as opposed to “earlier
antisemites, who had mostly argued that Jews could be accepted into society if they would cease to
believe and behave in a Jewish way.”74 Grattenauer actively argued against any assimilation of Jews
and in making this argument disparaged against the female Jewish salonnières who he saw as
assimilationists par excellence. Grattenauer’s pamphlet quickly limited Rahel’s social interactions, which
were already confined to her salon.
Those in power or more prestigious social positions latched on to Grattenauer’s pamphlet,
arrogantly using it to blame Jews for any problems. There was swift public support of its views
which, did not question the virulently antisemitic claims it made. In this sense, Grattenauer’s
pamphlet and its popularity align with Medina’s final epistemic vice—arrogance. He characterizes
this vice in its most common form as “letting one’s perspective go unchecked [which] results in an
unavoidable, mundane accumulation of oversights, errors, biased stereotypes, and distortions.”75
German social circles, including Rahel’s, accepted and internalized Grattenauer’s unchecked sense of
superiority—or arrogance—over Jews, and Jewish women in particular. Medina’s virtue aimed at
ameliorating epistemic arrogance is epistemic humility or “attentiveness to one’s cognitive
limitations and deficits.”76 The lack of evidence and extremely polemic nature of Grattenauer’s
pamphlet ought to have signified it baseless assertions, but because actively listening to the varied,
lived experiences of Jews in Germany was not commonplace, German epistemic arrogance
perpetuated antisemitic sentiment, effectively shuttering most Jewish salons.
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In this time of rising antisemitism, Arendt claims that “What remained, even in the most
favorable situation, was the necessity ‘of having always to show who one is; that is why it is so
repulsive to be a Jewess!’ The necessary legitimation kept her from devoting herself directly to the
world and to present circumstances.”77 Arendt’s use of Rahel’s own words in this quote do not
reflect Arendt’s repulsion—Arendt is merely sharing Rahel’s disgust. Instead, Arendt’s use of Rahel’s
words here show how counterproductive her self-hate was. Rahel saw her Jewishness, and its
segregating effect, as repulsive; and, that repulsion kept her from political action aimed at
ameliorating her and other Jews’ circumstances.
Rahel’s self-repulsion was an act of resistance against societal norms which necessitated she
hide or deny her Jewish identity. After unpacking his account of epistemic vices and virtues in
Epistemologies of Resistance, Medina examines how political resistance or what he calls epistemic friction
operates in two different ways. His resistance model functions at the nonideal level of political
philosophy because it pays attention to when groups or populations are resisting, in both senses of
fighting and holding one’s ground against, political or societal systems. For example, Medina looks
at oppression that is rooted in and perpetuated by racism, such as in Rahel’s case. There are those
who resist being racially oppressed, but there are also those who resist listening to or taking seriously
accounts of racial oppression. Medina values the former resistance in politics because it is what has
the power to avoid a complacent democracy, especially complacent democracies that perpetuate
oppression.78 The latter kind of resistance, a sort of negative resistance, acts as an indication of the
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perpetuation of oppression. In turn, positive resistance-based models have the capacity, in Medina’s
account, to make society better by actively fighting racist institutions.
I claim that Rahel, through her self-deprecation, perpetuated a negative resistance that in
turn perpetuated the oppressive environment towards Jews. She stood her ground, never giving up
the hope that society would eventually accept her. But she did so by attempting to become an
“exceptional Jew” which meant her efforts further marginalized less privileged Jews. Arendt,
however, in her critique of Rahel is enacting a positive resistance that aims to actively push against
the racist stereotyping of Jews.
This chapter examines Rahel’s story and the story of German Jewish assimilation, the
manner in which Arendt told those stories, and the implications of how Arendt told them. In a letter
to Karl Jaspers about Rahel from 1952 Arendt writes, “You are absolutely right when you say this
book ‘can make one feel that if a person is a Jew he cannot really live his life to the full.’ And that is
the central point.”79 Additionally, in the preface to Rahel, Arendt tells us that “What interested me
solely was to narrate the story of Rahel’s life as she herself might have told it.”80 Not only is it a
nonideal approach to enter into the life and storytelling of Rahel herself, but in so doing Arendt
herself is acting out political action while asking her readers to experience Rahel’s tumultuous life.
By giving a voice to one she thought was ignored—one in which she heard her own worries and
laments—Arendt is entering a public space and making room for Rahel’s story. In The Human
Condition, Arendt characterizes action as that which reveals one’s identity, and hopefully preserves it
for future generations. In sharing Rahel’s life story, Arendt is preserving her identity, and all the
tribulations that came with being Jewish in the 18th and 19th centuries, in order to caution against
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Rahel’s mistakes and argue for a public realm where those who are marginalized can come to share
their experiences and narratives.
Arendt’s focus on Rahel’s life story naturally situates this text in a nonideal context. She uses
Rahel’s struggle for self and social acceptance as the “nutshell” to her larger concern for and
arguments about Jewish assimilation and marginalization. These arguments are an earlier version of
Arendt’s arguments made in The Human Condition for the acceptance of given qualities and the
necessity of action. And because of the nonideal nature of this text, I argue that Rahel provides a
helpful, nonideal version of political action that ought to be read in tandem with the ideal version
found in The Human Condition. As the previous chapter argues, The Human Condition’s ideal version of
political action does not account for the how real individuals, existing within real power dynamics,
subject to social and political whims, can become political actors. Rahel’s life story is a testament to
the struggle to act and be recognized in the public realm. But, Arendt’s biography of Rahel also
provides a demonstration of how difficult it is to access the ideal version of political action.
Discrimination and epistemic injustices from outside forces, in addition to Rahel’s insensitivity to
her own privilege, affect her ability to act.
In the following chapter, I turn to a collection of Arendt’s texts from the 1930s and 1940s
which put into practice her nonideal version of political action outlined in Rahel. These texts, I claim,
serve as Arendt’s practicum—her practical application of political action in her own life. Not only
do these texts exemplify political action but they also provide insight into Arendt’s prejudices.
Understanding her prejudices in these early texts aids in developing my multi-dimensional account
of political action because it recognizes aspects of her arguments concerning political action which
fail to transfer from the ideal account into the real world.

CHAPTER FOUR
ARENDT’S EXEMPLIFICATION OF POLITICAL ACTION
This chapter turns to a collection of Arendt’s largely unpublished texts on Jewish identity,
culture, religion, and most importantly for this dissertation, politics from the 1930s and 1940s. I
argue that in these underappreciated texts Arendt exemplifies her theory of political action, in largely
unproblematic ways—as compared to the ideal and exclusive version of political action found in The
Human Condition. But instead of embracing these helpful exemplifications in order to replace
Arendt’s more problematic account of political action, I urge caution. Similar to the previous
chapter, I argue that the exemplified version of political action found in her texts from the 1930s
and 1940s ought to be considered in conjunction with the nonideal version found in Rahel as well as
the ideal version found in The Human Condition. Put differently, I argue for a more nuanced reading
of political action in her underappreciated texts from this era which recognizes how Arendtian
political action is, at times, helpful while also paying attention to where Arendt is Eurocentric,
myopic concerning race, and willfully ignorant. Interpreting political action as multi-dimensional
makes visible when Arendt undermines her own project in such a way that it affects the integrity of
her philosophy of political action. Her prejudices and oversights, which I turn to in the third part of
the chapter, support my argument that a single version of Arendtian political action is inherently
flawed because it caters predominantly to white, Western Europeans.
In what immediately follows I introduce the collection of texts from the 1930s and 1940s
which I claim are exemplifications of nonideal political action. In this first part I provide an
overview of the relevant literature and briefly revisit my methodology. In Part II, I outline my
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argument for interpreting these texts as examples of political action. I make the argument that what
we find in this collection of texts are examples of Arendt exemplifying political action. I focus on
four examples: her arguments for a Jewish army during World War II; her involvement with and
eventual distance from Zionism; and, a letter condemning Tnuat Haherut, an Israeli political party
that encouraged attacks on their Arab neighbors, that she wrote and which was co-signed by Albert
Einstein, Sidney Hook, and Seymour Melman. Each of these examples unpack aspects of Arendtian
political action, particularly, in unproblematic ways.
In Part III, I conclude by reassessing Arendt’s texts from the 1930s and 1940s and assert
that they are, at times, Eurocentric, myopic, and epistemically ignorant. The third part of this
chapter is a proactive attempt to engage critically with a variety of perspectives on Arendt—
perspectives that take seriously her anti-Black racism, so that we can develop a more detailed, multidimensional rendering of her theory on political action. Just because these texts contain a number of
helpful examples of Arendtian political action does not mean that we ought to sweep under the rug
her weaknesses and epistemic flaws—that would provide us only a partial, one-dimensional
rendering of her thought. This part of the chapter argues that we ought to hold in tension the
valuable and problematic aspects of Arendt’s thought in order to develop a multi-dimensional
rendering—one of remarkable Jewish political action, and one of tunnel vision affected by prejudice.
If we recognize and appreciate this tension, we move beyond a diagnostic analysis of Arendt that
merely states she is racist. Instead, through standpoint theory we piece together the diverse
perspectives that allow us to acknowledge her oversights—of her Eurocentrism, her myopic
conception of race, and her epistemic ignorance—in hopes of not repeating them. To focus only on
one of these stories is to perpetuate “the danger of a single story” outlined in Chapter 1—a story
that, in this case, values the white philosopher over those she overlooks.
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Part I: Overview of Arendt’s “Jewish Writings”
The texts from the 1930s and 1940s that I consider in this chapter are found in The Jewish
Writings, an edited collection of Arendt’s texts that engages with many aspects of Jewishness—
culture, identity, religion, politics, etc. It was published in 2007, thirty-two years after her death, by
Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman. A handful of the texts found in The Jewish Writings were
previously unpublished or obscure, though there are a few well known essays including “We
Refugees” and “The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition.” Much of the collection is concerned with
Jewish politics and Jewish political action. Structurally, the collection is organized by decade, starting
in the 1930s and moving through the 1960s.
Despite the inclusion of some well-read and often referenced texts, such as the two
mentioned above, The Jewish Writings contains many short and obscure writings that are infrequently
taken up, if at all, in Arendt scholarship. To a degree this is justifiable—the collection aims to
include all texts that engage with the Jewish question, in all imaginable formulations. The result is
that many short articles or essays are repetitive; and, at nearly five hundred pages, it is
understandable that this collection of texts is often overlooked.
Chronologically, the majority of texts included in The Jewish Writings were written after Rahel
Varnhagen and before The Human Condition, with the exception of those included from the 1960s—
The Human Condition was published in 1958. In this chapter, I do not consider material included from
the 1960s which is centered around the Eichmann trial and controversy. There are many analyses of
Arendt’s interpretation of and aftermath from her coverage of the Eichmann trial and there is not
enough space to adequately address this saga here.1 More importantly, I have made the decision to

1 For an overview of Arendt’s trial coverage see Young-Bruel’s biography Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World, chapter 8.
On page 348 she notes that immediate reception of her report, originally published in The New Yorker drew the ire of
many, including the Council of Jews from Germany and the Anti-Defamation League who referred to “Arendt’s
defamatory conception of ‘Jewish participation in the Nazi holocaust.’” See also, Jacob Robinson, And the Crooked Shall
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exclude, with one small exception, Eichmann in Jerusalem and Arendt’s subsequent responses
concerning that book from this chapter. Though they contain exemplifications of Arendtian political
action, there are too many outliers because of the book’s notoriety that mire a clear analysis of the
concept. To put it more bluntly, that is the work of another project.
Given the chronological placement of Arendt’s texts from the 1930s and 1940s, between
Rahel and The Human Condition, particularly in light of the exclusion of Eichmann, I want to emphasize
that I am not attempting to make a historically dependent argument that claims The Human Condition
is necessarily a product of the development of Arendtian political action over time. Instead, it is
helpful to conceive of Rahel as an early theory of political action and by the time Arendt is writing
what would be collected in The Jewish Writings she has moved from that early theory into the real,
nonideal world. I argue that these early texts consist of Arendt’s application and exemplification of
political action as a theory first developed in Rahel. At this time of her life, Arendt was not only
writing about political action, she was acting it out. The next time we encounter an explicit account
of political action is in The Human Condition wherein she moves back to theorizing it. With this in
mind, I argue we ought to think of her texts from the 1930s and 1940s as Arendt’s practicum—her
time in the field practicing her theory of political action before she moves on to further develop that
theory in The Human Condition.
The Value of Arendt’s Early Writings
Though much of The Jewish Writings is not often referenced in Arendt scholarship, and
certainly not outside of it, there are compelling arguments for its importance. Richard Bernstein, in
Be Made Straight (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1965); David Cesarani, Becoming Eichmann
(Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2007); Michael Mumanno,“Man with an Unspotted Conscience,” New York Times, May 19,
1963, https://www.nytimes.com/1963/05/19/archives/man-with-an-unspotted-conscience-adolf-eichmanns-role-inthe-nazi.html; and Barry Sharpe, Modesty and Arrogance in Judgement: Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1999), for further critiques concerning Arendt’s purported victim-blaming, antisemitism, and leniency
toward Adolf Eichmann.
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his 1996 book Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, forcefully argues that the key to understanding
Arendt lies in understanding her engagement with “the Jewish Question.”2 For him, the Jewish
question necessarily needs to grapple with Jewishness through Judaism—a concern Arendt herself
never tackled. Though I agree with Bernstein that we cannot fully understand Arendt on say, for my
purposes here, politics or political action without understanding Jewish politics and Jewish political
action, I do not agree that Arendt needed to engage with Judaism. As he points out, for Arendt, the
Jewish question is a social and political one, not religious. While Bernstein takes issues with that, I
do not.
Similar to Bernstein, the trustee of Arendt’s literary trust and editor of The Jewish Writings,
Jerome Kohn argues in the preface that it is impossible to understand the Arendt of The Human
Condition or The Origins of Totalitarianism without starting with her Jewish writings. His lengthy and
detailed preface outlines five phases of Arendt’s Jewish experience that begins with her “initial
interest in the story of German Jewry,” moving through “political awakenings” and developments,
and ending in “the experience of the rejection, entirely unwarranted, of a Jew by her own people” in
the wake of the Eichmann trial.3 Kohn summarizes his, his co-editor Ron H. Feldman, and
Bernstein’s appreciation of Arendt’s Jewish writings when he writes, “her experience as a Jew, is
literally the foundation of her thought: it supports her thinking even when she is not thinking about
Jews or Jewish questions.”4
It is possible to entertain the counterargument that Arendt’s texts in question were largely
unpublished and therefore cannot be taken as seriously as the texts Arendt chose to publish, or even
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that these texts constitute a biographical as opposed to philosophical context with which to
understand Arendt. To a degree, Bernstein, Kohn, and Feldman are making more biographical than
philosophic arguments. However, in this chapter I am interested in reading these texts as exemplars
of Arendtian political action. In all dense, philosophical analysis, examples are heartily welcomed to
unpack the concepts at hand. I argue that what we find in these texts from the 1930s and 1940s is a
collection of helpful examples that unpack Arendtian political action. When we come across
examples in philosophy, we value and pay close attention to them—the same ought to apply to
those found throughout her articles and essays from the 1930s and 1940s.
Toward a Multi-Dimensional Reading of Nonideal Political Action
What further sets this chapter apart from Bernstein, Kohn, and Feldman is the lens through
which I examine the examples in her texts from the 1930s and 1940s. To understand that lens, we
must return to Kathryn Sophia Belle and her 2014 book Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question. Belle’s
book forcefully argues that Arendt’s private-public-social divide is rooted in her anti-Black racism;
yet, the rejection of Belle’s book by some Arendt scholars, Roger Berkowitz in particular, has been
emphatic. As explained in Chapter 1, Berkowitz, the current director of The Hannah Arendt Center
at Bard, wrote a scathing review of Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question, accusing Belle of textually
unfounded arguments against Arendt.
In an attempt to cultivate a multi-dimensional interpretation of Arendtian political action, in
this chapter it is necessary to recognize how Arendt’s Eurocentric prejudices affect her
understanding of the concept. In the following part, I provide an account of the nonideal
exemplification of political action in Arendt’s early Jewish-centric texts. Yet, in the final part of this
chapter I acknowledge Arendt’s Eurocentrism and how it negatively affects her account of political
action to the point of undermining her mission to have more people involved with politics.
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Part II: Examples of Political Action
Arguments for a Jewish Army
From October 1941 through November 1942, Arendt wrote a handful of articles for Aufbau,
a German-American newspaper, about the need for a Jewish Army. She passionately argues for
Jewish representation in the fight against those who sought to exterminate the Jewish people.
Logistically, the battalion would consist of Palestinian Jews—a representation of specifically Jewish
action, as opposed to those Jewish soldiers who served in British or American battalions. One of
Arendt’s reasons is that the Jews were “the first European nation on whom Hitler declared war.”5
Being the first is of little philosophical concern, though she takes seriously this historical fact.
Arendt’s repeated calls for and arguments concerning a Jewish Army are excellent examples
of her nonideal version of political action. Her calls for a Jewish Army are themselves
exemplifications of political action—speaking and acting in public, though our focus here is on
speaking—while her justification is representative of the concept. In other words, her speaking out,
through writing in Aufbau, serves as an impeccable example of political action.6 In addition to the
exemplification of speech that we find in her calls for a Jewish Army, we can turn to the
justifications she gives for her call to action—these justifications further unpack what political action
looks like in nonideal situations and how Arendt is thinking through—maybe unconsciously or
unintentionally—the implications of those situations. Let us turn to some specifics to explain what I
mean when I say her justifications for a Jewish Army are representative of political action.
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In December of 1941, Arendt refers to the “Washington Conference of the ‘Committee for
a Jewish Army’” and their deliberations regarding the creation of a Jewish Army. Though the
conference was productive, Arendt warns that “There is always a danger whenever Jewish politics
first lets its demands be certified by non-Jewish circles, and hardly a single Jew spoke at this
conference.”7 Though Arendt certainly gets herself into hot water—rightfully so—for not following
her own advice when writing “On Violence” and “Reflections on Little Rock,” she takes a clear
stance regarding speaking for oneself and the problems of speaking for others here. Setting the
productivity of the meeting aside, Arendt is criticizing the conference’s method because it assumed
Jewish voices did not need to be heard in order to make a decision on their ability to form a Jewish
Army—those at the conference were capable of deciding for them. There is an undercurrent of
superiority in the conference’s proceedings, even though, as Arendt notes, it was a productive one.
As one half of political action, speaking—and in this case, speaking for oneself—is certainly
important to Arendt’s thought. In The Human Condition, Arendt tells us that speaking, more often
than action, is the manifestation of political action.8 Arendt’s argument for a Jewish Army is an
excellent example of such political speech.
In terms of her justification, Arendt makes it abundantly clear in her Aufbau articles that
when it comes to the need for a Jewish Army, Jews are the ones who ought to have a visible
presence and audible voice in the decision-making process. The importance of speaking and
acting—the two main aspects of political action—for oneself is a recurrent theme in Arendt’s texts
from the 1930s and 1940s, and one which I argue acts to justify the particular political need for an
army. Who better to communicate the political needs of the Jewish people, than the Jewish people?
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This point is both an obvious and frequently disregarded phenomenon. Speaking for oneself or
one’s people in this example asserts epistemic sovereignty of their experiences, needs, and desires. In
other words, the Jewish people are best suited to address their own problems and propose their own
solutions. Assuming otherwise denies the “sovereignty,” as I’ve called it above, or the capability of
the Jewish people to speak for themselves. The harmful assumption that marginalized groups are
not capable of speaking for themselves asserts power dynamics—those who are marginalized are
kept marginalized because they are not given the opportunity to speak for themselves. Despite its
obviousness, the political need for representation, for the ability to literally fight for oneself, is one
proposed solution to the stateless status of many Jews at the time. Though the prospect of a Jewish
Army did not guarantee national identity or political sovereignty—secondary, though meaningful,
concerns for Arendt at this time—it did offer the opportunity for action against one’s enemies.
To further contextualize the justification for a Jewish Army, I want to put into conversation
“The Problem of Speaking for Others,” by Linda Martín Alcoff, with Arendt. Doing so allows us to
uncover some of the philosophic underpinnings in Arendt’s call for a Jewish Army—something that
she does not go on to explicitly theorize but which I think is important to postulate here. In her
article, Alcoff explores the varied implications of speaking about and for others. She makes it clear
that there is no universal answer for when it is appropriate, or not, to speak for others; instead, we
ought to be aware of our “social location” before deciding to speak. For Alcoff, one’s “social
location” is connected to their social identity. She tells us that a speaker’s “location…has an
epistemically significant impact on that speaker’s claims and can serve either to authorize or
disauthorize one’s speech.”9 In other words, Alcoff makes it abundantly clear that one’s speaking for
others is more complex than a social nicety or a well-intentioned act—it has epistemic import
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because it affects the perceived reliability of the speaker. Put differently, one’s identity plays an active
role in how their speech—the knowledge they verbally share—is understood. Depending on the
person, their speech could be believed or denied because of their social identity. In Arendt’s
scenario, her Jewish identity affords her the epistemic authority to speak. She also believes that her
social identity as a Jewish woman lends credibility—authorizes her, to use Alcoff’s language—to
speak on behalf of other Jews. The well-intentioned, non-Jewish people at the Washington
conference did not have the same authority because of their social identity. Though Arendt does not
speculate that those who spoke on behalf of a Jewish Army at the conference derailed their
proposal, that is an active possibility.
However, the possibility of derailment is exactly why Arendt is alarmed that no Jewish voices
spoke at the conference. Because no Jewish perspectives were included in the conference’s
deliberations on a Jewish Army, Jewish interests could easily have been misinterpreted or disauthorized. Additionally, the preponderance of non-Jewish voices deciding the fate of a Jewish
Army perpetuates the false and harmful narrative that Jews are not able to make important, political
decisions for themselves. Arendt states she is grateful for any conversations surrounding the
argument for a Jewish Army; however, her main critique is that this act of speaking for the Jewish
people is questionably informed and motivated. The main concern is that those who did speak at the
conference were—by virtue of their social identity and necessarily by virtue of a vested interest in
Jewish political affairs—authorized to speak on behalf of Jews.
The questionable aspects of speaking for others can be tied to reinforcing systems of
oppression and imperialism, according to Alcoff. In terms of privileged people speaking for less
privileged people, Alcoff tells us it “has actually resulted (in many cases) in increasing or reinforcing
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the oppression of the group spoken for.” Arendt took the conference attendees call to action as
well-intentioned; however, as previously mentioned, it perpetuated a harmful victim-narrative of
Jews being unable to speak for themselves. Her serious critique of others speaking for Jews is also
tied up with the political nature of speech for Arendt. This too, Alcoff agrees with when she writes
that “Who is speaking, who is spoken of, and who listens is a result, as well as an act, of political
struggle.”11
The political nature of the call for a Jewish Army is undeniable for Arendt—it is tied up with
the need for civil and human rights and protections for Jewish people all over the world, but
especially those displaced and decimated by Nazi Germany and its allies. The call for a Jewish Army
is both symbolic of the need for a Jewish homeland but also literal in its desire to actively fight in the
war. One of Arendt’s articles in Aufbau is even aptly titled, “The Jewish Army—The Beginning of
Jewish Politics?” The political need for the Jewish people to be afforded the epistemic authority to
speak is tied up with the importance of political representation—something the Jewish people were
time and again denied.
So, why is it important to recognize Arendt’s argument for a Jewish Army as an example of
political action, and speech as political action in particular? As I argue in Chapter 2, Arendt’s
examples of speech in The Human Condition are idealized and exclusive in nature. In her argument for
a Jewish Army, we have an unproblematic example of her acting out political action through speech.
This example illustrates that speech, especially speech that is carried out on behalf of a group of
people, is contentious, dangerous, and politically charged. Not only is Arendt concerned about
making her own voice heard, she is concerned about the implications of others speaking for the
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Jewish people at such a crucial point in their history. Her fight for a Jewish Army is an example of
nonideal political action, which is quite different than the ideal version of political action found in
The Human Condition. It is necessary to recognize that these versions of Arendtian political action are
fundamentally different because, I argue, we must value the multi-dimensional model of political
action, not just the one-dimensional story of the concept we receive in The Human Condition.
Zionism
In her early texts, Arendt’s discussion of and involvement with the Zionist movement is
exemplary of political action. Over the course of her life, Arendt’s involvement with the Zionist
organizations was limited. Growing up in Germany, in a secular Jewish household, fostered an
ambivalence toward the movement. Richard Bernstein, author of Hannah Arendt and the Jewish
Question, claims that she grew up indifferent to the movement because she first and foremost
thought of herself as German.12 It was not until a few years into her university studies that she
became interested in Zionism. Bernstein says that in 1926 she attended a lecture by Kurt
Blumenfeld, a Zionist political organizer who was, at the time, involved in the Zionist Federation of
Germany, and would go on to serve in the World Zionist Organization. Though Arendt was not
wholesale converted to the movement, Blumenfeld became a lifelong friend of hers who helped
shape her understanding and critiques of Zionism.
In the first example I turn to, we see Arendt ardently encouraging young people to
participate in Youth Aliyah,13 an organization she was involved with which brought young European
Jews to Palestine starting in 1933. Here we see a vigorously involved Arendt, writing about the hope

See Bernstein’s Chapter 1 “The Conscious Pariah as Rebel and Independent Thinker,” particularly pages 14-16 for
more on Arendt’s German-Jewish upbringing.
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young Jews could experience through Aliyah. Understandably, Arendt’s own precarious position
during the war and her successful escapes from Nazi forces twice—once while still in Germany and
once when interned at Gurs14—caused her to be less involved until she was settled in the United
States. According to Bernstein, Arendt worked with Judah Magnes, the founder of the Ihud (Unity)
party in the 1940s. He writes:
Initially Arendt was critical of Magnes’ pro-British leanings, although she approved of Ihud
as a reaction against outworn Zionist slogans and policies. But she herself was coming very
close to the binational policies advocated by Magnes. For a brief period, after breaking out
of hostilities in Palestine that led to the founding of the State of Israel, she worked closely
with Magnes and his support group in America. This is one of the brief periods in Arendt’s
life in which she engaged in direct political action—as a member of the loyal opposition.15
Prior to Arendt’s involvement with Ihud, she was sharply critical of revisionist Zionist organizations
which she saw as ignoring, or at times, violently opposing, Palestinian Arabs in the region.
Revisionist Zionism aims to maximize Jewish occupation in and around the state of Israel.16 Then,
when Judah Magnes, passed away in 1948 she lost hope for the Ihud party and Bernstein quotes her
as stating, “There are other people who are primarily interested in doing something. I am not. I can
very well live without doing anything. But I cannot live without trying at least to understand
whatever happens.”17 Arendt’s time as a political actor was short-lived and relegated to Zionism, and
here we see her resignation from action after Magnes’ death. The arc of her own political action
started with ambivalence, moved through skepticism and cautionary involvement, and ended in a
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retreat to theory. Though this section will not further dwell on the importance of this arc, it is
helpful to keep in mind her eventual move toward theory, and away from direct action, in The
Human Condition. Within this in mind, I turn to a few specific instances in her texts from the 1930s
and 1940s that exemplify political action, both through Arendt’s own acts but also through her
arguments with and against Zionism.
As mentioned above, the first example is of a young Arendt and her involvement with
Youth Aliyah while she sought refuge in France. In the article, “Some Young People Are Going
Home,” which was originally published in Le Journal Juif in June of 1935, Arendt addresses the
experiences of Jewish refugee children. She poses their experience as a problem that needs
solutions—these children have lost stable homes, basic necessities, personal possessions, and often
“are exploited by their parents” when need requires they work to help support the family.19 Her
proposed solution is partnership with Youth Aliyah, a Jewish organization operating out of France
at the time that provided paperwork and resources to children and young adults so they could both
visit and resettle in Palestine. Arendt’s argument here is for the immigration of Jewish youth to
Palestine because “Several weeks of preparatory camp, with work and study, games and singing,
reading and free discussion on all the issues they are interested in, restores their freedom and their
joy….This joy, this dignity, and this youth will be converted into strength and this strength will
rebuild the country.”20 At this point in her life, Arendt is the most involved with Zionist efforts that
she ever would be, and her dedicated vigor is palpable in the above quote. Here we have an example
of Arendt enacting political action through her writing by encouraging young Jewish people to join
18 This is not to say that Arendt withdrew from active life completely, but that after this moment she made a deliberate
decision to focus more on understanding political action than enacting it.
19
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Youth Aliyah and experience Eretz Israel as a homeland. According to numerous scholars,
Arendtian political action ought to be thought of as including storytelling, which is exactly what she
does in this article.21
Arendt tells the story of a teenager visiting the Youth Aliyah office with his father and how
after coming back the next day alone, commits to participating. Arendt tells us that “Once
everything is ready, he informs his parents, and two weeks later he is in the camp, where he begins
to solve the Jewish question in a practical way by learning agriculture.”22 Keeping in mind that
Arendt conceives of the Jewish question as solely a political concern, her story of the young teenager
tells us that Arendt sees the agricultural, and otherwise, development of areas in Palestine as a
solution to the Jewish political need for a homeland. As we will see shortly, her support of a Jewish
homeland as a means to provide political protections and human rights was ardent; however,
Arendt, outside of her time with Youth Aliyah, was cautious about the implications of creating a
Jewish state in the then predominantly Arab populated, British Mandated Palestine. Her support can
certainly be read as naïve—the idealized fervor of a solution to the myriad issues plaguing European
Jews. However, I think that it is important to note her involvement with Youth Aliyah is a direct
expression of her concept of political action.
Additionally, what she points out as benefits of participation in Youth Aliyah directly tie to
political action. As stated in the quote, her argument for joining Youth Aliyah is to participate in

21 See Lisa J. Disch, “More Truth Than Fact: Storytelling as Critical Understanding in the Writings of Hannah Arendt,”
Political Theory 21, no. 4 (1993); Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, “Hannah Arendt’s Storytelling,” Social Research 44, no. 1 (1977);
and Michael Jackson, The Politics of Storytelling: Variations on a Theme by Hannah Arendt, 2nd edition (Copenhagen: Museum
Tusculanum Press, 2013). In Jackson’s preface to the second edition he writes, “Arendt’s dialectical view that storytelling
is a mode of purposeful action (praxis) that simultaneously discloses our subjective uniqueness and our intersubjective
connectedness to others, as well as the environmental forces to which we are all subject.” (13) Additionally, see Chapter
3, Part II of the present dissertation for more on Arendt’s storytelling.
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political action through collectively coming together to debate, discuss, hear from others, and
physically build up the land for habitation through agricultural initiatives. The work being done in
Palestine through the organization is political action because of its collective nature, its dedication to
fostering public discussions, in addition to its commitment to cultivating a physical space for other
people to come together to build the country. The collective nature of the organization and the
active deliberations that occurred among the participants coincides with the idea that “men, not
Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.”23 Political action, in other words, is possible because
we exist among other humans. The act of purposefully coming together to build a new home is
political for Arendt. Additionally, as the first chapter explains, people coming together to “start
anew” is another hallmark of political action.24 Through the organization, Jewish visitors and
immigrants joined forces in Palestine to physically work the land and construct new buildings in
order to initiate a new life for themselves and their family. Although the article acts as a sort of
advertisement for Youth Aliyah, it functions well as an example of political action because it is
nonideal and therefore rooted in the lived experiences of European Jews experiencing homelessness
and statelessness. These lived experiences of those who participated in and advocated for Youth
Aliyah provide a concrete, affective understanding of the importance of political action—the real
need for a Jewish homeland that allowed for economic self-sufficiency and political protection.
Her time with Youth Aliyah was short-lived, though. And, as mentioned above, after
Magnes’ death, she largely withdrew from being an overt political actor. Before moving on to her
critiques of the actualization of Zionism, it is necessary to examine her understanding of the
movement as operating at a theoretical level. Doing so demonstrates that Arendt conceives of

23

Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (HC), 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 7.

24

HC, 5.

145
Zionism as particularly Jewish political action which is a point that is often lost in the fray of her
Zionist critiques. In other words, the fact that Arendt herself posits that the Zionist movement
qualifies as political action affords us the opportunity to examine how, in her later theorized account
of the concept, the political movement for a Jewish homeland is a nonideal, and therefore a helpful
and less problematic example worth investigating.
In the 1946 essay “The Jewish State: Fifty Years After, Where Have Herzel’s Politics Lead?”
Arendt strongly stakes the claim that, historically, there have only been two instances of Jewish
political action. She writes, “During the twenty centuries of their Diaspora the Jews have made only
two attempts to change their conditions by direct political action.”25 She goes on to name the two:
the 17th century Shabbetai Tzavi messianic movement and Zionism. The first Arendt describes as a
“mystic-political movement for the salvation of Jewry” which started with a self-proclaimed messiah
but ended in his demise.26 Arendt marks the failed-messianic moment of the movement as the end
of “the period in which religion alone could provide the Jews with a firm framework within which to
satisfy their political, spiritual, and everyday needs.”27 More importantly, she claims that the only
other Jewish political action is Zionism. In the context of the article, Arendt is reviewing and
critiquing the eventual founder of the World Zionist Organization, Theodor Herzl’s Zionist
pamphlet “The Jewish State,” hence her title. Putting aside her critiques for now, her classification
of Zionism as political action exemplifies a crucial aspect of the concept. As discussed in Chapter 1,
political action is revelatory—speech or action in the public realm reveals one’s identity to the world,
and therefore allows them to be remembered. Zionism, as political action, is speech and action
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intended to disclose, not only a group of people to the world, but to posit their necessary political
existence for their continued survival.
Arendt’s ensuing critiques of Herzl or the revisionist Zionists have little to do with the idea
of Zionism itself because that is purely the act of revealing oneself, speaking for oneself, and acting
for oneself as Jews for the continuation of the Jewish people. Her critique of Herzl is rooted in his
claim that the need for a Jewish return to Palestine was directly caused by the rise of antisemitism
throughout Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, and that the creation of a Jewish state would
necessarily remove the problem of antisemitism.28 Arendt understood the Zionist movement to be a
possibility for political representation, and civil and human rights protections, not merely a reaction
to antisemitism. According to Arendt, Herzl saw Zionism as a response to the problem wherein “A
people without a country would have to escape to a country without a people.”29 Arendt is quick to
point out Herzl’s oversight of the Palestinians already living in the area.
Arendt often makes the argument for a bi-national, council system in Palestine which aimed
to actively take into account the inhabitants of the area alongside the need for a Jewish homeland.
She is not against the idea of a Jewish return to the promised land, but she, particularly in the essay
“To Save the Jewish Homeland,” fights against the narrative that she claims Palestinian and
American Jews largely held which, at the time, was that “Arab and Jewish claims are irreconcilable
and only a military decision can settle the issue.”30 Her main critiques of Zionism and what crafts her
understanding as a member of the “loyal opposition,” I argue, are informed by ideal theory. She sees

28 Arendt argues that Herzl “identified the Jewish question in all its aspects and connections with the fact of
antisemitism, which both conceived of as the natural reaction of all peoples, always and everywhere, to the very
existence of Jews.” (JW, 380)
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Zionism, particularly Revisionist Zionism, as ignoring the real social, political, and religious factors
at play in British Mandated Palestine. Under ideal theory, it is acceptable to ignore these factors;31
however, Arendt is quick to point out the danger inherent which connects back to the perceived
notion that only war is a viable solution. By conceiving of a homeland as only Jewish, as opposed to
a homeland that accounts for cohabitation with Arab populations, it is logical that the only way to
pursue this end is by overpowering the Arab population and surrounding countries. Because Arendt
is aware that this is the Revisionist approach, I contend that Arendt’s criticism of the purported need
for war are leveled against the idealized, and therefore problematic, nature of the movement. This is
important because it demonstrates that Arendt is aware of ideal theory—even if not explicitly—and
its harms in inhibiting political action. By ignoring the needs and desires of the Arab people living in
Palestine at the time, Revisionists saw war as the only solution to procuring the land. The resort to
war demonstrates a move away from approaches such as deliberation and cooperation which are not
only more responsive to nonideal social, political, and religious factors but also more reflective of
political action. Recognizing that Arendt is critical of ideal theory acts as further support for my
overarching argument for this chapter—that we should turn to these early texts in tandem with The
Human Condition. This is an important shift to make when reading and teaching Arendt because it is
necessary to develop a multi-dimensional picture of political action.
Arendt’s Critique of Zionist Idealism
Throughout these texts from the 1930s and 1940s, there are a plethora of examples of
Arendt criticizing Zionism for its idealism. I briefly examine three moments when Arendt critiques
ideal, elitist, and exclusionary aspects of Zionism. For the first, I turn to a previously unpublished
essay from approximately 1938-39 titled “Antisemitism.” This text is actually referred to as a chapter

31 Take for instance, Rawl’s veil of ignorance which purposely asks us to remove political, social, and religious
considerations in order to establish a just society.
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by Arendt, but if she wrote more, the editors note that they did not survive. In this text she is
articulating her disagreement with the argument that Zionists such as Herzl have taken up. The
argument claims that Zionism is the direct result of antisemitism which introduces a necessary
causation narrative that Arendt heartily dismisses. The causation narrative states that the need for a
Jewish homeland is the direct result of antisemitism and only through the establishment of a Jewish
state will antisemitism be able to be eradicated. Instead, she, as she does at greater length a decade
later in The Origins of Totalitarianism, historically analyzes the connection between assimilation and
Zionism while treating the long history of antisemitism as a phenomenon unto its own and not a
necessary contributing factor in the demand for a Jewish homeland.
In “Antisemitism,” Arendt claims the modern development of antisemitism was influenced
by Medieval ghost stories which portrayed Jews as vampires, Christian narratives from the Crusades
on that purported Jesus’ death was the Jews’ fault, and stories that cast Jews as usurers.33 More
immediately important in this text is Arendt’s criticism of the ideal nature of the movement in
general. Not only does she claim that “Zionists are incapable of representing Jewish interests on a
global scale,” but that they also ignore the immediate needs of European Jews given Hitler’s
dictatorship and increasing pogroms at the time of her writing.34 The Zionists that Arendt is critical
of she refers to as “The Don Quixotes, who on the basis of pure ideals and pure moral protest
believed they were protesting and acting with benevolence, have become practitioners of realpolitik,
blind devotees of temporary power relationships.”35 The literary reference to the satiric novel by

32

See JW 111 for the editors’ note.

See JW, 65-70, to read more about Arendt’s historical analysis of antisemitism, including Germany’s use and distortion
of that history.
33

34

JW, 56-57.

35

JW, 57.

149
Miguel de Cervantes alludes to the impractical and overly idealized approaches Arendt believes
powerful Zionists practice—except for when push comes to shove and they, according to Arendt,
are willing to negotiate with their enemies who make it clear their preference to harm the Jewish
people. By ignoring the immediate danger that European Jews were during World War II, Arendt
sees Zionism as overgeneralizing and universalizing the needs of all Jewish people—a hallmark of
ideal theory. Arendt is a proponent of a council system in Palestine—a system that inherently
distrusted an overarching power structure that would harmfully speak for masses of diverse Jews,
hence her strong stance against what she saw as quixotic Zionists.
In addition to claims of idealism, Arendt frequently addresses an elitist strand in Zionism.
This, in addition to claims of harmful universalization of Jewish needs and desires, is worth noting
because, as I argue in Chapter 2, Arendt herself falls into the trap of universalizing political action in
such a way that promotes elitism. In “Zionism Reconsidered” from 1944, Arendt is critical of
Zionism’s dismissal of the political strongholds Jews have established from Leningrad to New York,
not just in Palestine. Hand in hand with this constructed narrative, is the claim that a Zionist return
to Palestine ought to be for the elite Jewish people—it is too small an area to welcome all the
world’s Jewish population. Arendt notes that at the time of her writing, this is, thankfully, a
diminishing narrative. However, it is not the only time that Arendt questions how elite or
exceptional individuals benefit at the cost of the Jewish masses. In the current article, she writes,
“Zionists used to argue that ‘only the remnant will return,’ the best, the only ones worth saving; let
us establish ourselves as the elites of the Jewish people.”36 However, it is a constant refrain of
Arendt’s to acknowledge the historical theme of the “exceptional” Jew. From Rahel Varnhagen
through The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt points out how individual acceptance is in tension with
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Jewish emancipation en masse. In an Aufbau article from the same year, Arendt responds to the idea,
perpetuated by what she refers to as Jewish nationalists, of the Jewish people as “the salt of the
earth” or a superior people, as “nonsense.”37 Here, however, Arendt acknowledges that there are
Zionists that work against the “salt of the earth” narrative by organizing Palestine as a country for all
Jews. In all, Arendt pays keen attention to and ardently fights against those who sought to establish
Palestine as a Jewish homeland fit only for the wealthy and powerful elite.
The final idealized aspect of Zionism that Arendt is intent on disabusing is the exclusion of
Palestine’s Arab inhabitants in their narrative of nation-building. This form of idealization ignores
the social, political, and religious implications of establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine where
the Arab population also has historical ties to the land. To return to “Zionism Reconsidered,”
Arendt calls out the ignorance of Zionists who “had not the slightest suspicion of any national
conflict with the present inhabitants of the promised land; they did not even stop to think of the
very existence of the Arabs.”38 The exclusionary nature of idealism is readily present in those who
ignored or thoughtlessly disregarded those who already occupied Palestine. Arendt notes that the
result of such exclusion is truly to the detriment of Zionists:
“Thus the social revolutionary Jewish national movement, which started half a century ago
with ideals so lofty that it overlooked the particular realities of the Near East and the general
wickedness of the world, has ended—as do most such movements—with the unequivocal
support not only of national but chauvinistic claims—not against the foes of the Jewish
people but against its possible friends and present neighbors.”39
Arendt’s criticisms here are of an ideal theory, particularly the ideal theory taken up by Revisionist
Zionists—one which overlooks the current conditions of the world in which decisions are actually
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being made. By ignoring the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, Arendt claims that the Revisionist
Zionists have lost the possibility of building an alliance with those in the area, and instead of making
more friends, have gained more enemies.
Though there are certainly underdeveloped aspects of Arendt’s criticisms of and alternatives
to the creation of the state of Israel, her firm grasp on the shortcomings of working at the ideal level
demonstrate that these texts serve as a less problematic account of political action. For instance, she
is overly optimistic about a council system—given her summarization of Revisionist Zionism’s own
approaches, there was little large-scale support for this political approach which would have been
necessary for its success. Regardless, Arendt is aware of how ideal—universalizing and elitist—
Zionism was. As a loyal objector, she is still invested in a political solution for Jewish
“homelessness;” however, she is dedicated to a solution which accounted for the Arab population
living in Palestine. Her awareness of the particular social, political, and religious factors at play in
Palestine demonstrate that she is exemplifying and theorizing political action nonideally.
Letter
In another critique of Revisionist Zionism, Arendt drafted an open letter speaking out
against Menachem Begin and the Israeli Freedom Party or the Truat Haherut, which is now referred
to as the Herut Party, in 1948.40 According to Jerome Kohn, the letter was drafted by Arendt and
signed by 27 other people including physicist Albert Einstein, pragmatist Sidney Hook, and
economist Seymour Melman. It was published in the New York Times on December 4, 1948. The
letter itself is a scathing uncovering of the Freedom Party’s history which they claim is fascist and

40 The Herut merged to form the current Likud Party, of which former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is the
leader.
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akin to Nazi totalitarianism. According to the letter, before it became the Freedom Party, it was the
Irgun Zvai Leumi party which they call “a terrorist, right-wing, chauvinist organization in Palestine.”41
The authors penned the letter after Begin and the Freedom Party visited the United States
and were largely welcomed. They claim their purpose in writing is to let people in the United States
know Begin’s history of terrorism and fascist tactics. Their rationale for disseminating this
information publicly was tied to the Freedom Party’s dedication to obfuscation—they claimed
through their writing to desire “freedom, democracy, and anti-imperialism” yet the letter claims their
actions tell a different story.42 In typical Arendt fashion, the letter chooses to tell a story—the story
of the Deir Yassin massacre. Deir Yassin was an Arab occupied village which, according to the
letter, actively avoided military involvement with British, Arab, and Jewish paramilitary forces.
Despite their neutrality, “On April 9 The New York Times reported that terrorist bands attacked this
peaceful village, which was not a military objective in the fighting, killed most of its inhabitants—
240 men, women, and children—and kept a few of them alive to parade as captives through the
streets of Jerusalem.”43 Arendt and the co-signers claimed that the massacre “exemplifies the
character and the actions of the Freedom Party.”44
In addition to the massacre, those who made up the Freedom Party were said to also attack
Jews who disagreed or protested their tactics; “Teachers were beaten up for speaking against them,
adults were shot for not letting their children join them. By gangster methods, beatings, windowsmashing, and widespread robberies, the terrorists intimidated the population and exacted a heavy
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tribute.” The letter ends by arguing that the actions of the party members while involved with the
45

Irgun Zvai Leumi Party are at direct odds with their current mission and self-representation. They
claim it is a blatant façade to cover up their fascist actions in the past and imperialist desires to
continue the expansion of Jewish occupation—a façade which the public must know and
understand so as not to be duped by their present machinations.
This letter, I argue, is another excellent example of Arendtian nonideal political action. Not
only is it representative of Arendt, alongside others, speaking out against what they see as injustice
and obfuscation, but it demonstrates her idea of acting in concert. As mentioned above, the decision
to tell the story of the Deir Yassin massacre was both deliberate and effective. The massacre
certainly acted as a catalyst for the letter and telling the story of this act of terrorism reveals to the
world the previous actions and ethics of the Freedom Party. Storytelling is its own kind of revelation
within Arendt’s work—as political action it reveals to the world who Begin and his party members
are. Additionally, Arendt makes it clear in HC that true, non-totalitarian power exists when words
and deeds align. I find it to be no small coincidence that in The Human Condition, Arendt takes
serious issue with those who use their political speech to hide their devious actions which is exactly
what the letter aims to make public.
In The Human Condition, she argues that “Power is actualized only where word and deed have
not parted company, where words are not empty and deeds not brutal, where words are not used to veil
intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to establish
relations and create new realities.”46 The letter’s main claim is that Begin and the Freedom Party are
spinning a new tale that ignores and erases their violent past actions, and that people ought to know
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this. And in coming together with the 27 other co-signers, Arendt is demonstrating that her
understanding of power is not about violence or force, but that it is the act of acting in concert with
others for political purposes.47 When speaking of power in political action, Arendt references David
and Goliath, though she notes this story is only somewhat helpful—the story of David and Goliath
is allegorically helpful but not fully applicable. When fighting one-on-one in a mismatched battle, she
says “strength decides” the outcome. But when the idea of a smaller group of people working
closely together attempts to take on a giant organization, the odds are in favor of the Davids of the
world. I find it a missed opportunity that Arendt chose not to tell the story of her letter and the
massacre at Deir Yassin instead of a partially helpful allegory of David and Goliath to demonstrate
her concept of power in acting together. In The Human Condition, Arendt’s use of David perpetuates
the narrative that political action is reserved for the great men of history who will be remembered
well past their deaths. If she had used this letter to exemplify the idea of acting in concert with
others, I think she would have avoided an elitist approach to political action.
Part III: The Effects of Arendt’s Eurocentrism
The previous section is devoted to searching for generative examples of political action in
Arendt’s writings from the 1930s and 1940s—yet, as I have made clear from the start, that is only
part of the story. Locating examples of political action in these texts allows us to piece together a
more complete picture—one which is more akin to a multi-dimensional rendering of the concept—
than what we have access to if we limit ourselves to The Human Condition where it is explicitly
theorized. Once again, the goal of this dissertation is to provide a multi-dimensional account of
political action. In these early texts, we are given a nonideal account of the concept which
exemplifies how Arendt saw herself and others acting as political actors. However, if we take

47 In HC, Arendt writes that “power springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they
disperse” (200).
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seriously, Kathryn Sophia Belle’s critiques of Arendt in Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question and the
tradition of Black Feminist Standpoint Theory, we must not stop here. Doing so would hinder our
ability to render a multi-dimensional account of political action because it would entail ignoring
some of Arendt’s shortcomings in this collection of texts. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter is
devoted to bringing to the surface the Eurocentric, myopic, and willfully ignorant tendencies of
Arendt in these texts which is made possible by my utilization of the previously mentioned genuine
inclusivity approach.
Keeping in mind my methodology, in this chapter I claim that Arendt’s writings in these
early texts reflect her particular standpoint as a European, Jewish woman—one which produces, at
times, Eurocentric, myopic, and willfully ignorant renderings of political action. At this stage, these
criticisms are minor compared to those which will be discussed in the subsequent chapter; however,
my point is not to create a hierarchy of Arendt’s texts, listed from least problematic to most. Instead,
in this chapter, I aim to advocate for the value found in Arendt’s nonideal account of political action
while, at the same time, prompting awareness of its weaknesses which are informed by a genuinely
inclusive reading of Belle and her argument concerning Arendt’s anti-Black racism. According to
genuine inclusivity I move forward in claiming that Belle’s argument has bearing on Arendt’s texts
from the 1930s and 1940s, even though she does not often reference these texts in Hannah Arendt
and the Negro Question.48
Eurocentrism
It makes sense that Arendt is and should be speaking from her experience as a central
European Jewish woman while not speaking for Far Eastern Russian or North African or even
American Jews. My main concern in this section is with the concept of Eurocentrism, which I
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understand as operating in two senses. In the first sense, Eurocentrism accepts Europe, particularly
Western and Central Europe, as the primary site of knowledge and power, setting Europe on a
pedestal of superiority over and against other peoples. At the same time, Eurocentrism also
functions as exclusion. In this sense, Europe is conceived of as preeminent in such a way that
ignores and erases the possibility for non-Europeans to be perceived as equal to their counterpart, to
the point of not being able to even conceive of the other as equal.49 These senses work hand-inhand, often at the same time despite their contradictory assumptions. Eurocentrism as superiority
must acknowledge the existence and presumed inferiority of other peoples in order to elevate
themselves, whereas Eurocentrism as exclusion not only actively excludes others which requires the
acknowledgement of them, but, more importantly, it results in the ignorance of those others. In this
sense, Eurocentrism operates as a kind of Orwellian doublethink where there must be knowledge of
the other in order to exclude them, yet what happens in this exclusion is the willful ignorance of the
other. Eurocentrism as superiority is an ontology—a way of being—while Eurocentrism as
exclusion is epistemic—an active ignoring of those who are categorized as “other.”50
The dual senses of Eurocentrism above, I argue, are found in Arendt’s essays and articles
from the 1930s and 1940s, specifically in the argument for a Jewish Army. In this example, it is clear
that Arendt envisioned this army as a fellow European force, fighting alongside other European
armies. In her review of The Jewish Writings, “I merely belong to them,” Judith Butler also contends
that Arendt’s vision of a Jewish Army was Eurocentric: “In the late 1930s and early 1940s, Arendt
thought that the Jews might become a nation among nations, part of a federated Europe; she
49 This second element of Eurocentrism should sound familiar—it is from the same pedestal of superiority that Rollins’
employers failed to acknowledge her presence.
50 For more at the intersection of Eurocentrism and epistemic injustice see Linda Martín Alcoff, “Philosophy and
Philosophical Practice: Eurocentrism as an Epistemology of Ignorance,” in The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice,
eds. Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus (London: Routledge, 2017), 397-408.
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imagined that all the European nations that were struggling against Fascism could ally with one
another, and that the Jews might have their own army that would fight against Fascism alongside
other European armies.”51 Though Butler does not spell it out in her review, I believe an underlying
critique here is that Arendt’s logic and argumentation for a Jewish army operates within a strict
binary wherein the “good” Europeans could come together to fight the fascists and that this binary
leaves little room for imagination. What I mean by that is that within this logic, Arendt is unable to
imagine a Jewish army as anything other than a European entity instead of a transnational or
cosmopolitan force. Additionally, this logic entails the idea that the Jewish people ought to be able
to form their own army and join the “good” or “true” Europeans. But this logic refuses to recognize
those who do not fit within the binaries provided, that of “good” Europeans and “bad” ones,
effectively leaving out non-European Jews.
In a sweeping review of Arendt’s texts from the 1930s and 1940s, Butler states that “her
views throughout this early period are emphatically Eurocentric.” Butler goes on to initially quote
Arendt as writing, “‘We enter this war as a European people,” before explaining that “she insisted
[this claim] in December 1941, skewing the history of Judaism by marginalizing the Sephardim and
Mizrachim (mentioned as ‘Oriental Jews’ in Eichmann).”52 The exclusionary and superior nature of
Arendt’s politics is not limited to her arguments for a Jewish Army. And as Butler points out it was
both prevalent in the ‘30s and ‘40s, but also throughout much of her writings in the ‘60s and ‘70s
such as “On Violence” and “On Civil Disobedience,” and “Reflections on Little Rock.”

51 Judith Butler, “I merely belong to them,” London Review of Books 29, no. 9 (10 May 2007): https://www.lrb.co.uk/thepaper/v29/n09/judith-butler/i-merely-belong-to-them.

Sephardi or Sephardic Jews have historical and cultural ties to what is now Spain and Portugal, and to a lesser degree
North Africa. Sepharad translates to “Hispania” from Hebrew. In Hebrew, the plural of Sephardi is Sephardim.
Mizrachim, the plural of Mizrahi, are Middle Eastern and North African Jews, some of which emigrated to Eastern
Europe. Mizrach in Hebrew is “East.” At times through her early texts, Arendt refers to Mizrahi Jews in German as
Oustjuden, or “Eastern Jews.”
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So why does this matter? In the first half of the chapter, I unpack how important Arendt’s
arguments for the Jewish Army are because they act as an exemplary example of political action—
particularly speech. However, if we proceed with this example as helpful, and maybe even more
helpful than the ones she gives us in The Human Condition, without recognizing her Eurocentrism, we
are only telling one part of the story. Arendt’s example of speech as political action here is still quite
limiting because she is speaking for all Jews who wish to fight their enemies, but she is only
imagining that fight as being undertaken by Europeans which leaves out North African and even
East Russian Jews. She does not give us room to imagine a Jewish Army as a truly multi-national or
non-national organization. And this undermines her own project, not only because she perpetuates a
dangerous nationalism which she goes on to argue against in The Origins of Totalitarianism, but also
because she is so adamant that if attacked as a Jew, one must fight back as a Jew. But all Jews were
threatened and attacked by Hitler’s rise to power and final solution. And, organizing a Jewish Army
that conceptually ignored non-central European Jews is only an example of diminished political
action—a Eurocentric political action. This image of a Jewish Army both elevates European Jews
and overlooks non-European Jews, exemplifying both superior and exclusionary senses of
Eurocentrism.
Myopia
Myopia or the analogy of losing the forest for the trees is a charge often lodged at Arendt,
and one which I claim plays a role in her understanding of how race functions.53 In the context of

53 Certainly, many of Kathryn Sophia Belle’s arguments in Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question are rooted in Arendt’s
myopia. See also Danielle Allen, “Laws Necessary Forcefulness: Ralph Ellison v. Hannah Arendt on the Battle of Little
Rock,” Oklahoma City University Law Review 26 (2001), for her analysis of Arendt’s myopic interaction with Ellison.
Richard Wolin makes the argument concerning Arendt’s focus on interracial marriage over and against school
integration in “The Ambivalences of German-Jewish Identity: Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem,” History and Memory 8, no. 2
(1966). Hanna Pitkin in The Attack of the Blob : Hannah Arendt's Concept of the Social additionally makes the argument that
Arendt’s hyper-fixation on the social sphere of existence impedes her project of promoting freedom in The Human
Condition.
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her early texts, many of which were written while still living in Europe, myopia or near-sightedness
in Arendt’s work refers to her narrow perspective on political action which is the result of
privileging central Europe in her thought. Such myopia itself results in, as the first half of this
chapter demonstrates, an excellent exemplification of political action but also a one-dimensional
account of the concept. For instance, despite all her insights on assimilation and antisemitism,
Arendt’s understanding of race blurs her ability to see how race functions differently, depending on
the social context. At times, Arendt’s understanding of race appears to be rooted in biological
determinism, the largely debunked theory that race is fundamentally tied to one’s genomes, as
opposed to the more commonly accepted belief that race is socially constructed. The myopic nature
of this assumption about race results in a continued Eurocentric approach to political action—one
which is minimal in these early texts but which snowballs in later texts such as “On Violence” and
“Reflections on Little Rock.”54 Under biological determinism, or the idea that race is determined by
biology, claims are made about one’s aptitude and characteristics which are naturally tied to their
racial identity. This claim about race overlooks the way that power dynamics actively affect race and
perpetuate oppression. While I do not think that Arendt understands race as biologically determined
in terms of eugenics, I do contend that her understanding fails to properly account for the social and
political factors that shape racial identities. In this section I turn to Arendt’s self-assessment of her
Jewish identity to argue that her myopic understating of race, once again, undermines the potential
of political action by narrowing the field of possible actors.

54 While I argue that Arendt appears to understand race as biologically constructed in Rahel and some of her texts from
the 1930s and 1940s, it is clear her thinking shifts, as demonstrated in The Origins of Totalitarianism (OT). See Chapter Six,
“Race-Thinking Before Racism” in OT wherein she argues that totalitarian tactics promoted eugenicist-based
understandings of race as biological. Once it was widely accepted that a group of people were understood to be
biologically inferior, the solution to their inferiority was to eradicate them. This section of OT was originally written in
1944 and published in The Review of Politics. While it is clear in this text that Arendt is aware of the dangers of a
biologically-based understanding of race, she does not repudiate it; instead, she repudiates the manipulation of what she
sees as given qualities such as race or gender.
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Though most of my analysis in Part 1 is concerned with Arendt’s Jewish texts in the 1930s
and 1940s, I turn to her exchange, from 1963, with Gershom Scholem concerning the negative
reception of Eichmann in Jerusalem. The two were “well acquainted” according to the editors, and
Scholem wrote Arendt to discuss his frustrations with her analysis of the Eichmann trial, particularly
claiming that she has “no love of the Jewish people.”55 It is in this text that Arendt expounds on her
self-assessment of what it means to be Jewish: “To be a Jew belongs for me to the indisputable facts
of my life, and I have never had the wish to change or disclaim facts of this kind. There is such a
thing as a basic gratitude for everything that is as it is; for what has been given and not made; for
what is physei and not nomō.”56 The first sentence quoted commits to a conception of race which is
indisputable and immutable, which works against the social construction theory of race. Yet, it is in
the second sentence that it becomes clearer that Arendt conceives of race as biologically determined
when she refers to her Jewishness as an accident, a fact of the physical world (physei) and not the
regulated world of laws and social customs (nomō). As Butler points out in her review, “Being a
woman and being a Jew are both referred to as physei and, as such, naturally constituted rather than
part of any cultural order. But Arendt’s answer hardly settles the question of whether such categories
are given or made.” I agree that in her letter to Scholem, Arendt’s statement about her gratitude for
what is given is not explicitly linked to the previous sentence where she claims her Jewishness is
indisputable. However, I think that her approach to assimilation, as explained above, are sufficient
to support the claim that Arendt’s understanding of race is at times rooted in biological determinism,
not social construction.
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How race functions in society, particularly when it is understood as biologically determined,
severely limits the possibility for all to partake in Arendtian political action. A biological approach to
race states race as a fact much like Arendt understands her own identity, which does not take into
account the social and cultural factors that affect individuals. We can see this play out at the hands
of Arendt herself in her wrongheaded analysis of Black college and university students in “On
Violence.” Arendt’s anti-Black racism plays an active part in her misunderstanding of Black students
in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s when she claims, “the majority of them were admitted without
academic qualifications.”57 In conceiving of Black college and university students as unqualified,
Arendt implicitly asserts that these students were academically inferior to the white students already
in attendance; yet, they were admitted merely based on their race. Additionally implicit here is the
claim that Black students, according to Arendt, are naturally inferior academics. In other words, if
we think of Arendt as ascribing to biological determinism, it leads to the conclusion that she
believed that Black students were unqualified and unprepared, naturally. Her persistent argument
that race is just a matter of fact, purely a natural occurrence, makes her insensitive to the social
construction of race and how Black students at the time were being demonized for their campus
protests and uprisings while white students who also participated in protests and activism were
viewed as heroic political actors.
Willful Ignorance
In this final section I turn to a few examples of Arendt’s naivety and willful ignorance.
Willful ignorance, according to Linda Alcoff in “Epistemologies of Ignorance: Three Types,” can be
understood in three main ways, none of which are mutually exclusive. The first, and the one which I
will take up here, is founded in Lorraine Code’s work on one’s social position. The other two, which

57

Hannah Arendt, “On Violence” (OV), in Crises of the Republic (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1972), 120.

162
I will not take up are founded on Sandra Harding’s idea of group identity and Charles Mills’ work on
systemic factors. In Code’s work, Alcoff summarizes her understanding of ignorance as following
“from the general fact of our situatedness as knowers.”58 In other words, our social identity and
interactions with others affects what we can know. Additionally, our ability to gain knowledge is
most often reliant on judgements which are informed by personal experience.59 This is all to say, this
section will investigate the willful ignorance of Hannah Arendt in JW and how it is affected by her
personal experiences.
Without a doubt, the articles and essays from the 1930s and 1940s largely constitute Arendt’s
early writings before her major philosophical works such as The Human Condition and her final,
unfinished book The Life of the Mind. My contention here is not to point out a few hypocritical
moments of Arendt’s in order to cast aside her insights into Arab-Jewish cooperation, speaking for
oneself as a Jew, and the importance of standing up to genocide, which are the three examples we
will turn to. Instead, I aim to demonstrate how important it is to be genuinely inclusive of
historically minoritized people’s criticisms of thinkers like Arendt so that we can take note of how
she fails to recognize that her experience as a persecuted person produces a situated understanding
of oppression and marginalization. But that experience is particular to her “situatedness” and does
not transfer seamlessly to other people’s experiences of oppression and domination. What I mean by
that is, in these examples Arendt offers advice to others that she does not go on to take later herself
in her more contentious writings, specifically “On Violence,” much to her detriment.

Linda Martín Alcoff, “Epistemologies of Ignorance: Three Types,” in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, ed. Shannon
Sullivan and Nancy Tuana (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 40.
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Of course, there exists the concern that Arendt also should have realized her own
experiences do not transfer over to Black Americans, but that is the subject of another project.60 In
the instances to follow, I believe Arendt’s willfully ignorant moments are a result of her
Eurocentrism—she did not conceive of how cross-cultural collaboration, conceptions of epistemic
justice, and activism could also be enacted by Black Americans and in turn she once again narrows
the possibilities for political action. In particular, Arendt’s Eurocentrism situates her understanding
of cross-cultural collaboration, epistemic injustice, and activism within the context of central
Europe, not North America. While she provides excellent examples of these in her own context, she
is mired by her Eurocentrism and therefore hindered from fully understanding how the same
concepts are at play in the United States. As I go on to demonstrate, political action is diminished
here because she does not allow the same opportunities to Black Americans to be political actors
that she exemplifies and promotes.
To begin, in the 1948 essay “About ‘Collaboration’” Arendt argues that Jewish collaboration
with Palestinian Arabs is absolutely necessary in the newly created state of Israel. In responding to a
critic, she writes, “The central question in this controversy is really the question whether one wants
or does not want to collaborate.”61 Though Arendt does not provide details on how to collaborate
with Palestinian Arabs, she makes her point clear—it is imperative to recognize one’s immediate
neighbors, particularly if their citizen status and safety in the state is currently very much at risk.
Inherent to this approach is the claim that we ought to acknowledge the real, nonideal context of the
situation in order to allow all parties a chance to collaborate.62 This example lines up well with
60 To a large degree, this is what Belle aims to unpack in Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question. See chapters 3, 6, and 7 for
Belle’s analysis concerning Arendt’s hypocritical judgements against Black Americans.
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Arendt’s failure to collaborate or even consult with Black American activists during the Civil Rights
Movement. In Arendt’s “Reflections on Little Rock” she dismisses offers to discuss her misguided
argument that Black Americans ought to be concerned more with mixed-race marriage laws instead
of school desegregation. Instead, her harsh condemnation of school desegregation as argued in
“Reflections” was solely informed by her own perspective. Even after she received significant
pushback for the article and personally responded to Ralph Ellison’s criticism of it—he offered an
olive branch and she merely waved at it instead of accepting an active offer of collaboration—she
publicly doubled down on her argument that desegregation put children at risk so that their parents
could climb the social ladder.63 Ellison’s olive branch was a clear opportunity to collaborate crossculturally as he openly offered the opportunity to share his social and political experiences—
experiences she was ignorant of—with her, yet she ultimately dismissed the opportunity.
In her exchange with Ellison she made it clear she misunderstood how race functioned in
the American South which could be interpreted as attempted collaboration; however, publicly, she
never admitted to her mistake and she did not continue her conversation with Ellison. She
disregarded a valuable opportunity to understand the “situatedness” of someone who had the
experience to better judge the circumstances surrounding school desegregation which would have
ameliorated some of her willful ignorance. In part, this disregard connects back to the pervasiveness
of Eurocentrism and the dismissal of purportedly inferior ways of viewing the world. Admittedly,
the circumstances of collaboration between warring nations and between individuals over civil rights
issues are very different. Yet, the two speak to instances of missed opportunities to cross-culturally
collaborate.

63 In Ralph Ellison’s response to Arendt’s RLL, he writes that she “has absolutely no conception of what goes on in the
minds of Negro parents when they send their kids through those lines of hostile people.” Her rigid central European
“situatedness” impeded her from hearing Ellison’s arguments against her, to her detriment. His response is reprinted in
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl’s Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World, 2nd ed., page 316.
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Arendt’s missed opportunity to collaborate with Ellison when she previously advocated for
it highlights the kinds of opportunities that Arendt understood to be worthy of political action.
Once again, the two examples are very different. However, the fact that Arendt recognized the value
in Arab-Jewish collaboration—which is collaboration on a massive scale—but did not recognize the
value in continued collaboration which could have been literally public speech between herself and
one other person helps to substantiate my claim that Arendtian political action is more often than
not promoted as grandiose speech and action which is carried out by the Achilles or Alexander
Hamilton’s of the world. Though I think Ellison ought to be considered alongside these heroic and
brilliant political actors of history, it is clear Arendt did not see her interaction as comparable. I do
not presume to know if Arendt considered interactions such as this one with Ellison as political
action; however, I think a case can be made that it is and that she missed the chance to learn from
Ellison’s perspective on desegregation that is informed by his particular lived experiences as a Black
man in the United States. With the knowledge of Ellison’s lived experience, Arendt would have been
less willfully ignorant of the political concerns of Black Americans at the time. By overlooking the
collaboration potential between her and Ellison, Arendt proves that when it comes to speech and
action, she is hindered by her own ignorance.
For the second example, I return to Arendt’s arguments concerning speaking for others. In
the previously unpublished text “The Minority Question” from the summer of 1940 Arendt argues
against speaking for all Jews. Referring to a conference concerning peace initiatives in Palestine that
occurred two decades prior, she claims that the parties in attendance “acted and spoke without
actually being rooted in the Jewish people.”64 What she means by this is that those in attendance
made up two factions—Zionists who she claimed were mostly interested in colonization and
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Eastern European Jews who she claims were “inert and lacking all initiative”—and those two
factions did not have the interests of all Jews in mind when deliberating the Jewish question and
Palestine’s role in its solution.65
Certainly, her assessment of Eastern European Jews is bigoted, further reinforcing my claim
of her Eurocentrism. Additionally, we once again witness Arendt arguing against speaking for
others. Yet, this time it is important to note the willful ignorance and cognitive dissonance in its
relation to Arendt speaking for the parents of students in desegregated schools. Without a doubt,
Arendt was not rooted in, or even familiar with, Black life in the American South, let alone the
experiences of Black parents. Regardless, she forcefully took a stand and spoke out against
desegregation. In preliminary remarks to “Reflections on Little Rock,” she made it clear she was
unaware of much racism in the South stating that the thought of travelling to witness racist laws and
cultural norms was too much for her to bare given her own experience with Nazi Germany.66 It is
understandable, though regrettable, that trauma held her back from learning more about race in
America but it is not a valid excuse when, despite her lack of knowledge, she continued to speak on
behalf of Black Americans. Once again, her “situatedness” affected her ability to rely on Black
Americans’ knowledge production of their own political circumstances concerning desegregation
and marriage laws. This instance of willful ignorance further appears to define political action as
speech as enacted by white Americans, not Black Americans. If it was inclusive of Black Americans,
it is a real possibility that Arendt would have amended “Reflections” to account for the backlash she
experienced. Instead, Arendt asserts herself as the kind of person able to participate in speech and
action concerning the lives of Black Americans.
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The last example of Arendt’s willful ignorance turns to her reporting of the Holocaust. In an
Aufbau article from June of 1942, Arendt writes about Joseph Goebbels public announcements
concerning Jewish extermination and concentration camps, and the inherent danger for all peoples
in the wake of Hitler’s Third Reich. She writes, “If I were not a Jew, but belonged to some other
European people, my hair would stand on end in fear the moment a single hair on the head of a Jew
was touched.”67 In this quote she puts herself into the position of a non-Jewish European, someone
who she thinks ought to be appalled by the Third Reich and the Holocaust. Yet, implicitly her own
frustration is rooted in the non-Jewish Europeans’ ambivalence. Her response is purposely
hyperbolic in order to exact public outcry and action against the horrors of the Holocaust.
Yet, take note of the Eurocentrism in her thought experiment—certainly an Algerian or
Indian would understand, and maybe even more so as a colonized subject, that totalitarian power is
far reaching and worth fighting against even if they do not experience an immediate threat.
Additionally, her reaction is uncannily similar in “A Reply to Critics,” her rebuttal to criticism of
“Reflections,” where she asks herself, “what would I do if I were a Negro mother?”68 In this thought
experiment, Arendt adopts the perspective of a Black mother to advance her own argument against
desegregation. She sees school desegregation as a fight being waged by children for their parents
benefit, hence her wrongheaded claim that if she were a Black mother, she would not put her
children in danger by sending them to desegregated schools. At face value, the question is an
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68 Hannah Arendt, “A Reply to Critics,” Dissent 6, no. 2, Spring 1959. Her longer response is even more appalling in its
ignorance and presumed superior epistemological standpoint, particularly as someone who did not experience
motherhood: “My first question was: what would I do if I were a Negro mother? The answer: under no circumstances
would I expose my child to conditions which made it appear as though it wanted to push its way into a group where it
was not wanted. Psychologically, the situation of being unwanted (a typically social predicament) is more difficult to bear
than outright persecution (a political predicament) because personal pride is involved. By pride, I do not mean anything
like being “proud of being a Negro,” or a Jew, or a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant, etc., but that untaught and natural
feeling of identity with whatever we happen to be by the accident of birth.” Emphasis added.
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attempt at empathy. However, underneath that weak attempt at empathy, Arendt assumes an
omniscient, or at least more informed, position of knowledge over Black parents’, just as she does in
the first thought experiment. In this instance, the presumed “rational” mind of the political actor
ought to act and think and speak like her. She is still assuming the position of the knower, even in
her response to numerous critics who tell her she is wrong. Additionally, she did not experience
motherhood, let alone Black motherhood. To speak as though she could assume what Black
mothers ought to do is harmfully ignorant.
I think Arendt’s oversight of her own ignorance and hypocrisy functions as a red flag—we
ought to pay attention to what she is proposing in the examples provided above and examine if her
ignorant claims and actions reveal a weakness in her arguments or overarching theory of political
action. In other words, these examples provide the opportunity to examine and reassess Arendt’s
prejudices in order to understand how they affect other aspects of her thought. To little surprise, I
do think that these examples point to a weakness in Arendt’s thought that ultimately undermines
political action because they show us that her conception of who a political actor is is narrowly
constructed, and it, in these examples, does not include Black Americans. In turn, the idea of
political action appears to be informed by Arendt’s narrow sense of who can be a political actor—
those who act and speak and think like her. In turn, her account of political action is diminished by
her Eurocentrism, myopia, and willful ignorance.
Examining these early texts through the lens of genuine inclusivity allows us to see the
darker underside of political action as Arendt enacted it. Certainly, as Part I has demonstrated, these
essays and articles contain excellent examples of political action that ought to supplement our
readings of other philosophical texts, such as Rahel Varnhagen and The Human Condition. Yet, that is
only one side of the story which aims to elevate Arendt above her Eurocentric, myopic, and ignorant
moments. It is worth noting that Arendt is human, and as such fallible. We ought not hold our
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philosophers to impossible standards of perfection, omniscience, and humility. But when faced with
Arendt’s problems, we should also not brush aside her shortcomings, but instead take advantage of
the opportunities they offer. Arendt’s shortcomings in these texts and their connection to her later
writings about the Civil Rights Movement and school desegregation offer us the opportunity to
examine some of the first and only times Arendt enacted political action and how they shaped her
theorization of it. Her Eurocentrism found in her early writings appears to not have dissipated
which informs her understanding of who actually is speaking and acting, and what that looks like.
Her apparent biological determinism and instances of her willful ignorance informs a, most likely,
unconscious anti-Black racism which she demonstrates through her inability to recognize Civil
Rights advances as instances of political action. It is necessary to move forward with both sides of
the story here in order to more deeply understand Arendtian political action, in all its flaws and
assets.

CONCLUSION
TOWARD AN ANTIRACIST READING OF ARENDT
What constitutes political action within Hannah Arendt’s thought is largely, if not entirely,
informed by her explanation of the concept in The Human Condition. Put differently, interpretation of
Arendtian political action relies heavily on The Human Condition alone, infrequently relying on other
texts to explicate the concept. There is good reason for this—about one-third of the book is
dedicated to explicating the realm of action in the vita activa or the active life according to Arendt.
However, the concept is presented and promoted as a utopian ideal worth striving for. From a
nonideal point of view, Arendt’s mode of explicating political action in this text undermines the
universal or wide-ranging applicability of Arendtian political action. Additionally, Kathryn Sophia
Belle argues in her 2014 book Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question that Arendt’s framework in The
Human Condition harmfully separates private, public, and social realms of life. Accordingly, she argues
that this framework has anti-Black racist implications that transfer to her notorious interpretation of
desegregation and the advent of Black Studies courses at colleges and universities. In short, Belle
forcefully and persuasively argues for recognition of the anti-Black racist elements present in the
previously uncontentious The Human Condition.
Given these shortcomings and following Belle’s lead, I argue for a reconceptualization of
Arendtian political action that relies on more than The Human Condition to establish a clear
understanding of the concept as it exists in her texts. I argue that a monolithic understanding of
political action which solely relies on The Human Condition allows for a narrow and ineffectual
account of the concept. Taking up the analogy of one-dimensional blueprints, I claim that using The
170
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Human Condition alone only provides one perspective on and version of political action. We ought,
instead, to aim for a multi-dimensional perspective of political action much like an architectural
rendering software such as AutoCAD provides, or renders, a three-dimensional view of a building.
In order to achieve such a view, we need to turn to other texts which inadvertently explicate and
demonstrate political action, as well as incorporate minoritized perspectives on Arendt and political
action. With a three-dimensional rendering of political action, we are better prepared to follow what
I claim are different versions of political action—one tied to The Human Condition which is idealized
and exclusive and the other which is nonideal and in turn more inclusive.
I begin the dissertation with a chapter on my methodology which is rooted in antiracism and
Standpoint Theory, particularly Black Feminist Standpoint theory. This first chapter further
explicates Belle’s germinal argument and the future research she makes possible because of Hannah
Arendt and the Negro Question. I utilize antiracist research methods from the social sciences in order to
argue for the prevalence of white supremacy in philosophy and the need to combat this prevalence.
In order to do so, I turn to Black Feminist Standpoint Theory and Feminist Standpoint Theory to
intentionally incorporate the philosophical perspectives of women of color, white women, and
people of color. The majority of my supplementary sources are from historically minoritized
scholars. This approach is an intentional decision aimed at developing a multi-dimensional view of
Arendtian political action.
Chapter 2 begins with The Human Condition’s explanation of political action which I argue is
ideal and therefore ideological following Charles Mills’s work on ideal theory. I examine Arendt’s
inspiration for an ideal political realm where action successfully occurs—a fictionalized ancient
Greek and Roman polis. This fictionalization does not appropriately recognize that only a select few
are able to participate in political action. Additionally, I interpret Arendt’s concepts of the web of

172
human relations, plurality, and natality as operating at the ideal level. This interpretation highlights
the exclusive nature of political action—it is not easily practiced by those from historically
marginalized populations. I end this chapter by turning to the Combahee River Collective Statement,
María Lugones, George Yancy, Miranda Fricker, and José Medina to indicate limitations and
possible solutions to Arendtian political action in The Human Condition. In particular, I examine
moments when Arendt ignores race and racial differences, privilege, and protections against
epistemic injustices.
After establishing the harmful repercussions of an account of political action solely derived
from The Human Condition, I turn to Arendt’s second dissertation, Rahel Varnhagen in Chapter 3. This
text is often overlooked for its fluctuation between biography and autobiography, yet I argue it is a
valuable text to examine how political action operates, largely through Arendt’s well-curated
narrative of Rahel’s life. In this text we are able to initially develop an account of political action that
is nonideal in nature and therefore more inclusive. As a bookend to the previous chapter, I examine
how this underappreciated text is more successful at recognizing race and racial differences,
privilege, and the prevalence of epistemic injustices aimed at those from minoritized groups.
Chapter 4 turn to essays and articles Arendt wrote in the 1930s and 1940s that explicitly
engage with Jewish politics in order to argue for a more developed, second version of nonideal
political action. I argue that this version is more robust than what Arendt presents in Rahel Varnhagen
because her theory is informed by her personal activism and lived experiences as a German-Jewish
woman. Though this developed account of nonideal action is more inclusive than the one promoted
in The Human Condition, I argue in this chapter that it is still problematic because it is mired by
Eurocentrism.
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In the following section I dwell on the significance of this dissertation and the contribution
it makes to the relevant scholarship. I focus on examining how a single, one-dimensional account of
political action readily allows for the anti-Black racism prevalent in Arendt’s later writings in On
Violence and “Reflections on Little Rock.” Here I reiterate my argument that a more nuanced,
nonideal version of Arendtian political action as developed through Rahel Varnhagen and essays in
The Jewish Writings better achieves Arendt’s concerns and desires marked out in The Human
Condition—it is lamentable that action has been in decline since late antiquity and it is necessary to
revive humanity’s interest and involvement in political action.
Interpretation
Arendt’s problematic and racist arguments made in “Reflections on Little Rock” and On
Violence are well known. In this section I briefly turn to these two texts to demonstrate that her
idealized political action prevents her from recognizing a nonideal version of political action as it
exists in the Civil Rights Movement and the Black Student Movement of the 1960s. In examining
these two texts I aim to underscore how important it is for Arendt scholars and everyday readers of
Arendt to note the two versions of political action that this dissertation has attempted to outline. In
identifying the ideal version of political action at work in these two texts I point out the harms
enacted through the generalized and exclusive nature of her theory. I also point out how a nonideal
version of political action ought to have been more inclusive of Black American activism.
“Reflections on Little Rock”
As explained in Chapter 4, Arendt argues in “Reflections on Little Rock” that desegregation
is a social issue, not a political one. Ideal political action, for Arendt, abides by the strict division of
the private, public, and social realms. This means that no issue of economic or cultural concern
belongs in the public or political realm. While Arendt is wrong to designate desegregation a social
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concern as opposed to a political one—she argues that Black parents put their children on the front
lines of their own social advances by placing them in desegregating schools—under her ideal
account of political action, no social issue belongs in the political sphere. From this perspective,
within the framework of The Human Condition, Arendt’s argument is consistent. However, the ideal
approach ignores the specifics of the situation and denies the possibility of political action in this
instance. A young adult such as Elizabeth Eckford who bravely attempted to enter Central High
School in Little Rock in the face of a vitriolic white Southern mob whose participants heckled, spat,
and threatened violence clearly acted politically. She was not interested in economic gain, but instead
was acting in line with her constitutional right to public education.
If we turn to Arendt’s nonideal account of political action to understand issues concerning
the Civil Rights Movement in the American south, it becomes clear that we ought to interpret
desegregation and Eckford’s journey differently. Of course, Arendt did not explicitly theorize and
apply this nonideal account of political action later in her life. However, her assessment of action in
the case of Rahel and Jewish politics provides us better tools to understand how we ought to
conceive of political action so that it is more inclusive. For instance, as I argued in Chapter 3,
Arendt’s biography of Rahel Varnhagen implicitly argues for the recognition of racial differences,
the awareness of privilege, and safeguards against epistemic injustices. In the context of
desegregation and Arendt’s arguments against it, we ought to acknowledge how race functions in
this situation. Similar to Rahel, students like Eckford and her family desired the freedom to choose
where to receive their education. According to Arendt, Rahel desired the ability to exist freely
outside of her brothers’ financial control as well as outside the social and political constraints against
Jews in Prussia at the time. In this sense, Rahel ardently wished her race did not affect her ability to
exist freely—so much so that she wished to erase her Jewish identity. As an aside, it’s important to
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note that not all Black students desired integration. For those who did choose to integrate into
white schools, Ralph Ellison characterizes the decision as one rife with “inner tensions created by
his racial situation.”2 From a nonideal perspective, desegregation and the struggles associated with it
are inherently about racial discrimination. Recognizing it as an example of political action and not
merely an attempt at social improvement, acknowledges the lived experiences of racial
discrimination—something Arendt bore witness to in writing Rahel Varnhagen.
Additionally, Arendt was keen to point out Rahel’s privilege, yet did not apply the same
critical eye inward. In her correspondence with Ellison concerning the diversity of lived experiences
of Black Americans and the racial power dynamics involved in desegregation, Arendt admits to
Ellison that his frustration with her misunderstanding was “‘so entirely right, that I now see that I
simply didn’t understand the complexities of the situation.’”3 Kathryn Belle notes that while Arendt
admitted her misunderstanding in private to Ellison, she did not publicly retract her claims made in
“Reflections on Little Rock.” I do not intend to attack Arendt as a person here, but I do intend to
point out how her privileged position as a successful and famous scholar impeded her from publicly
admitting to her wrongheaded assessment of desegregation. Working from the nonideal version of
political action I have interpreted from Rahel Varnhagen and her underappreciated texts from the
1930s and 1940s, we can develop an account of political action that is mindful of how privilege and
power dynamics affect one’s ability to speak for others. More specifically, this approach warns

1 See footnote 14 in Chapter 1 for more on bell hooks’s personal story of desegregation and the harms it caused her by
removing her from a nurturing learning environment in an all-Black school.
2 Quoted in Danielle Allen, “Laws Necessary Forcefulness: Ralph Ellison vs. Hannah Arendt on the Battle of Little
Rock,” in Oklahoma City Law Review 26 (2001), 861. (857-859).
3
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against speaking for others from different social locations and advocates for a humble approach to
criticism coming from individuals from historically minoritized populations.
The final aspect of an improved Arendtian nonideal political action concerns epistemic
injustice. Rahel Varnhagen and many texts from the 1930s and 1940s address harms against Jews
whose concerns and desires were ignored. A nonideal account of the concept ought to be mindful
of epistemic injustices against individuals that deny their attempts at political action, namely through
speech. In “Reflections on Little Rock,” Arendt’s insistence that desegregation is a social, and not
political, issue already denies the political action of those like Eckford. Additionally, Arendt’s fight
for Jewish representation and self-advocacy in World War II ought to parallel our understanding of
desegregation. Just as she claims Jews ought to fight for their own survival and represent their own
interests, Black Americans ought to be afforded the same opportunities. In speaking for the interests
of a diverse population, which she was not a member, she impeded Black Americans from acting
and speaking on behalf of their own political interests.
“On Violence”
In addition to her contentious comments made in “Reflections on Little Rock,” Arendt’s
essay On Violence makes unmistakably anti-Black racist claims. Mirroring her earlier concern for
technological advancement and the desire to leave the earth in The Human Condition, Arendt revisits
how such advancement plays an active role in the rise of violence. Writing in the late 1960s, she sees
the current generation of college-age students as fearful of any possible future after having grown up
in a post-atomic world. She focuses her investigation into violence on the student movements and
riots occurring at the time of her writing. She draws a stark contrast between white “highly moral”
movements and Black student movements that were “clearly silly and outrageous.”4 In footnotes
4
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Arendt does not mince words when denouncing the Black student movements and what she deems
their desire to “lower academic standards.”5 One particular footnote expresses outrage at the call for
new and more inclusive classes, stating they are a mask for what she thinks is the real problem—lack
of ability and effort. She claims that what is “even more frightening is the all too likely prospect that,
in about five or ten years, this ‘education’ in Swahili…, African literature, and other nonexistent
subjects will be interpreted as another trap of the white man to prevent Negros from acquiring an
adequate education.”6 Here it is difficult to ignore Arendt’s arrogance, racism, and Eurocentrism.
She holds an idealized understanding of what a proper college education ought to entail, and with no
evidence or reference to entrance exams, assumes Black students need remedial training in math and
writing as opposed to “Swahili” (what better way to learn more about your native language than to
learn another!) and “African literature” (what better way to become a better writer than to read
literature!).
This text is the most explicit example of Arendt’s racism when it comes to Black student
learning and Africana studies. She is unaware of the possibility of what she considers literature
coming out of any African state or diaspora, dubious of the merits of Swahili as a language, and
critically judgmental of “soul courses” that might teach African or African American history, culture,
or politics. 7 In stark contrast to Arendt’s criticism of Black students and Black studies, she embraces
and encourages the white student movements fighting against the Vietnam war occurring
concurrently.

5

OV, 120.

6

OV, 192 n.viii.
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OV, 191.
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Arendt clearly demonstrates an anti-Black racism and preference for white educational
norms in this text. She vilifies and denies the political action of Black students, calling it
“nonpolitical action.”8 The violence that accompanies the Black Power movement and Black student
movements, according to Arendt, delegitimizes their actions as political. She claims that the
introduction of violence strips the movement of its relationship to speech and action in the way she
argues political action exists. As a result Arendt claims,
Serious violence entered the scene only with the appearance of the Black Power movement
on the campuses. Negro students, the majority of them admitted without academic
qualifications, regarded and organized themselves as an interest group, the representatives of
the black community. Their interest was to lower academic standards. They were more
cautious than the white rebels, but it was clear from the beginning...that violence with them
was not a matter of theory and rhetoric.9
This passage articulates Arendt’s two-fold analysis—she appears to analyze the strategic
development of community-based action and introduction of violence well, but she then wrongly
judges that strategy and disregards the organization as political. Additionally, Arendt cites that she
fears for the future of the university and its (white) standards because she argues that violence is
effective—administrators will bow to the pressure to introduce Africana studies and she thinks this
will be the end of the university’s integrity.
Arendt’s assessment of university integrity appears to stem in part from her involvement
with elite, research-focused institutions. In this sense, her understanding of a successfully rigorous
education is rooted in a white ideal of education that leaves no room for alternatives. This idealized
perception of education negatively affects her understanding of nonwhite students. While Arendt
also disregarded Black political action as action in “Reflections on Little Rock” by claiming

8

OV, 118 n.22.
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desegregation is a social concern, here she claims Black activism on college campuses is not political.
The implication is that it is social, but she does not even dignify the movement by considering its
social value. Her distain for the Black student movement is palpable.
If we return to Arendt’s arguments for a Jewish Army, we can see how her nonideal account
of political action can appropriately recognize the Black student movement’s merits and intentions.
As explained in the previous chapter, in the 1940s Arendt argues for a Jewish Army to join the
Allied powers in World War II. She is not interested in Jewish men merely joining the Allied armies.
Her argument is, instead, to allow Jews to fight specifically as Jews in a clearly designated Jewish
Army. Arendt’s argument occurs at the nonideal level because it recognizes how race and religion
ought to be acknowledged. Similarly, the Black student movement paralleled the Civil Rights
Revolutionary Action Movement.10 Ahmad claims that “from black working class struggles for
national democratic rights, black youth, especially in the South, began to relate to the [Civil Rights]
movement. Many were determined not to ‘wait’ for freedom.”11 Instead, Black students advocated
for their political rights and for improvements to their own education that included diverse
representation on campus. A college education based on white norms was not enough. They
advocated for an education that reflected their own history and culture. Put in Arendt’s terms, Black
students fought as Black students for Black representation in the classroom through increased
admission rates and a variety of Black studies courses. A nonideal approach to the Black Student
Movement recognizes the parallels between Arendt’s call for a Jewish Army and the call for diverse,
equitable, and inclusive educational environments.

10

Muhammad Ahmad, “On the Black Student Movement—1960-70,” The Black Scholar, 9 no. 8/9 (1978): 2-11.
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Limitations
The nonideal account of Arendtian political action developed in this dissertation, however,
was not intentionally theorized by Arendt. She did not knowingly advocate from a nonideal point of
view. Nor is it clear that she intentionally developed an ideal account of the concept in The Human
Condition. The previous section indicates how I interpret the nonideal account of Arendtian political
action to function when faced with her most racist arguments. With that being said, one of the
limitations of this dissertation is my imposed framework of interpretation. I use the ideal-nonideal
distinction in Arendt’s texts to work toward a multi-dimensional account of political action. Yet,
Arendt herself did not purposefully operate at these levels in different texts. My use of the
framework serves to interpret Arendt’s account of political action, not argue that she ought to have
recognized this framework. As a result, I believe that understanding when Arendt is theorizing at the
nonideal and ideal levels helps to identify moments when political action is inclusive or exclusive of
individuals from historically minoritized demographics.
Additionally, an argument can be made that Arendt’s theorization of political action in her
early works such as Rahel Varnhagen and her writings from the 1930s and 1940s are immature and
underdeveloped. Under this argument, it is untenable to consider earlier conceptions of political
action alongside her intentional development of the concept in The Human Condition. While I do not
profess to know Arendt’s rationale for moving toward an ideal theorization of political action later
on in her life, I do claim that the earlier version is valuable, even if it is underdeveloped. The arc of
this dissertation aims to make sense of Arendt’s racist assessment of the desegregation and the Black
student movement. If we are to only rely on The Human Condition, Arendt’s assessment is interpreted
as contradictory to political action—she merely failed to apply the concept to both white and Black
individuals. And while I think this is true, this dissertation aims to understand the contradiction, not
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merely name it. In returning to her earlier texts and interpreting a nonideal account of political
action, I have advanced a version of the concept that can and ought to apply to nonideal situations.
In other words, Arendt ought to have applied the nonideal version of political action to the nonideal
debates concerning desegregation and diversification efforts on college campuses. Instead, she
applied the ideal version to the nonideal events.
A final limitation of this dissertation is its scope. I have closely examined The Human
Condition, Rahel Varnhagen, and a selection of her essays and newspaper articles from the 1930s and
1940s. Yet, there are many more texts worth investigating. In particular, Arendt’s The Origins of
Totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem are two books which are rooted in historical events—the
origins, rise, and continued threat of totalitarianism and the trial of Adolf Eichmann. These two
texts appear to operate at the nonideal level by virtue of their subject matter, yet, similar to The
Human Condition, there are still ideal aspects of political action at play worth investigating.
Possibilities for Future Research
My final limitation noted above is a natural transition into future research using the idealnonideal framework in Arendt’s work. In order to further develop a theory of ideal Arendtian
political action and its shortcomings, I plan to turn to The Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in
Jerusalem. Because these texts concern historical circumstances I intend to examine if and how
Arendt idealizes political action when examining nonideal situations. Turning to these two texts
would further strengthen my interpretation of an idealized version of political action in The Human
Condition.
This dissertation has also opened up new possibilities to advance the scholarship at the
intersection of Arendt studies and Critical Philosophy of Race. In particular, expansion of my
attempt at an antiracist reading of Arendt can and ought to include aspects of her thought beyond
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political action. Possibilities include investigations into ideal and nonideal aspects of Arendt’s
thought on collective responsibility and freedom, as well as her assessment of the history of
philosophy.
A final consideration for future research can turn to Arendt’s vita contemplativa. This dissertation
focuses narrowly on action within the vita activa, or active life. Yet, Arendt’s philosophy of thinking,
willing, and judgement are ripe for an antiracist reading. As a next project, I intend to turn to Arendt’s
theory of judgment and its appropriation in feminist theories of universalism. While Linda Zerilli
claims Hannah Arendt’s theory of judgement promotes a universalist,12 as opposed to relativist,
feminism, I intend to develop an alternative account by juxtaposing Arendt’s Kantian-influenced
account of judgement with the decolonial feminist work of Serene Khader, María Lugones, Mariana
Ortega, and Linda Martín Alcoff. Similar to the present dissertation, this project is indebted to Kathryn
Sophia Belle’s final chapter in Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question which examines Arendt’s theory of
judgement. Not intending to be a comprehensive account of the racism inherent to Arendt’s theory
of judgement, Belle’s chapter instead opens up new lines of research at the intersection of Arendtian
judgment and philosophy of race. To further scholarship at this intersection and continue developing
an antiracist reading of Arendt, I intend to incorporate decolonial feminist theory in order to avoid
privileging white, female perspectives. Similar to this dissertation, this next project aims to further
develop tools to better understand the white-dominated field of Continental philosophy.
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